| People v Flagg |
| 2017 NY Slip Op 02901 [149 AD3d 513] |
| April 13, 2017 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Damon Flagg, Appellant. |
Robert S. Dean, Center for Appellate Litigation, New York (Sara Maeder of counsel), forappellant.
Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York (Alexander Michaels of counsel), forrespondent.
Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Carol Berkman, J.), rendered November 14,2012, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of criminal possession of a weapon in the secondand fourth degrees and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fourth degree, andsentencing him, as a second felony drug offender, to an aggregate term of eight years,unanimously affirmed.
The court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress statements he made beforereceiving Miranda warnings. When, in response to an officer's pedigree question as to hisaddress, defendant acknowledged he resided in the apartment where he was arrested and wherethe contraband at issue was found, warnings were not required because this routineadministrative question, which was part of a series of standard booking questions such as name,address, and so forth, was not designed to elicit an incriminating response (see Pennsylvaniav Muniz, 496 US 582, 601-602 [1990]; People v Rodney, 85 NY2d 289, 292-294[1995]; People v Watts, 309 AD2d 628 [1st Dept 2003], lv denied 1 NY3d 582[2003]), even if the answer was reasonably likely to be incriminating (see People v Alleyne, 34 AD3d367 [1st Dept 2006], lv denied 8 NY3d 918 [2007], cert denied 552 US 878[2007]). The People also met their burden of proving that defendant's other pre-Mirandastatements were spontaneous and not the product of any questioning or its equivalent, andthere is nothing to cast doubt on the statements' spontaneity. Defendant's claim that even if thestatements were otherwise spontaneous, they were the product of the allegedly inadmissiblepedigree statement is unpreserved, and we decline to review it in the interest of justice. As analternative holding, we find that the spontaneous statements were admissible irrespective of theadmissibility of the pedigree statement.
The verdict was based on legally sufficient evidence and was not against the weight of theevidence (see People v Danielson, 9NY3d 342, 348-349 [2007]). There is no basis for disturbing the jury's credibilitydeterminations. When viewed as a whole, the evidence, including, among other things,defendant's undisputedly admissible post-Miranda admissions, amply connected him withall of the contraband at issue. We have considered and rejected defendant's remaining argumentson the sufficiency and weight of the evidence.
Defendant's challenges to the prosecutor's summation are entirely unpreserved becausedefendant failed to object, made only unspecified generalized objections or failed to complainthat the court's curative actions were inadequate (see People v Romero, 7 NY3d 911, 912 [2006]), and we decline toreview them in the interest of justice. As an alternative holding, we find no basis for reversal(see People v Overlee, 236 AD2d 133 [1st Dept 1997], lv denied 91 NY2d 976[1998]; People v D'Alessandro, 184 AD2d 114, 118-119 [1st Dept 1992], lvdenied 81 NY2d 884 [1993]).
Based on our in camera review of the minutes of the hearing conducted pursuant toPeople v Darden (34 NY2d 177 [1974]), we find that there was probable cause for theissuance of the search warrant and that there was no violation of Brady v Maryland (373US 83 [1963]).
We perceive no basis for reducing the sentence. Concur—Acosta, J.P., Renwick,Manzanet-Daniels, Kapnick and Webber, JJ.