| DLJ Mtge. Capital, Inc. v Pittman |
| 2017 NY Slip Op 03730 [150 AD3d 818] |
| May 10, 2017 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| DLJ Mortgage Capital, Inc., Respondent, v BerthaPittman, Also Known as Bertha Mae Pittman, et al., Defendants, and Vista Holding, Inc.,Appellant. |
Warner & Scheuerman, New York, NY (Jonathon D. Warner of counsel), forappellant.
Hogan Lovells US LLP, New York, NY (David Dunn, Chava Brandriss, and Richard A.Sillett of counsel), for respondent.
In an action to foreclose a mortgage, the defendant Vista Holding, Inc., appeals, as limited byits brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Silber, J.), datedSeptember 8, 2014, as denied those branches of its motion which were pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) (3) and (5) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it.
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
On October 24, 2001, the defendant Bertha Pittman, also known as Bertha Mae Pittman, thenthe owner of the subject property, executed a note and mortgage in favor of the defendantD&M Financial Corp. (hereinafter D&M). In August 2002, Pittman defaulted inmaking her mortgage payments. Thereafter, the defendant Vista Holding, Inc. (hereinafter theappellant), obtained title to the subject property.
After a prior action to foreclose the mortgage was dismissed for lack of standing, the plaintiffcommenced the instant action to foreclose the mortgage, alleging that it was the owner andholder of the note and mortgage. The appellant moved, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (3)and (5) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it, arguing that the plaintiff lackedstanding, and that the action was time-barred. The Supreme Court denied those branches of theappellant's motion.
The Supreme Court properly determined that the action was not time-barred. Contrary to theappellant's contention, an affidavit made in support of a motion for an order of reference in theprior action, which the plaintiff in that action lacked standing to commence, did not, under thecircumstances of this case, constitute an affirmative action evidencing the exercise of the optionto accelerate the maturity of the loan (see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Burke, 94 AD3d 980 [2012]; EMC Mtge. Corp. v Suarez, 49 AD3d592, 593 [2008]).
The Supreme Court also properly denied that branch of the appellant's motion which was todismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it for lack of standing. A plaintiff [*2]establishes its standing in a mortgage foreclosure action bydemonstrating that, when the action was commenced, it was either the holder of, or the assigneeof, the underlying note (see LGFHoldings, LLC v Skydel, 139 AD3d 814 [2016]; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Rooney, 132 AD3d 980, 981 [2015])."Either a written assignment of the underlying note or the physical delivery of the note prior tothe commencement of the foreclosure action is sufficient to transfer the obligation, and themortgage passes with the debt as an inseparable incident" (U.S. Bank, N.A. v Collymore, 68 AD3d 752, 754 [2009]; seeLGF Holdings, LLC v Skydel, 139 AD3d at 814; Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams. v Vitellas, 131 AD3d 52, 59[2015]).
Here, the complaint alleged that the plaintiff had standing based on a series of assignments ofthe note. Specifically, the note was assigned by D&M, the original mortgagee, to FairbanksCapital Corp. (hereinafter Fairbanks). A second assignment from Fairbanks to U.S. BankNational Association, as trustee for Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.Mortgage Pass-Thru Certificates, Series 2004-AR6 (hereinafter US Bank), was executed byWells Fargo Bank, N.A. (hereinafter Wells Fargo), "as attorney-in-fact" for Fairbanks. WellsFargo, as attorney-in-fact for US Bank, then executed a third assignment, from US Bank to theplaintiff.
On a defendant's motion to dismiss a complaint based upon the plaintiff's alleged lack ofstanding, "the burden is on the moving defendant to establish, prima facie, the plaintiff's lack ofstanding" as a matter of law (Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams. v Vitellas, 131 AD3d at 59;see New York Community Bank vMcClendon, 138 AD3d 805, 806 [2016]; Arch Bay Holdings, LLC-Series 2010B v Smith, 136 AD3d 719[2016]). Here, the appellant failed to meet that burden, since it merely demonstrated the existenceof questions of fact as to Wells Fargo's authority to assign the note on behalf of Fairbanks, bypointing to the plaintiff's failure to attach a power of attorney to the complaint along with theassignment and asserting that no such document was recorded. Although the plaintiff willultimately be required to demonstrate that Wells Fargo had authority to assign the note on behalfof Fairbanks in order to demonstrate its standing on the basis of the written assignments (see Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. vHaller, 100 AD3d 680, 683 [2012]; Bank of N.Y. v Silverberg, 86 AD3d 274, 281-283 [2011]; Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v Weisblum,85 AD3d 95, 109 [2011]), the appellant was not entitled to dismissal of the complaint basedon lack of standing (see HSBC BankUSA, N.A. v Lewis, 134 AD3d 764, 765 [2015]).
Contrary to the appellant's further contention, the language of the assignments was" 'broad enough to transfer the interest in the mortgage as well as the underlyingdebt' " (Deutsche Bank Natl.Trust Co. v Romano, 147 AD3d 1021, 1023 [2017], quoting Chase Home Fin., LLC v Miciotta, 101AD3d 1307, 1307-1308 [2012]).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied those branches of the appellant's motionwhich were pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (3) and (5) to dismiss the complaint insofar as assertedagainst it. Mastro, J.P., Leventhal, Hall and Sgroi, JJ., concur. [Prior Case History: 2014 NYSlip Op 32426(U).]