| People v Brown |
| 2017 NY Slip Op 03765 [150 AD3d 871] |
| May 10, 2017 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v David Brown, Appellant. |
Steven A. Feldman, Uniondale, NY (Arza Feldman of counsel), for appellant.
Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, NY (John M. Castellano, JohnnetteTraill, Joseph N. Ferdenzi, and Merri Turk Lasky of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Lewis, J.),rendered October 27, 2015, convicting him of criminal possession of a weapon in the seconddegree (four counts) and conspiracy in the fourth degree, after a nonjury trial, and imposingsentence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The Supreme Court properly denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment on theground that he was deprived of his statutory right to a speedy trial (see CPL 30.30). Infelony cases, the People are required to be ready for trial within six months after thecommencement of the criminal action (see CPL 30.30 [1] [a]). Contrary to thedefendant's contention, the period of time in question, 55 days, during which one of the witnesseswas unavailable due to his illness and a recommendation from his doctor that he not travel toNew York, was excludable as an exceptional circumstance (see CPL 30.30 [4] [g] [i];People v Zirpola, 57 NY2d 706, 708 [1982]; People v Alcequier, 15 AD3d 162, 163 [2005]; People vMcLeod, 281 AD2d 325, 327 [2001]; People v Celestino, 201 AD2d 91, 95 [1994];cf. People v Stanley, 275 AD2d 423 [2000]).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People vContes, 60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish thedefendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conductan independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15 [5]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342[2007]), we nevertheless accord great deference to the fact-finder's opportunity to view thewitnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383,410 [2004]; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). Upon reviewing the recordhere, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633[2006]).
The Supreme Court's Sandoval ruling (see People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371,376-377 [1974]) constituted a proper exercise of discretion, and did not deprive the defendant ofthe right [*2]to testify on his own behalf (see People v Smith, 18 NY3d 588,594 [2012]; People v Hayes, 97 NY2d 203, 207-208 [2002]; People v Manigat, 136 AD3d 614,615 [2016]; People v White, 60AD3d 1095, 1096 [2009]; People vMcLaurin, 33 AD3d 819, 820 [2006]).
The defendant's remaining contention is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL470.05 [2]; People v Brown, 262 AD2d 328, 329 [1999]) and, in any event, withoutmerit. Balkin, J.P., Cohen, Hinds-Radix and Maltese, JJ., concur.