Matter of Ernest V. v State of New York
2017 NY Slip Op 03818 [150 AD3d 1434]
May 11, 2017
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, June 28, 2017


[*1]
 In the Matter of Ernest V., Appellant,
v
State of NewYork, Respondent.

Sheila E. Shea, Mental Hygiene Legal Service, Ogdensburg (Matthew Bliss of counsel), forappellant.

Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Frank Brady of counsel), forrespondent.

Egan Jr., J. Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Buchanan, J.), entered October 19,2015 in St. Lawrence County, which dismissed petitioner's application, in a proceeding pursuantto Mental Hygiene Law article 10, for his discharge from confinement at a secure treatmentfacility.

Petitioner was convicted of his first sex offense—sexual abuse in the firstdegree—in 1982; at the time of the underlying offense, petitioner was 15 years old and hisvictim was five years old. While that charge was pending, petitioner lured another five-year-oldgirl from her porch by offering to take her to a local park. Rather than going to the park,petitioner (then 17 years old) brought the child to his home and tied her—partially clothedand spread-eagle—to his bed. When law enforcement arrived, petitioner lowered the childby rope from his bedroom window to the ground below. As a result of this incident, petitionerpleaded guilty to kidnapping in the second degree and was sentenced to a prison term of 4 to 12years. Petitioner was released to parole supervision in 1991 but, in 1994, he was charged withviolating the conditions of his release by allegedly having sexual contact with a three-year-oldchild. Although criminal charges apparently were not pursued, petitioner was found to haveviolated parole and was returned to prison, where he was held to his maximum expiration date.Finally, in 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to rape in the second degree and was sentenced to aprison term of 2 to 6 years. The victim in this most recent offense was petitioner's 12-year-oldniece, whom he described as "mentally handicapped." In addition to the noted convictions,petitioner also admitted to sexually offending against an additional 25 to 30 victims—allof whom were five years old.

[*2] As petitioner'sconditional release date for the rape conviction approached, respondent filed a petition underMental Hygiene Law article 10—alleging that petitioner was a sex offender requiring civilmanagement (see Mental Hygiene Law § 10.06 [a]). In response, petitioneradmitted that he suffers from a mental abnormality and consented to a finding that he is adangerous sex offender requiring confinement at a secure treatment facility. In February 2015,petitioner challenged his continued confinement (see Mental Hygiene Law§ 10.09) and, following a hearing at which respondent's expert was the sole witness,Supreme Court (Demarest, J.) found that respondent established, by clear and convincingevidence, that petitioner remained a dangerous sex offender requiring confinement.

In July 2015, petitioner commenced the instant proceeding contending that a newdetermination was warranted—citing a recent evaluation by his own expert, wherein theexpert concluded that, while petitioner still suffered from a mental abnormality, he no longer wasa dangerous sex offender requiring confinement and, instead, could be released into thecommunity under strict and intense supervision and treatment. A hearing ensued in October 2015and, at the conclusion thereof, Supreme Court (Buchanan, J.), by order entered October 19, 2015,dismissed petitioner's application, finding that petitioner was a dangerous sex offender requiringconfinement. This appeal by petitioner ensued.

Shortly before oral argument of this appeal, we were advised that petitioner once again hadchallenged his confinement and that, following a hearing, Supreme Court (Farley, J.) rendered anorder, dated February 17, 2017, finding that petitioner was a dangerous sex offender requiringconfinement. Respondent now argues that the issuance of the February 2017 order continuingpetitioner's confinement renders petitioner's challenge to the October 2015 order of confinementmoot. We agree (see Matter of Martinekv State of New York, 108 AD3d 1048, 1049 [2013]). Unlike the petitioner in Matter of State of New York v MichaelM. (24 NY3d 649 [2014]), petitioner's status here, i.e., confinement to a secure facility,did not change between—or as a result of—the October 2015 and February 2017orders. Accordingly, petitioner's appeal from the October 2015 order has been rendered moot bythe issuance of the subsequent February 2017 order (compare id. at 657). Petitioner doesnot argue that this matter falls within the exception to the mootness doctrine (see Matter ofHearst Corp. v Clyne, 50 NY2d 707, 714-715 [1980]) and, under the particular facts of thiscase, we discern no basis upon which to invoke such exception. Notably, petitioner could haveavoided the mootness issue by "stay[ing] all future annual review proceedings pending thisappeal" (Matter of Holmes v State ofNew York, 125 AD3d 1306, 1306 [2015]).

McCarthy, J.P., Garry, Rose and Mulvey, JJ., concur. Ordered that the appeal is dismissed, asmoot, without costs.


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