| People v Lambert |
| 2017 NY Slip Op 04326 [151 AD3d 1119] |
| June 1, 2017 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v CollinLambert, Appellant. |
G. Scott Walling, Schenectady, for appellant.
D. Holley Carnright, District Attorney, Kingston (Joan Gudesblatt Lamb of counsel), forrespondent.
Clark, J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Ulster County (Williams Jr., J.),rendered October 14, 2014, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime of robberyin the third degree (two counts).
Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant waived indictment and pleaded guilty to two countsof robbery in the third degree as charged in a superior court information. During the pleaallocution, defendant admitted that he committed armed robberies of two banks in Ulster Countyon separate dates, during which he forcibly stole money. As part of the agreement, defendant wasrequired to waive his right to appeal. Consistent with the plea agreement, County Court imposedupon defendant, as an admitted second felony offender, the promised prison sentence of 3 to 6years on each count, to be served consecutively, and ordered that he pay restitution. Defendantappeals.
We affirm. Initially, we are unpersuaded by defendant's contention that his waiver of theright to appeal is invalid. Contrary to defendant's assertions, County Court explained during theplea colloquy that defendant would ordinarily retain the right to appeal, as well as the meaning ofthe appeal waiver that was required as a term of the plea agreement, and made clear that the rightto appeal is separate and distinct from the trial-related rights that he automatically forfeited by hisguilty plea (see People v Cuomo,144 AD3d 1266, 1267 [2016]; People v Toledo, 144 AD3d 1332, 1332-1333 [2016], lvdenied 29 NY3d 1001 [Apr. 6, 2017]). Defendant stated [*2]that he understood and agreed to waive his right to appeal, and thensigned a detailed written waiver of appeal in open court after reviewing it with counsel andindicating that he had no questions about it. Both the oral and the written waivers specified thathe would not be permitted to challenge the sentence as harsh and excessive. Consequently, thecourt ascertained that defendant, who was 49 years old and had extensive experience with thecriminal justice system, appreciated the consequences of the appeal waiver, thereby establishingthat the waiver was knowing, voluntary and intelligent (see People v Sanders, 25 NY3d 337, 340-341 [2015]; People v Griffin, 134 AD3d 1228,1229 [2015], lv denied 27 NY3d 1132 [2016]). Inasmuch as defendant's waiver of hisright to appeal was valid, we are precluded from addressing his further contention that hissentence was harsh and excessive (seePeople v Lopez, 6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006]; People v Toledo, 144 AD3d at1332).
McCarthy, J.P., Egan Jr., Lynch and Devine, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isaffirmed.