People v Rousaw
2017 NY Slip Op 04499 [151 AD3d 1179]
June 8, 2017
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, August 2, 2017


[*1]
 The People of the State of New York,Appellant,
v
Gary Rousaw, Respondent.

Mary E. Rain, District Attorney, Canton (Peter F. Stroe of counsel), for appellant.

Susan Patnode, Rural Law Center of New York, Castleton (Cynthia Feathers of counsel), forrespondent.

Devine, J. Appeal from an order of the County Court of St. Lawrence County (Richards, J.),entered October 3, 2014, which granted defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment.

By several instruments dated December 12, 2013, defendant was charged with offensesstemming from his alleged molestation of two young girls. He was arraigned the next day, andthe matter was eventually held for action of the grand jury and divested to County Court. Incontemplation of plea negotiations, defense counsel advised the People in a January 21, 2014letter that defendant was waiving his right to be released under CPL 190.80 until further writtennotice. The letter made no mention of defendant's statutory right to a speedy trial (seeCPL 30.30).

Defense counsel then wrote an April 3, 2014 letter that revoked "both [defendant's] speedytrial waiver . . . and his right to be released under CPL 190.80," with thoserevocations taking effect on April 17, 2014. A grand jury handed up an indictment chargingdefendant with two counts of sexual abuse in the first degree on August 7, 2014 and, four dayslater, the People declared that they were ready for trial. Defendant, who was represented by newcounsel by this point, moved to, among other things, dismiss the indictment upon the ground thathis statutory right to a speedy trial had been violated. County Court agreed and dismissed theindictment, prompting this appeal by the People.

The People are obliged to declare their readiness for a felony trial within six months of thecommencement of a criminal action, a period that is "determined by computing the time [*2]elapsed between the filing of the first accusatory instrument and thePeople's declaration of readiness, subtracting any periods of delay that are excludable under theterms of the statute and then adding to the result any postreadiness periods of delay that areactually attributable to the People and are ineligible for an exclusion" (People v Cortes,80 NY2d 201, 208 [1992]; see CPL 30.30 [1] [a]; People v Scaringe, 137 AD3d 1409, 1410 [2016], lv denied28 NY3d 936 [2016]). The six-month period here began to run upon filing of the instruments onDecember 12, 2013. The People declared readiness for trial in a notice served upon defendantand County Court on August 11, 2014, approximately eight months later.

Defense counsel averred, having discussed the matter with defendant, that defendant did notwaive his speedy trial rights at any point during those eight months (see CPL 210.45 [1]).This was sufficient to shift the burden to the People to show that any delay beyond the statutorymaximum should be excluded (seePeople v Barden, 27 NY3d 550, 553 [2016]; People v Scaringe, 137 AD3d at1411). The People endeavored to do so by averring that prior defense counsel had orally waivedspeedy trial protections from December 13, 2013 to April 17, 2014 in order to engage in pleanegotiations. The People supported that claim by reference to the January 2014 letter waivingCPL 190.80 protections and, more importantly, the April 2014 letter revoking both that waiverand a speedy trial waiver. Defense counsel downplayed the speedy trial language in the April2014 letter as having been inserted in error, noted the absence of any proof that a speedy trialwaiver had been put in place to begin with, and reiterated that the waiver "was never made."

By revoking a waiver of defendant's statutory speedy trial right in his April 2014 letter, priordefense counsel unambiguously and explicitly acknowledged the existence of the waiver itself,and that acknowledgment did not need to be contemporaneous with the waiver to show itsvalidity (see People v Waldron, 6NY3d 463, 469 [2006]). That being said, the record contains no other proof of a speedy trialwaiver and notably omits the sworn statements of defendant and his prior counsel, leaving itentirely plausible that prior defense counsel included the speedy trial language in the April 2014letter in error. The People accordingly "show[ed] that there is a factual dispute" in response todefendant's claims (People v Santos, 68 NY2d 859, 861 [1986]), but neither they nordefendant "conclusively" established an entitlement to success on the merits (CPL 210.45 [4] [c];[5] [c]). Thus, County Court erred in granting the motion without conducting a hearing, and weremit so that it may do so (see CPL 210.45 [6]; People v Berkowitz, 50 NY2d333, 349 [1980]; People v Allard,113 AD3d 624, 626 [2014]; People v Smith, 245 AD2d 534, 534 [1997]).

McCarthy, J.P., Egan Jr., Rose and Clark, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is reversed, onthe law, and matter remitted to the County Court of St. Lawrence County for further proceedingsnot inconsistent with this Court's decision.


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