| Matter of Mancini v Office of Children & Family Servs. |
| 2017 NY Slip Op 05284 [151 AD3d 1494] |
| June 29, 2017 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| In the Matter of the Claim of Steven G. Mancini,Respondent-Appellant, v Office of Children and Family Services et al.,Appellants-Respondents. Workers' Compensation Board,Respondent. |
William O'Brien, State Insurance Fund, Albany (Edward Obertubbesing of counsel), forappellants-respondents.
Mraz & Gaud, PLLC, Albany (Amina Karic of counsel), for respondent-appellant.
Garry, J.P. Cross appeal from a decision of the Workers' Compensation Board, filed August11, 2015, which ruled, among other things, that claimant was entitled to workers' compensationbenefits pursuant to Workers' Compensation Law § 15 (3) (v).
Claimant, a youth division aide at a juvenile facility for incarcerated youths, established awork-related injury to his left shoulder and left hip and was awarded workers' compensationbenefits. In 2009, claimant was found to have a permanent partial disability with a 50% scheduleloss of use of his left arm and was awarded workers' compensation benefits through June 4, 2011.Following the exhaustion of those benefits, claimant, who participated in a vocationalrehabilitation program and became employed as a security officer, sought entitlement toadditional compensation for impairment of wage-earning capacity pursuant to Workers'Compensation Law § 15 (3) (v). Following a hearing, a Workers' CompensationLaw Judge (hereinafter WCLJ) ruled that claimant was entitled to additional compensation andthat the award was not subject to the durational limitations of Workers' Compensation Law§ 15 (3) (w). The Workers' Compensation [*2]Board, by decision filed April 18, 2014, modified the WCLJ'sdecision by finding that the additional compensation award pursuant to Workers' CompensationLaw § 15 (3) (v) was subject to the durational limitations set forth in Workers'Compensation Law § 15 (3) (w). Claimant's subsequent application forreconsideration and/or full Board review was denied.
Following a hearing on July 21, 2014 to determine claimant's loss of wage-earning capacityand the number of weeks that benefits would be available, the WCLJ ruled that claimant had a37.5% loss of wage-earning capacity entitling him to 275 weeks of benefits as of June 4, 2011,which is the date that the schedule loss of use award ended. By decision filed August 11, 2015,the Board modified that decision, finding that the effective date of loss of wage-earning capacitybenefits was the date of the loss of wage-earning capacity finding, and thus, here, was at theconclusion of the July 21, 2014 hearing. This cross appeal ensued.
Claimant contends that the Board erred in finding that additional compensation benefitsawarded pursuant to Workers' Compensation Law § 15 (3) (v) are subject to thedurational limits set forth in Workers' Compensation Law § 15 (3) (w). Workers'Compensation Law § 15 (3) (v) provides that additional compensation shall bepayable for impairment of wage-earning capacity following termination of a scheduled award forthe loss of 50% or more of a specified body member, provided such impairment of earningcapacity is due solely to the established injury. The legislative purpose was to provide additionalcompensation for the most serious of the schedule awards, specifically the loss of an arm, hand,leg or foot, so as to be comparable to the forms of permanent partial disability (seeGovernor's Program Bill at 1-2, Bill Jacket L 1970, ch 286). Workers' Compensation Law§ 15 (3) (v) thus specifically provides that determination of such additionalcompensation "shall be . . . in accordance with paragraph w of thissubdivision."
Workers' Compensation Law § 15 (3) (w) pertains to all other cases ofpermanent partial disability not subject to a schedule award. The Legislature amended thatprovision as part of a comprehensive reform in 2007. "The amendment . . . cappedthe number of weeks that a person is eligible to receive benefits for a non-schedule permanentpartial disability" (Matter of Raynor vLandmark Chrysler, 18 NY3d 48, 54 [2011], citing L 2007, ch 6, § 4)."Prior to the amendment, a permanently partially disabled worker was able to receive benefits forlife" (Matter of Raynor v Landmark Chrysler, 18 NY3d at 54, citing Workers'Compensation Law former § 15 [3] [w]).
"Although this matter presents an issue of pure statutory interpretation and, as such, requiresno deference to the Board's interpretation of [the two provisions of Workers' Compensation Law§ 15 (3)], we nonetheless must determine whether the Board's interpretation of thatstatute indeed is rational" (Matter ofCrisman v Marsh & McLennan Cos., 6 AD3d 899, 900 [2004] [citations omitted]).Contrary to claimant's contention, Workers' Compensation Law § 15 (3) (v) doesnot direct that only the amount of money payable shall be determined in accord with theprovisions of Workers' Compensation Law § 15 (3) (w); the statutory language doesnot prohibit application of that latter provision to the durational period of benefit payments.Absent a statutory qualification limiting the applicability of Workers' Compensation Law§ 15 (3) (w) in determining additional compensation pursuant to Workers'Compensation Law § 15 (3) (v), we find that the Board's decision represents arational interpretation and application of the relevant statute, and we will not disturb it (see Matter of Catapano v Jow, Inc., 91AD3d 1018, 1018-1019 [2012], lv denied 19 NY3d 809 [2012]; Matter ofCrisman v Marsh & McLennan Cos., 6 AD3d at 900-901).
Next, we are unpersuaded by the contention of the employer and its workers' compensationcarrier that the Board's determination regarding the effective date of the durational [*3]limits—July 21, 2014—was arbitrary and capriciousand without a rational basis. As set forth above, Workers' Compensation Law § 15(3) (v) authorizes additional compensation for certain permanent partial disabilities following thetermination of the scheduled award, which is calculated in accordance with Workers'Compensation Law § 15 (3) (w) to determine the amount and duration inconsideration of a claimant's loss of wage-earning capacity. We find this matter distinguishablefrom the administrative decisions relied upon by the employer and its carrier. Here, claimant wasalready classified in 2009 with a permanent partial disability and received schedule loss of usebenefits. Claimant reopened his claim and received reduced earnings from June 4, 2011 throughJuly 21, 2014. Given that the additional compensation is sought pursuant to Workers'Compensation Law § 15 (3) (v), we do not find the Board's determination as to theeffective date of the durational limits to be irrational and it therefore will not be disturbed.
Egan Jr., Lynch, Clark and Aarons, JJ., concur. Ordered that the decision is affirmed, withoutcosts.