| People v Steigler |
| 2017 NY Slip Op 05879 [152 AD3d 1083] |
[*1]
| 1 The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Dillon R.Steigler, Appellant. |
Randolph V. Kruman, Cortland, for appellant.
Stephen K. Cornwell Jr., District Attorney, Binghamton (Stephen Ferri of counsel), forrespondent.
Mulvey, J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Tioga County (Keene, J.),rendered October 27, 2015, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime ofattempted robbery in the second degree.
Defendant was charged by indictment with the crimes of robbery in the second degree,assault in the second degree and grand larceny in the fourth degree stemming from allegationsthat he stole the victim's purse while she was walking in the Village of Owego, Tioga County.Defendant moved, among other things, to suppress his signed, written statement to police.Following a Huntley hearing, County Court found that defendant had been read andvoluntarily waived his Miranda rights prior to giving his statement, and the courttherefore denied his motion to suppress it. Defendant subsequently pleaded guilty to attemptedrobbery in the second degree, and County Court sentenced him as a second felony offender tofive years in prison followed by five years of postrelease supervision. Defendant nowappeals.
We affirm. Defendant's sole contention on appeal is that County Court erred when itdetermined that his written statement to police was preceded by a voluntary waiver ofMiranda warnings and was legally obtained. On defendant's motion, the People had theburden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant's statement to police was voluntarilygiven, "including that any custodial interrogation was preceded by the administration anddefendant's knowing waiver of his Miranda rights" (People v Nadal, 131 AD3d 729, 730 [2015] [internal quotation[*2]marks and citations omitted], lv denied 26 NY3d1041 [2015]). "Determining whether a statement is voluntary is a factual issue governed by thetotality of the circumstances and the credibility assessments of the suppression court in makingthat determination are entitled to deference" (People v Mattis, 108 AD3d 872, 874 [2013] [internal quotationmarks, brackets and citations omitted], lv denied 22 NY3d 957 [2013]). "If the Peoplemeet their burden, the defendant then bears the burden of persuasion" (People v Newell, 148 AD3d 1216,1218 [2017] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lv denied 29 NY3d 1035[2017]).
At the Huntley hearing, the Village of Owego police officer who conducted theinterrogation testified about the events of the night in question, including the circumstance underwhich defendant waived his rights and signed the written statement. According to the officer,defendant was arrested and in custody prior to being transported to the police department. Theofficer testified that, before he questioned defendant and composed the written statement fordefendant to sign, he read defendant his rights from the police department's Mirandawarnings form. To the left of each warning on that form is a space for the suspect to initial thathe or she received and understood each respective warning. The officer recounted that he readeach warning to defendant, who then placed his initials in the spaces provided and signed thebottom of the form, acknowledging that he understood his rights and agreed to answer questionswithout an attorney present. The officer questioned defendant regarding the events that eveningand composed a written statement that detailed defendant's account of his participation in therobbery, which defendant then signed. The officer testified that no threats or promises were madeto defendant to induce him into signing the waiver and statement. On cross-examination,defendant pointed out apparent discrepancies in the time line to which the officer testified andsought to undermine his credibility with regard to his past employment in law enforcement.Defendant did not testify or call other witnesses.
County Court credited the officer's testimony and, according due deference to thatdetermination and given the totality of the circumstances, we find that defendant was advised asto, and validly waived, his constitutional rights (see People v Nadal, 131 AD3d at 730).The record does not indicate that the officer's testimony was "patently tailored to avoid anyconstitutional objections" (People v Keith, 240 AD2d 967, 968 [1997], lv denied90 NY2d 906 [1997]). Accordingly, the motion to suppress defendant's statement was properlydenied.
Peters, P.J., Rose, Aarons and Pritzker, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isaffirmed.