Matter of New Cingular Wireless PCS, LLC v Tax Appeals Trib. of theState of N.Y.
2017 NY Slip Op 06010 [153 AD3d 976]
August 3, 2017
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, September 27, 2017


[*1]
 In the Matter of New Cingular Wireless PCS, LLC,Petitioner,
v
Tax Appeals Tribunal of the State of New York et al.,Respondents.

Wilson Law Group LLC, Somerville, New Jersey (Margaret C. Wilson of counsel), forpetitioner.

Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Robert M. Goldfarb of counsel), forCommissioner of Taxation and Finance, respondent.

Egan Jr., J. Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (initiated in this Court pursuant to TaxLaw § 2016) to review, among other things, a determination of respondent TaxAppeals Tribunal denying petitioner's request for certain refunds of sales and use tax imposedunder Tax Law articles 28 and 29.

Petitioner is a limited liability company that, among other things, provides Internet accessservices to its customers nationwide. Between November 2005 and September 2010, petitionererroneously billed and collected sales tax from its customers for such services, and those taxes, inturn, were remitted to the Department of Taxation and Finance. In 2009, 54 separate class actionlawsuits were filed on behalf of petitioner's customers in 44 states, alleging that petitionerimproperly had charged them taxes for Internet access service, and those actions subsequentlywere consolidated in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.Thereafter, in June 2011, the federal court approved a global settlement agreement betweenpetitioner and a national settlement class with state-specific subclasses, including a New Yorksubclass, consisting of current and former customers who had paid taxes for Internet accessservice during the period at issue.

For taxing jurisdictions like New York, the settlement agreement required petitioner to [*2]file a refund claim on behalf of its impactedcustomers—subject to each individual state's own laws relative to refunds or refundprocedures (In re AT & T Mobility Wireless Data Servs. Sales Tax Litig., 789 FSupp 2d 935, 983 [ND Ill 2011]). By the express terms of the settlement agreement, eachsettlement class member consented to (1) petitioner filing a claim for refund of the Internetaccess taxes erroneously collected, (2) payment of the refund by the taxing authority to petitioneror directly to the court's escrow account, and (3) the distribution of the net settlement funds to thecustomers by the escrow agent under the supervision of the court. Consistent with the terms ofthe settlement agreement, petitioner assigned all of its rights, title and interest in any refund itreceived to the settlement class customers. To the extent that a specific taxing authority requiredpetitioner to refund the erroneously collected taxes to the affected customers prior to suchauthority granting or paying a refund claim, the settlement agreement provided that the paymentby petitioner of a sum representing such taxes into a pre-refund escrow account would constituterepayment thereof.[FN1]

In November 2010, petitioner submitted a claim for a refund of sales tax or credit. Petitionertwice modified the amount of its claim—ultimately seeking a refund of approximately$106 million. There is no dispute that, as of the point in time that petitioner submitted its claimfor a refund, petitioner had not funded any escrow account, including the pre-refund escrowaccount referenced in the settlement agreement.[FN2] Thereafter, in August 2012, the Division ofTaxation denied petitioner's refund claim, finding that petitioner had failed to reimburse itscustomers for the sales tax collected and, further, that the supporting documentation tendered bypetitioner was insufficient to permit the Division "to determine how the refund amounts shownfor each customer were determined."

Following the Division's denial of petitioner's refund claim, petitioner and the settlementclass entered into a "clarifying" agreement dated September 9, 2013, which provided, in relevantpart, that any payments made by petitioner to either the New York escrow account or thepre-refund escrow account would be considered as payments made to the settlement class, thatthe funds so deposited would be used to make refunds and, further, that such funds would beconsidered as refunds to the settlement class at the moment they were deposited into suchaccounts. Consistent with the terms of the clarifying agreement, petitioner was prepared to makethe required deposit if the Division would concede that such deposit would satisfy the [*3]requirements of Tax Law § 1139 (a).

In October 2012, petitioner filed a petition contesting the denial of its refund claim. TheDivision moved for summary determination contending, among other things, that petitioner wasnot entitled to the requested refund due to its failure to refund the erroneously collected taxes toits customers. Petitioner opposed the Division's motion and cross-moved for partial summarydetermination. By determination dated July 17, 2014, an Administrative Law Judge (hereinafterALJ) granted the Division's motion, finding, among other things, that the plain language of TaxLaw § 1139 (a) and 20 NYCRR 534.2 required petitioner to repay the erroneouslycollected taxes to its customers before it could apply for a refund. Petitioner thereafter sought toreopen the record pursuant to 20 NYCRR 3000.16, which vests an ALJ with discretion to reopenthe record based upon, among other things, newly discovered evidence. Petitioner's motion wassupported by an affidavit indicating that, as of August 14, 2014, petitioner—in accordancewith the terms of the global settlement agreement—had entered into an escrow agreementand funded a pre-refund escrow account in the amount of $106,038,598.59. By order datedDecember 4, 2014, the ALJ denied petitioner's motion, finding that the subject affidavit did notconstitute newly discovered evidence.

Petitioner filed exceptions to both the ALJ's July 2014 decision in favor of the Division andthe denial of its motion to reopen the record. Respondent Tax Appeals Tribunal heard oralargument in this matter in August 2015 and, in February 2016, affirmed the ALJ's July 2014decision and upheld the denial of petitioner's motion to reopen the record.[FN3] Petitioner then commenced thisCPLR article 78 proceeding to challenge the Tribunal's determination.

With respect to petitioner's application to reopen the record, the parties debate whether theaffidavit attesting to the funding of the pre-refund escrow account in August 2014 constitutesnewly discovered evidence or newly created evidence and, as to the merits of petitioner's refundapplication, argue over, among other things, whether petitioner had to repay its customers beforeseeking a refund from the Division. However, in their zeal to advance their competinginterpretations of Tax Law § 1139 (a) and the corresponding regulations, the partiesappear to have lost sight of one salient fact—namely, that petitioner's customers are owedin excess of $106 million—moneys that were erroneously collected by petitioner in theform of taxes over a five-year period, moneys that now—some 7 to 12 yearslater—are being held by the Division and moneys that, quite simply, neither petitioner northe Division are entitled to retain.

Regardless of the interpretation ultimately to be accorded to Tax Law § 1139(a), there is no question that the ALJ properly denied petitioner's refund claim in July 2014because, as of that point in time, petitioner admittedly had made no effort to repay—in anyway, shape or form—the $106 million due and owing to its customers. Petitioner had notdirectly remitted such funds to its customers out of its own pocket, nor had it—consistentwith the terms of the global settlement agreement—funded any escrow account for thatpurpose. Whatever petitioner's [*4]underlying rationale forproceeding in this fashion may have been, the fact remains that petitioner had not "repaid" theerroneously collected taxes—as of July 2014—in any sense of theword.

As the ALJ aptly noted, however, the procedural landscape changed in August 2014 whenpetitioner funded a pre-refund escrow account in an amount exceeding $106 million. Althoughthe ALJ refused to grant petitioner's subsequent motion to reopen the record upon this groundand respondents have effectively viewed petitioner's funding of the pre-refund escrow account astoo little, too late, we are not prepared to ignore the fact that the funds in question, which amountto over $106 million and are undeniably due and owing to petitioner's customers, are nowavailable and are awaiting distribution—if only petitioner and the Division could get outof each other's way long enough to make that happen. Based upon the particular facts of this case,and in the absence of a viable alternative,[FN4] we find that it was as abuse of discretion todeny petitioner's motion to reopen the record. Accordingly, petitioner's motion to reopen isgranted, and this matter is remitted for further proceedings.

As noted previously, having upheld the denial of petitioner's motion to reopen the record, theTribunal never reached the overarching question of whether petitioner's funding of the pre-refundescrow account in compliance with the terms of the global settlement agreement and the ensuingclarifying agreement indeed would constitute repayment of the improperly collected taxes withinthe meaning of Tax Law § 1139 (a). While resolution of that issue awaits furtheradministrative proceedings, we acknowledge that the Division—consistent with the termsof the statute and its accompanying regulations—indeed may adopt a mechanism andprocess for evaluating and resolving refund claims such as the one advanced by petitioner. To ourthinking, however, it would be inconsistent with both the statutory purpose and the underlyingpublic policy considerations, i.e., avoiding unjust enrichment and ensuring that petitioner'scustomers are in fact made whole, for that process to be implemented in a manner that resulted ineither a windfall to the Division or further (and unnecessary) delay in tendering the long overduerefund to which petitioner's 2,100,027 customers are entitled. Pursuant to the terms of the global[*5]settlement agreement, petitioner has unquestionably assignedall rights, title and interest in the subject refund to the settlement class customers, and thosecustomers, in turn, have effectively consented to accept whatever refund they may be able toachieve. Notably, petitioner's customers already have acknowledged that the funding of thepre-refund escrow account constitutes repayment of the taxes erroneously collected, the federalcourt has judicially sanctioned the underlying settlement and, more to the point, the court hasretained supervision over the implementation and distribution of the refund to petitioner'scustomers. To our analysis, all that remains is the physical act of distributing the subject funds,i.e., tendering to petitioner's customers the moneys to which they are due and owing andremitting to petitioner whatever refund to which it may be entitled, and the parties would bewell-served to proceed in a fashion that accomplishes those tasks in as expeditious a manner aspossible.

Garry, J.P., Lynch, Clark and Aarons, JJ., concur. Adjudged that the determination ismodified, without costs, by annulling so much thereof as denied petitioner's motion to reopen therecord; said motion granted and matter remitted to respondent Commissioner of Taxation andFinance for further proceedings not inconsistent with this Court's decision; and, as so modified,confirmed.

Footnotes


Footnote 1:The settlement agreement alsoestablished a detailed and specific methodology to ensure that any refund received by petitionerwas passed along to its affected customers. As the intricacies of the refund methodology are notat issue here, the precise manner in which petitioner's customers would be made whole need notbe discussed.

Footnote 2:According to petitioner, it didnot fund the pre-refund escrow account because the Division of Taxation indicated that it wouldnot consider the funding of such account as satisfying the requirements of Tax Law§ 1139 (a) relative to the repayment of the taxes collected to the affected customers.In other words, while the funding of the pre-refund escrow account would, under the terms of thesettlement agreement, constitute a repayment of taxes erroneously collected, the Division wouldnot consider the funding of a such an account to constitute a repayment of taxes under Tax Law§ 1139 (a).

Footnote 3:The Tribunal upheld the denialof petitioner's refund claim because petitioner had not made any attempt to repay its customersprior to seeking the requested refund. Because the Tribunal also upheld the ALJ's denial ofpetitioner's motion to reopen the record, the Tribunal did not reach and, hence, did not addressthe issue of whether petitioner's subsequent funding of the pre-refund escrow account wouldconstitute repayment within the meaning of Tax Law § 1139 (a).

Footnote 4:At oral argument, counsel forrespondent Commissioner of Taxation and Finance took the position that, as a remedy for thedenial of petitioner's refund claim and/or motion to reopen the record, petitioner could simply filea new refund claim and rely upon the fact that the pre-refund escrow account now had beenfunded. Counsel also was quick to point out, however, that any such application would be subjectto whatever defenses the Division might wish to assert. Although counsel did not elaborate, itappears from a review of the pertinent regulations that a subsequent refund claim would besubject to a statute of limitations defense. If the Division were to assert such a defense and,further, were to prevail, the net effect would be a $106 million windfall to the Division—aresult that the statutory scheme surely did not envision. Additionally, even assuming that asubsequent refund application proved to be successful, starting the administrative process allover again from square one would only serve to further delay the required refund to petitioner'scustomers. Hence, in the interest of expediting the return of the erroneously collected taxes topetitioner's customers, it strikes us as appropriate to grant petitioner's motion to reopen andproceed accordingly.


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