| People v Clark |
| 2017 NY Slip Op 06220 [153 AD3d 1093] |
| August 17, 2017 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v QuintrilClark, Appellant. |
Theresa M. Suozzi, Saratoga Springs, for appellant.
Joel E. Abelove, District Attorney, Troy (Vincent J. O'Neill of counsel), for respondent.
McCarthy, J.P. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Rensselaer County (Ceresia,J.), rendered November 25, 2015, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crimes ofcriminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (two counts) and criminal possession of afirearm.
On December 19, 2014, a detective with the City of Troy Police Department receivedinformation from a confidential informant (hereinafter CI) indicating that defendant was inpossession of a handgun. Later that day, when the CI notified the detective that defendant wasparked in a vehicle outside a home in the City of Troy, Rensselaer County, the detective went tothe area to investigate. The detective observed defendant while waiting in a parked vehiclenearby and, as defendant drove away, he was followed by a marked patrol vehicle that had beendispatched to the scene. When the patrol officer following defendant observed that he did notcome to a complete stop at a stop sign, he pulled defendant over and, together with other officers,executed a felony traffic stop. The officer approached defendant's vehicle with his gun drawn,instructed defendant to keep his hands up, handcuffed him, removed him from the vehicle andpatted him down. During the pat down, the officer removed from defendant's coat pocket ahandgun that matched the description provided by the CI. As a result, defendant was arrested andcharged in an indictment with two counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the seconddegree and one count of criminal possession of a firearm. Following aMapp/Dunaway hearing, County Court denied defendant's motion to suppress theevidence seized. Defendant later pleaded guilty to all counts of the indictment with no promisebeing made concerning sentencing. County Court ultimately [*2]sentenced defendant to 6
Defendant contends that County Court erroneously denied his suppression motion becausethere was not probable cause for his arrest. Initially, it is well settled that "[p]robable cause toarrest a person for an offense without a warrant exists when a police officer has knowledge offacts and circumstances sufficient to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been or isbeing committed" (People v Tillie, 239 AD2d 670, 671 [1997] [internal quotation marksand citations omitted], lv denied 91 NY2d 881 [1997]; see People v Cruz, 131 AD3d 724,726 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1087 [2015]; People v Stroman, 106 AD3d 1268, 1269 [2013], lv denied21 NY3d 1046 [2013]). Notably, the commission of a traffic violation has been found toconstitute probable cause for the police to stop a vehicle (see People v Portelli, 116 AD3d 1163, 1164 [2014]; People v Thompson, 106 AD3d1134, 1135 [2013]). Furthermore, where the stop leads to an arrest, information given to thepolice by a confidential informant "may provide reasonable suspicion or probable cause if thePeople demonstrate the informant's 'reliability and the basis of his or her knowledge' "(People v Portelli, 116 AD3d at 1164, quoting People v Chisholm, 21 NY3d 990, 994 [2013]; see Spinelli vUnited States, 393 US 410, 416 [1969]; Aguilar v Texas, 378 US 108, 114 [1964];People v Cook, 134 AD3d1241, 1243 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1143 [2016]).
Here, defendant's failure to heed the stop sign provided probable cause for the patrol officer'sinitial stop of his vehicle. To the extent that the initial stop escalated and resulted in defendant'sarrest, we find that the information related by the CI provided the requisite probable causeconsidering that the CI's reliability and basis of knowledge were adequately established at thesuppression hearing. With respect to the CI's reliability, the detective who communicated withthe CI testified that he had worked with him for over two years on other investigations and,during this time, the CI had provided valuable information leading to some criminal convictions.As for the CI's basis of knowledge, the detective testified that, during the second telephone callthat the CI made to him on December 19, 2014, he indicated that defendant had a handgun in hiscoat pocket, which the CI had seen earlier in the day. The detective stated that the CI describedthe gun in particular detail and that it matched the one that was eventually recovered fromdefendant. The detective acknowledged that the CI did not specifically mention the gun when hecalled him the third time to inform him of defendant's whereabouts. However, the AssistantDistrict Attorney who questioned the CI about his conversations with defendant testified that theCI understood defendant to state to him that he possessed a gun at such time. The CI's reliabilitywas further supported by his accurate information regarding defendant's location in a parked car.Crediting County Court's credibility determinations (see People v Portelli, 116 AD3d at1164), the foregoing testimony demonstrates that the police had probable cause for defendant'sarrest (see People v Cook, 134 AD3d at 1243; People v Wolfe, 103 AD3d 1031, 1034 [2013], lv denied 21NY3d 1021 [2013]). Accordingly, his motion to suppress the evidence was properly denied.
Defendant also challenges the voluntariness of his guilty plea. This claim, however, has notbeen preserved for our review as the record does not indicate that he made an appropriatepostallocution motion nor does it reveal that he made any statements that would invoke thenarrow exception to the preservation rule (see People v Woods, 147 AD3d 1156, 1156-1157 [2017]; People v Millard, 147 AD3d 1155,1156 [2017], lv denied 29 NY3d 999 [2017]). Furthermore, we find no merit todefendant's claim that the sentence is harsh and excessive. Defendant pleaded guilty to the crimesat issue with full knowledge that there was no promise regarding sentencing and the sentenceimposed was significantly less than the statutory [*3]maximum(see Penal Law §§ 70.00 [2] [e]; [3] [b]; 70.02 [3] [b]). Accordingly,we discern no extraordinary circumstances or any abuse of discretion warranting a reduction ofthe sentence in the interest of justice (see People v Brodhead, 106 AD3d 1337, 1337 [2013], lvdenied 22 NY3d 1087 [2014]; People v Smith, 100 AD3d 1144 [2012]).
Lynch, Devine, Clark and Aarons, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.