| Andryeyeva v New York Health Care, Inc. |
| 2017 NY Slip Op 06421 [153 AD3d 1216] |
| September 13, 2017 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| Lilya Andryeyeva, Individually and on Behalf of All OthersSimilarly Situated, et al., Respondents, v New York Health Care, Inc., Doing Businessas New York Home Attendant Agency, et al., Appellants. |
Cohen Tauber Spievack & Wagner P.C., New York, NY (Stephen Wagner, Sari E.Kolatch, and Jackson S. Davis of counsel), for appellants.
Beranbaum Menken LLP, New York, NY (Jason Rozger of counsel), for respondents.
Littler Mendelson, P.C., Melville, NY (Lisa M. Griffith of counsel), for amici curiae HomeCare Association of New York State and others.
Hodgson Russ, LLP, New York, NY (Peter C. Godfrey, John M. Godwin, and EminaPoricanin of counsel), for amicus curiae New York State Association of Health Care Providers,Inc.
In a putative class action to recover damages for violations of Labor Law article 19, thedefendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Demarest, J.), datedSeptember 16, 2014, which granted the plaintiffs' renewed motion for class certification pursuantto CPLR article 9.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The plaintiffs were employed by the defendant New York Health Care, Inc., doing businessas New York Home Attendant Agency (hereinafter NYHC), as home health care attendants forNYHC's elderly and disabled clients. The plaintiffs allegedly worked at the clients' residences in24-hour shifts. They alleged that they did not "live in" the homes of NYHC's clients and that theywere not "working in the home of their employer," NYHC. The plaintiffs were paid an hourlyrate for the 12 daytime hours of their 24-hour shifts and a flat rate for the 12 nighttime hours. Theplaintiffs commenced this action, contending that they were entitled to the minimum wage foreach hour of their 24-hour shifts and that NYHC's payment practice violated the Labor Law and12 NYCRR 142-2.1 (b) (hereinafter the Wage Order) because it resulted in a regular hourly wagethat was below the minimum wage.
In February 2014, after the Supreme Court had initially denied, as premature, the plaintiffs'motion to certify the action as a class action, the plaintiffs made a renewed motion to [*2]certify a class of approximately 1,063 home attendants who hadworked 24-hour shifts for NYHC between December 28, 2007, and March 8, 2013. Inopposition, the defendants contended that they were not required to pay home attendants for eachhour of a 24-hour shift, but were permitted to exclude 8 hours of sleep time and 3 hours of mealtime from the home attendants' wages, so long as that time for sleep and meals was actuallyafforded. In support of their contention, the defendants relied on, among other things, an opinionletter issued by the New York State Department of Labor (hereinafter DOL), which interpretedthe Wage Order. The defendants thus contended that, contrary to the plaintiffs' contention, themembers of the class could not simply rest on proof that they worked 24-hour shifts; they wouldeach also be required to prove that they had not been afforded their sleep and meal times duringthose shifts. In light of the need for such a fact-intensive inquiry as to each member of theputative class, the defendants contended that the plaintiffs could not meet the numerosity,commonality, and typicality requirements for class certification, and that class certificationshould therefore be denied. The Supreme Court granted the renewed motion for classcertification. The defendants appeal, and we affirm.
As relevant here, subsection (b) of the Wage Order (12 NYCRR 142-2.1 ["Basic minimumhourly wage rate and allowances"]) provides: "The minimum wage shall be paid for the time anemployee is . . . required to be available for work at a place prescribed by theemployer . . . . However, a residential employee—one who lives on thepremises of the employer—shall not be deemed to be . . . required to beavailable for work . . . during his or her normal sleeping hours solely because he [orshe] is required to be on call during such hours; or . . . at any other time when he orshe is free to leave the place of employment" (see 12 NYCRR 142-3.1 [b] [substantivelyidentical provision applicable to employees in nonprofitmaking institutions]). A March 11, 2010,DOL opinion letter advises that "live-in employees," whether or not they are "residentialemployees," "must be paid not less than for thirteen hours per twenty-four hour period providedthat they are afforded at least eight hours for sleep and actually receive five hours ofuninterrupted sleep, and that they are afforded three hours for meals" (NY St Dept of Labor OpNo. RO-09-0169 at 4 [Mar. 11, 2010]). As we have already noted, the defendants rely on thisletter as support for their payment practices.
"The construction given statutes and regulations by the agency responsible for theiradministration, if not irrational or unreasonable, should be upheld" (Samiento v World Yacht Inc., 10 NY3d70, 79 [2008] [internal quotation marks omitted]). On this appeal, the defendants and theplaintiffs do not dispute the status of the putative members of the class as nonresidentialemployees. Thus, we must determine whether the DOL's interpretation of the Wage Order isrational or reasonable insofar as it permits NYHC's payment practices with respect tononresidential aides. We agree with our colleagues in the Appellate Division, First Department,that the DOL's interpretation is neither rational nor reasonable, because it conflicts with the plainlanguage of the Wage Order (seeTokhtaman v Human Care, LLC, 149 AD3d 476, 477 [2017]; see generally Matter of Visiting Nurse Serv.of N.Y. Home Care v New York State Dept. of Health, 5 NY3d 499, 506 [2005]). Theplaintiffs were required to be at the clients' residences and were also required to perform servicesthere if called upon to do so. To interpret that regulation to mean that the plaintiffs were not,during those nighttime hours, "required to be available for work" simply because it turned outthat they were not called upon to perform services is contrary to the plain meaning of "available"(12 NYCRR 142-2.1 [b]; cf. Severin v Project Ohr, Inc., 2012 WL 2357410, *8, 2012 USDist LEXIS 85705, *24-25 [SD NY, June 20, 2012, No. 10 Civ. 9696 (DLC)]). In short, to theextent that the members of the proposed class were not "residential" employees who "live[d] onthe premises of the employer," they were entitled to be paid the minimum wage for all 24 hoursof their shifts, regardless of whether they were afforded opportunities for sleep and meals (12NYCRR 142-2.1 [b]; see Tokhtaman v Human Care, LLC, 149 AD3d at 477; see generally Yaniveth R. v LTD RealtyCo., 27 NY3d 186, 192-193 [2016]; Matter of Settlement Home Care v IndustrialBd. of Appeals of Dept. of Labor of State of N.Y., 151 AD2d 580, 581-582 [1989]).
The defendants' arguments regarding class certification are premised on their contention thatthe DOL's opinion letter is in accord with the Wage Order. Inasmuch as we reject the DOL'sinterpretation of the Wage Order, we also find that, on their renewed motion, the plaintiffsestablished the existence of the five prerequisites to class certification (see CPLR 901 [a];[*3]Cityof New York v Maul, 14 NY3d 499, 508, 514 [2010]), and none of the factors listed inCPLR 902 warranted a denial of the motion (see Jiannaras v Alfant, 124 AD3d 582, 584 [2015], affd 27NY3d 349 [2016]; Dowd v AllianceMtge. Co., 74 AD3d 867, 869 [2010]; Argento v Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 66 AD3d 930, 934 [2009]).Accordingly, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting the plaintiffs'renewed motion for class certification.
The defendants' remaining contention is without merit. Balkin, J.P., Hall, LaSalle and Barros,JJ., concur. [Prior Case History: 45 Misc 3d 820.]