| People v Wyatt |
| 2017 NY Slip Op 06561 [153 AD3d 1371] |
| September 20, 2017 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Appellant, v Chrystian A. Wyatt, Respondent. |
Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, NY (Robert J. Masters, Edward D.Salsaw, and Kevin B. Ramnarain of counsel), for appellant.
Seymour W. James, Jr., New York, NY (Allen Fallek of counsel), for respondent.
Appeals by the People (1) from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Lopez, J.),dated May 2, 2016, which, after a hearing, granted that branch of the defendant's omnibus motionwhich was to suppress the results of a breathalyzer test, physical evidence, and the defendant'sstatements to law enforcement officials, and (2), as limited by their brief, from so much of anorder of the same court dated October 5, 2016, as, upon reargument, adhered to the determinationin the order dated May 2, 2016.
Ordered that the appeal from the order dated May 2, 2016, is dismissed, as that order wassuperseded by the order dated October 5, 2016, made upon reargument; and it is further,
Ordered that the order dated October 5, 2016, is reversed insofar as appealed from, on thelaw and the facts, upon reargument, the order dated May 2, 2016, is vacated, suppression of theresults of the breathalyzer test, physical evidence, and the defendant's statements to lawenforcement officials is denied, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Queens County,for further proceedings on the indictment.
According to the testimony adduced at a suppression hearing, on May 18, 2015, atapproximately 8:30 p.m., a police officer was on duty with his partner in a parked marked policevehicle in a residential neighborhood in Queens County where the speed limit is 25 miles perhour. The officer observed a white Chrysler sedan (hereinafter the vehicle) traveling toward himat a high rate of speed. The officer activated his siren to warn the driver of the vehicle to slowdown, and observed the vehicle then fishtail slightly when the driver slammed on the brakes tostop for a red traffic signal located behind the officer's parked vehicle. After the light turnedgreen, the vehicle proceeded ahead and the officer made a U-turn and followed it before pulling it over for speeding. The officer asked the defendant, whowas driving the vehicle, for his license and registration. In [*2]response, the defendant admitted that his license was suspended.The officer noticed that the defendant was nervous, agitated, and excited, with a flushed face,watery eyes, and the smell of alcohol on his breath. The defendant was unsteady when he exitedthe vehicle, and the officer observed an empty bottle of vodka between the driver's seat andwhere the door would be when it was closed. Believing that the defendant was intoxicated, theofficer arrested him and brought him back to the precinct station house, where the defendant wasadministered a breathalyzer test which indicated that he had a .246 blood alcohol content. Thedefendant was indicted on charges of aggravated driving while intoxicated, driving under theinfluence of alcohol, unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle, and aggravated unlicensedoperation of a motor vehicle in the first degree (two counts).
Thereafter, the defendant made an omnibus motion, among other things, to suppress theresults of the breathalyzer test, the physical evidence, and his statements to law enforcementofficials on the ground, inter alia, that the evidence was obtained in violation of the constitutionalprohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. After a hearing, the Supreme Courtgranted that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion. The People then moved to reargue and,upon reargument, the court adhered to its original determination. The People appeal, and wereverse.
The stop of a vehicle is a seizure implicating constitutional limitations even if the purpose ofthe stop is limited and the resulting detention is brief (see People v Spencer, 84 NY2d749, 752 [1995]). Insofar as relevant here, a vehicular stop requires probable cause to believe thatthe driver has committed a traffic violation (see People v Robinson, 97 NY2d 341,348-349 [2001]; People v White, 40AD3d 535, 536 [2007]).
Here, the officer stopped the defendant's vehicle for speeding. The People met their burdenof establishing the legality of the stop through the officer's testimony that the vehicle wastraveling toward him at a high rate of speed, and it fishtailed when the defendant slammed on thebrakes to stop for the red traffic signal located behind the officer's vehicle (see People vRobinson, 97 NY2d at 347; People v Olsen, 22 NY2d 230, 232 [1968]; People v Haynes, 16 AD3d 434,435 [2005]). Under the totality of the circumstances, including the officer's training in visualspeed estimation, the officer had probable cause to stop the vehicle driven by the defendant fordriving at a speed greater than 25 miles per hour (see People v Olsen, 22 NY2d at231-232).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied that branch of the defendant's omnibusmotion which was to suppress the results of the breathalyzer test, the physical evidence, and thedefendant's statements to law enforcement officials. Balkin, J.P., Roman, Sgroi and Duffy, JJ.,concur.