| People v Flores |
| 2017 NY Slip Op 06629 [153 AD3d 1186] |
| September 26, 2017 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Pedro Flores, Appellant. |
Center for Appellate Litigation, New York (Robert S. Dean of counsel), for appellant.
Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York (Sabrina Margret Bierer of counsel), forrespondent.
Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Ann M. Donnelly, J. at hearing and plea;Ellen Biben, J. at sentencing), rendered October 26, 2015, convicting defendant, of manslaughterin the first degree, and sentencing him to a term of 17 years, unanimously reversed, on the law,the plea vacated, the motion to suppress statements defendant made at a police station granted,and the matter remanded for further proceedings.
The court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress a statement made at the scene ofthe incident. Miranda warnings were not required, because there was neither interrogationnor custody. The police officer's inquiry about "what happened" was not interrogation, but wasfor investigatory purposes and was intended to clarify the situation, where there was a stabbingvictim one floor below defendant's apartment, and defendant had a wound on his arm and hadblood on his boots (see People vValderas, 7 AD3d 265, 265 [1st Dept 2004], lv denied 3 NY3d 649 [2004]).Furthermore, a reasonable innocent person in defendant's position would not have thought that hewas in custody (see People v Yukl, 25 NY2d 585 [1969], cert denied 400 US 851[1970]). The police did nothing to restrain defendant, and although at the time of the statement atissue, "[t]he police activity at the apartment was likely to have conveyed the impression that aninvestigation was in progress, . . . there was no indication that the police haddecided to arrest anyone" (People vRadellant, 105 AD3d 556, 557 [1st Dept 2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 1090[2014]).
However, we find that the People failed to establish that defendant made a knowing andintelligent waiver of his Miranda rights before giving oral and written statements to adetective at the precinct. In a videotaped statement to the prosecutor, made several hours after thestatements to the detective, defendant said, "I cannot pay for a lawyer, why do I write yes or no."The prosecutor then said, "[D]o you understand if you can't, the Court will give you one?," towhich defendant responded, "[S]o I put no." After the prosecutor reread the warnings defendantstated, "[Y]es, I need to have a lawyer . . . I cannot pay a lawyer." The prosecutornext asked, "[B]ut do you understand that one will be provided if you cannot pay," and defendantagain stated "yes, but I can't pay for a lawyer." Finally, the prosecutor told defendant, "[O]kay, soyou can write 'yes' if you understand, and 'no' if you don't understand," and defendant said,"[Y]es, I do understand." Based on this exchange, the court correctly suppressed defendant'svideotaped statement. Given defendant's failure to comprehend that he had the right to anattorney at the time of his statements if he could not afford one, it is evident that defendant'sprevious statement to the detective should also be suppressed (see People v Adames, 121 AD3d507, 513-514 [1st Dept 2014]).
[*2] We find thatthe error was not harmless, because there is a reasonable possibility that it contributed todefendant's guilty plea (see People vWells, 21 NY3d 716 [2013]). Concur—Friedman, J.P., Richter, Moskowitz andGesmer, JJ.