| People v Davis |
| 2017 NY Slip Op 06790 [153 AD3d 1631] |
| September 29, 2017 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v CraigDavis, Appellant. |
Frank H. Hiscock Legal Aid Society, Syracuse (John J. Gilsenan, of the Pennsylvania andMichigan Bars, admitted pro hac vice, of counsel), for defendant-appellant.
William J. Fitzpatrick, District Attorney, Syracuse (James P. Maxwell of counsel), forrespondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Onondaga County Court (Anthony F. Aloi, J.), renderedSeptember 11, 2014. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of rape in thesecond degree (two counts), criminal sexual act in the second degree (two counts), endangeringthe welfare of a child and sexual abuse in the third degree (two counts).
It is hereby ordered that the case is held, the decision is reserved and the matter is remitted toOnondaga County Court for further proceedings in accordance with the following memorandum:Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him, upon a jury verdict, of two counts each ofrape in the second degree (Penal Law § 130.30 [1]), criminal sexual act in thesecond degree (§ 130.45 [1]), and sexual abuse in the third degree(§ 130.55), and one count of endangering the welfare of a child(§ 260.10 [1]). We agree with defendant that he met his initial burden on hisBatson application by demonstrating that the prosecution exercised a peremptorychallenge to remove a member of a cognizable racial group from the venire, "and that there existfacts and other relevant circumstances sufficient to raise an inference that the prosecution used itsperemptory challenge[ ] to exclude [that] potential juror[ ] because of [her] race" (People vChildress, 81 NY2d 263, 266 [1993]; see People v James, 99 NY2d 264, 270 [2002];see generally Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79, 96 [1986]). We note that "the first-stepburden in a Batson challenge is not intended to be onerous" (People v Hecker, 15 NY3d 625,651 [2010], cert denied 563 US 947 [2011]; see Johnson v California, 545 US162, 170 [2005]), and that the initial burden is met when " 'the totality of the relevantfacts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose' " (Hecker, 15 NY3d at651, quoting Batson, 476 US at 94; see People v Jones, 63 AD3d 758, 758 [2009]). Here, defendant isAfrican-American, and the first prospective juror to be peremptorily challenged by the Peoplewas the only African-American on the panel. Neither the People nor defendant asked anyquestions of the prospective juror at issue during voir dire, and County Court's generalquestioning of the panel raised no issues that would distinguish her from the other prospectivejurors. Inasmuch as there is a basis in the record to infer that the People exercised the peremptorychallenge in a discriminatory manner, the burden shifted to the People to articulate anondiscriminatory reason for striking the juror, and the court then should have determinedwhether the proffered reason was pretextual (see James, 99 NY2d at 271). We thereforehold the case, reserve decision, and remit the matter to County Court for that purpose (seePeople v Bolling, 79 NY2d 317, 325 [1992]; People v Jenkins, 75 NY2d 550,559-560 [1990]; Jones, 63 AD3d at 758). Present—Whalen, P.J., Centra,DeJoseph, NeMoyer and Winslow, JJ.