People v Vega
2017 NY Slip Op 07960 [155 AD3d 462]
November 14, 2017
Appellate Division, First Department
As corrected through Wednesday, January 3, 2018


[*1]
 The People of the State of New York,Respondent,
v
Fidel Vega, Appellant.

Robert S. Dean, Center for Appellate Litigation, New York (Arielle Reid of counsel), forappellant.

Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York (David P. Stromes of counsel), forrespondent.

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (A. Kirke Bartley, Jr., J.), rendered December8, 2014, as amended July 18 and August 19, 2016, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, ofburglary in the first degree (two counts), assault in the second degree (two counts), andendangering the welfare of a child, and sentencing him to an aggregate term of 8 years,unanimously affirmed, without prejudice to further litigation relating to defendant's sentence inaccordance with this decision.

Because defendant's dismissal motion only addressed other elements of burglary, he failed topreserve his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the dwelling element of theburglary convictions, and we decline to review it in the interest of justice. As an alternativeholding, we reject it on the merits. We also reject defendant's remaining legal sufficiencyarguments and find that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d342, 348 [2007]). The evidence abundantly established that the victim's room was a dwellingbecause, under the particular living arrangements presented, it was a "separately secured oroccupied" unit (Penal Law § 140.00 [2]), albeit within defendant's mother'sapartment, where defendant also resided. The victim, defendant's daughter, had a key to herbedroom. The victim shared the room only with her child, and she regularly locked the room.The victim's testimony and photographic evidence showed that defendant broke down the lockeddoor to the room, establishing that he knowingly entered the room without being "licensed orprivileged to do so" (Penal Law § 140.00 [5]; see People v Clarke, 185AD2d 124 [1st Dept 1992], affd 81 NY2d 777 [1993]). The jury could have reasonablyfound that the living arrangements were not that of a typical family whose members generallyhave access to the entire residence. The victim's testimony, as well as photographs, alsoestablished that defendant's belt was a dangerous instrument under the circumstances in which itwas used, since defendant repeatedly beat his daughter using the metal belt buckle, causing facialswelling, bruising on her arm and leg, a cut to her knee, and an imprint that remained visible forat least one month (see People v Rollins, 120 AD2d 896, 897 [3d Dept 1986], lvdenied 68 NY2d 773 [1986]).

In its justification charge, the court properly instructed the jury to apply the deadly forcestandard if it found that defendant used a dangerous instrument, because, given the relationshipbetween the relevant statutory definitions (Penal Law § 10.00 [11], [13]), the latterfinding would necessarily imply that defendant used deadly force (see People v White, 66 AD3d 585,586 [1st Dept 2009], lv denied 14 NY3d 807 [2010]). Thus, the relevant factual issue wassubmitted to the jury in an appropriate manner. Defendant's constitutional challenges to thecourt's justification charge, and his contention that the court should have charged that he had noduty to retreat, are unpreserved, and we decline to review them in the interest of justice. As analternative holding, we find that they are without merit. In any event, any error in any portion ofthe justification charge was harmless (see People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230[1975]).

[*2] Defendant's challenge to the court'srulings precluding his counsel from questioning the victim and defendant about the victim'smental health is unpreserved. When the court denied counsel's request on the ground thatstatements by defendant's and the victim's relatives did not provide a good faith basis for such aninquiry in the absence of any expert opinion, counsel acquiesced in that ruling rather thanoffering any further proof (see People vCortez, 85 AD3d 409, 411 [1st Dept 2011], affd 22 NY3d 1061 [2014], certdenied 574 US &mdash, 135 S Ct 146 [2014]). As an alternative holding, we find that thecourt properly exercised its discretion (see People v Rivera, 105 AD3d 1343, 1345 [4th Dept 2013], lvdenied 21 NY3d 1045 [2013]; People v Lugo, 227 AD2d 247 [1st Dept 1996], lvdenied 88 NY2d 1022 [1996]). The court made it clear that it would entertain an offer ofcompetent medical proof, and there was no violation of defendant's right to impeach witnessesand present a defense. In any event, any error was harmless.

We conclude that defendant's excessive sentence claim is premature, and we decline toaddress it. Defendant's ultimate sentence as a first felony offender resulted from his successfulCPL 440.20 motion to set aside, on grounds related to People v Catu (4 NY3d 242 [2005]), his original sentence as asecond violent felony offender. However, the People, who assert that, under People v Smith (28 NY3d 191[2016]), the original sentence should be reinstated, have taken an appeal from the order grantingthe motion, as well as challenging it through further motion practice in Supreme Court. Ourpresent affirmance of the amended judgment of conviction is without prejudice to any of thepending litigation over defendant's second felony offender status, or to any appeal from any newresentencing that may result from that litigation, or to any appropriate application to this Court inthe event that no further resentencing is forthcoming. Concur—Richter, J.P., Mazzarelli,Kahn and Moulton, JJ.


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