| People v Crippen |
| 2017 NY Slip Op 08552 [156 AD3d 946] |
| December 7, 2017 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v TerranceCrippen, Also Known as Outlaw, Appellant. |
Brian M. Quinn, Albany, for appellant.
Robert M. Carney, District Attorney, Schenectady (Tracey A. Brunecz of counsel), forrespondent.
Lynch, J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Schenectady County (Milano, J.),rendered February 27, 2015, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of assault in thesecond degree, aggravated criminal contempt, criminal contempt in the first degree, criminalcontempt in the second degree, resisting arrest and obstructing governmental administration inthe second degree.
On March 4, 2014, the police responded to a 911 call regarding a woman who had beenstabbed at 779 Albany Street in the City of Schenectady, Schenectady County. When theyarrived, they found the victim with a large laceration on her right leg. The victim reported thather boyfriend—defendant—inflicted the wound. A police officer working privatesecurity at 799 Albany Street suspected that defendant may have gone to his mother's apartmentat that location. The police went to defendant's mother's apartment, attempted without success toobtain consent to enter and, after confirming that defendant was in the apartment, forcefullyentered and, after a struggle, arrested him.
Defendant was indicted and, following pretrial Huntley/Wade andPayton hearings, was convicted by a jury of assault in the second degree, aggravatedcriminal contempt, criminal contempt in the first degree, criminal contempt in the second degree,resisting arrest and obstructing governmental administration in the second degree. County Courtthereafter imposed [*2]concurrent prison terms of six years, to befollowed by three years of postrelease supervision, for defendant's conviction of assault in thesecond degree, 2 to 6 years for his conviction of aggravated criminal contempt and1
Initially, defendant contends that County Court erred in finding that he did not have standingto challenge his warrantless arrest as unlawful based upon Payton v New York (445 US573 [1980]). "It is axiomatic that warrantless entries into a home to make an arrest arepresumptively unreasonable" (People vMcBride, 14 NY3d 440, 445 [2010] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see People v Nicholas, 118 AD3d1183, 1187 [2014], lv denied 24 NY3d 1122 [2015]). In order to establish standingto allege a violation of one's Fourth Amendment rights, a defendant "must demonstrate alegitimate expectation of privacy" in premises belonging to another "e.g., an overnight guest or afamilial or other socially recognized relationship" (People v Ortiz, 83 NY2d 840, 842[1994] [citation omitted]).
The evidence at the suppression hearing included defendant's sworn statement that, althoughthe apartment at 799 Albany Street where he was arrested was in his mother's name, he sleptovernight there three to four times each week, showered, ate, watched television, kept clothingand toiletries there and invited guests to the apartment. At the hearing, officer Sean Cliffordtestified that he was working security at 799 Albany Street when he heard a radio dispatch thatthe victim had been stabbed nearby and that her boyfriend was a possible suspect. Based on hiswork in the building and neighborhood, Clifford knew the victim and was aware that she had an"on again off again" relationship with defendant. Clifford also testified that he went todefendant's mother's apartment to look for defendant because he was aware that defendant wouldspend time there. Another police officer, Christopher Scaccia, testified that he responded to 799Albany Street because Clifford advised that he "knows [defendant] to stay there" with his mother.In our view, although the mother "owns" the apartment, there is no dispute in the record withregard to defendant's regular presence at his mother's apartment, including as an overnight guest.We therefore find that County Court erred in its determination that defendant lacked standing toassert a Payton challenge (see Minnesota v Olson, 495 US 91, 96-97 [1990];People v Mason, 248 AD2d 751, 753 [1998]; compare People v Hill, 153 AD3d 413, 416 [2017]; People vPerretti, 278 AD2d 597, 599 [2000], lv denied 96 NY2d 762 [2001]).
Although defendant had standing to challenge the warrantless arrest, we find that CountyCourt properly dismissed defendant's motion on the merits. Where "there is probable cause, thepolice may proceed without a warrant to effectuate an arrest within a home if exigentcircumstances exist to justify a warrantless entry" (People v McBride, 14 NY3d at 445;see People v Levan, 62 NY2d 139, 144 [1984]). In general, we consider certain factors todetermine whether exigent circumstances may exist, including "(1) the gravity or violent natureof the offense with which the suspect is to be charged; (2) whether the suspect is reasonablybelieved to be armed; (3) a clear showing of probable cause . . . to believe that thesuspect committed the crime; (4) [a] strong reason to believe that the suspect is in the premisesbeing entered; (5) a likelihood that the suspect will escape if not swiftly apprehended; and (6) thepeaceful circumstances of the entry" (People v McBride, 14 NY3d at 446 [internalquotation marks and citations omitted]). Further, a warrant is not necessary where there is asituation that requires the police to provide assistance; that is, the police may proceed into ahome without a warrant provided that "[t]he police . . . have reasonable grounds tobelieve that there is an emergency at hand and an immediate need for their assistance for theprotection of life or property . . . [and] [t]here must be some reasonable basis,approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency with the area or place to be searched"(People v Musto, 106 AD3d1380, 1381 [2013] [internal [*3]quotation marks and citationomitted], lv denied 21 NY3d 1007 [2013]; see Brigham City v Stuart, 547 US398, 404-405 [2006]).
At the suppression hearing, Clifford testified that he knew defendant, the victim anddefendant's mother and was aware that there was a history of violence between defendant andboth women. When Clifford first arrived at the mother's apartment, he noticed what he believedto be new puncture holes in the door that appeared to be made with the tip of a knife. WhenClifford knocked on the door, he could hear the mother whispering with an adult male who,based on his experience, Clifford believed to be defendant. According to Clifford, it "sounded. . . like someone was leading [the mother] or telling her what to say." Cliffordcalled for assistance and, in addition to Scaccia, officers Michael Dalton and Ryan Kent andothers responded. All of the officers at the scene were aware that the victim had been stabbedwith a knife. Kent testified that when he arrived, a woman in the hallway indicated that defendanthad just gone inside his mother's apartment. When Clifford was unable to convince the mother tovoluntarily open the door, he used a master key to unlock the door to determine whether"everything was okay," but each time he unlocked the door to open it slightly, it was shovedclosed and locked again from the inside. Based on the amount of force against the door from theinside, Clifford believed that it was defendant who was pushing the door closed. At one point,the officers were able to push the door open wide enough to allow them to see inside, and bothKent and Dalton testified that they observed defendant brandishing a knife. In our view, andcontrary to defendant's argument, we find that the evidence demonstrates that there were exigentcircumstances to justify the officers' entry into defendant's mother's apartment and probable causefor the arrest (see People v Junious,145 AD3d 1606, 1608 [2016], lv denied 29 NY3d 1033 [2017]; People vMusto, 106 AD3d at 1381).
Defendant also contends that the verdict was not supported by legally sufficient evidence andwas against the weight of the evidence. With respect to the counts of assault in the seconddegree, aggravated criminal contempt and criminal contempt in the first degree, defendant, whomaintained his innocence, contends that the People did not prove that he was the perpetrator ofthe crime. While defendant's challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting hisaggravated criminal contempt conviction on this basis was not preserved, our weight of theevidence review necessarily includes an evaluation of whether all of the elements of the chargedcrimes were proven beyond a reasonable doubt (see People v Butler, 126 AD3d 1122, 1122 n [2015], lvdenied 25 NY3d 1199 [2015]).
A verdict is legally insufficient when, after consideration of the facts in the light mostfavorable to the People, there is no "valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences fromwhich a rational jury could have found the elements of the crime proved beyond a reasonabledoubt" (People v Denson, 26 NY3d179, 188 [2015] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). When we conduct aweight of the evidence review, we first must determine that a different result would not havebeen unreasonable; if not, we then "weigh conflicting testimony, review any rational inferencesthat may be drawn from the evidence and evaluate the strength of such conclusions. Based on theweight of the credible evidence, the [C]ourt then decides whether the jury was justified in findingthe defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt" (People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 348 [2007]).
The undisputed evidence at the trial was that defendant and the victim had known each otherand shared a sexual relationship for at least 15 years. The victim, who conceded that she wasaddicted to and used heroin daily, testified that, in February 2014, she and defendant argued, theargument turned physical and, consequently, a full stay-away order of protection in the victim'sfavor was issued against defendant. On March 4, 2014, the victim was with defendant at [*4]defendant's mother's apartment drinking, but the victim left after thetwo got into an argument. At approximately 8:00 p.m. that evening, the victim was in herapartment with another male when James Watson knocked at her door. As the victim opened thedoor to let Watson in, defendant jumped out from behind Watson and entered the apartment witha knife in his hand. The victim fell to the ground, curled into a fetal position and defendantslashed the back of her leg with the knife.
During his testimony, Watson also conceded that he used heroin and crack cocaine. Hetestified that the victim was a friend and that he was aware that she had a relationship withdefendant. On March 4, 2014, he went alone to the victim's apartment to visit. When the victimopened the door, he was unaware that defendant was behind him and was not expectingdefendant to run into the victim's apartment. Watson testified that he saw defendant's "hands goup but [didn't] see exactly what's in his hands until [the victim and defendant were] crushed overon the floor" and, when defendant's hands came back up, he saw blood "leaking" from thevictim's leg. Watson described the knife that defendant was holding as a "Rambo knife." Watsontestified that defendant told him that he was sorry and did not mean to cause the victim's injury. Itwas Watson who called 911 as defendant fled the apartment. Pauline Saunders, the victim'sdownstairs neighbor, testified that she knew defendant and that when she heard the victim callingfor help, she ran up the stairs and passed defendant on his way out of the building. Saundersdiscovered the victim on the floor with a "puddle" of blood underneath her.
In contrast to Saunders, Watson and the victim, defendant testified that he did not spend anytime with the victim on March 4, 2014 and that he was at his mother's apartment at 8:00 p.m. Hedisputed the victim's testimony that he had been physically abusive to her in February 2014, butacknowledged that he was aware that the order of protection existed and of its terms. Accordingto defendant, their relationship ended after the February 2014 argument and the victim had beentrying to reconcile with him.
Brendan Barrett, a detective with the City of Schenectady Police Department, testified that heassembled street and elevator footage taken at the time of the stabbing and determined that asuspect—later identified as defendant—walked from the victim's apartmentbuilding to the mother's apartment building and that an "object" could be seen protruding fromhis pocket. In sum, although defendant presented some evidence to suggest that he may not havebeen the perpetrator, when we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the People, wefind abundant evidence for the jury to conclude that defendant was the assailant with respect tothe assault and contempt charges (seePeople v Tunstall, 149 AD3d 1249, 1252 [2017]). Further, when we review the evidencein a neutral light and accord deference to the jury's credibility assessments, we find that theverdict was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d at348; People v Tunstall, 149 AD3d at 1252). For the reasons set forth herein, we rejectdefendant's claim that because the arrest was unlawful, the charges for resisting arrest andobstruction of governmental administration in the second degree should have been dismissed,and find that neither verdict was against the weight of the evidence.
Defendant's argument that the charges for contempt, resisting arrest and obstructinggovernmental administration should have been dismissed as multiplicitous because they involvedthe same time period, location and facts was not raised before County Court and thus notpreserved for our review (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Blount, 129 AD3d 1303, 1304 [2015], lv denied27 NY3d 992 [2016]). In any event, because the counts required proof of different elements (see People v Williams, 150 AD3d1315, 1317 [2017], lv denied 30 NY3d 984 [Oct. 5, 2017]; compare People v Hoffman, 130 AD3d1152, 1153-1154 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1009 [2015]), the contention lacksmerit.
[*5] Defendant's argument that he was deprivedof the effective assistance of counsel is unavailing. To prevail on an ineffective assistance ofcounsel claim under the NY Constitution, a defendant bears the burden of establishing thatdefense counsel deprived him or her of a fair trial by providing less than meaningfulrepresentation (see People vHeidgen, 22 NY3d 259, 278 [2013]; People v Gokey, 134 AD3d 1246, 1246-1247 [2015], lvdenied 27 NY3d 1069 [2016]). A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under the USConstitution requires a defendant to demonstrate "that (1) his or her attorney committed errors soegregious that he or she did not function as counsel within the meaning of the [US] Constitution,and (2) that counsel's deficient performance actually prejudiced the defendant" (People v Honghirun, 29 NY3d284, 289 [2017] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). The state standard offersgreater protection, "because 'under our State Constitution, even in the absence of a reasonableprobability of a different outcome, inadequacy of counsel will still warrant reversal whenever adefendant is deprived of a fair trial' " (id., quoting People v Caban, 5 NY3d 143, 156[2005]). When assessing a claim of ineffective assistance, "[t]he test . . . isreasonable competence, not perfect representation" (People v Carver, 27 NY3d 418, 422 [2016] [internal quotationmarks and citations omitted]). Here, defendant contends that counsel failed to present sufficientevidence to support his claim that he had standing to challenge his warrantless arrest. We rejectthis argument because, although counsel could have presented more evidence, the evidence wassufficient to establish defendant's standing. Moreover, when we review the record in its totality,we find that defendant received meaningful representation (see People v Kalina, 149 AD3d 1264, 1267 [2017], lvdenied 29 NY3d 1092 [2017]; People v Perry, 148 AD3d 1224, 1224-1226 [2017]).
Finally, we reject defendant's claim that his sentence was harsh and excessive. Because thesentence fell within the permissible statutory guidelines, it should "not be disturbed unless it canbe shown that the sentencing court abused its discretion or extraordinary circumstances existwarranting a modification" (People vMalloy, 152 AD3d 968, 971 [2017] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted],lv denied 30 NY3d 981 [Oct. 2, 2017]). Defendant has made no such showing here.
Egan Jr., J.P., Rose, Aarons and Pritzker, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isaffirmed.