| People v Gliwski |
| 2017 NY Slip Op 08983 [156 AD3d 1393] |
| December 22, 2017 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Joan A.Gliwski, Appellant. |
The Legal Aid Bureau of Buffalo, Inc., Buffalo (Erin A. Kulesus of counsel), fordefendant-appellant.
Lawrence Friedman, District Attorney, Batavia (Shirley A. Gorman of counsel), forrespondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Genesee County Court (Robert C. Noonan, J.), rendered April30, 2015. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of criminal possession ofstolen property in the third degree.
It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting her upon a jury verdict of criminalpossession of stolen property in the third degree (Penal Law § 165.50), defendantcontends that County Court erred in admitting evidence of her affair with a codefendant.Contrary to the People's contention, the issue is preserved for our review inasmuch as the courtexpressly decided the issue in its written decision (see People v Jackson, 29 NY3d 18, 23 [2017]). We conclude,however, that the court did not err. It is well settled that "evidence of uncharged crimes isinadmissible where its purpose is only to show a defendant's bad character or propensity towardscrime" (People v Morris, 21 NY3d588, 594 [2013]). However, motive is a "well-recognized, nonpropensity purpose[ ] forwhich uncharged crimes may be relevant" (id.). Here, defendant's adultery was anuncharged crime (see § 255.17), and it was admissible to show defendant'smotive to store merchandise that her codefendant had stolen from his FedEx truck instead ofdelivering it to various outlet stores (see Morris, 21 NY3d at 594).
Contrary to defendant's contention, we conclude that the evidence, viewed in the light mostfavorable to the People (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]), is legallysufficient to support the conviction, i.e., there is a "valid line of reasoning and permissibleinferences which could lead a rational person to the conclusion reached by the jury on the basisof the evidence at trial" (People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). The jury wasentitled to infer that the value of the stolen property exceeded $3,000, inasmuch as defendantadmitted to the police that she possessed at least 20 leather jackets and the undisputed testimonyestablished that the total value of the jackets was at least $3,600. With respect to knowledge, hercodefendants' testimony that defendant knew the goods to be stolen was corroborated by, amongother things, her own admissions to the police (see People v Reome, 15 NY3d 188, 191-192 [2010]). Viewing theevidence in light of the elements of the crime as charged to the jury (see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d342, 349 [2007]), we further conclude that the verdict is not against the weight of theevidence (see generally Bleakley, 69 NY2d at 495).
Finally, the record, viewed as a whole, demonstrates that defense counsel providedmeaningful representation (see generally People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137, 147 [1981]).Present—Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Carni, DeJoseph and Winslow, JJ.