| People v Laury |
| 2017 NY Slip Op 09071 [156 AD3d 1473] |
| December 22, 2017 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Andrew C.Laury, Appellant. |
Williams Heinl Moody Buschman, P.C., Auburn (Mario J. Gutierrez of counsel), fordefendant-appellant.
Jon E. Budelmann, District Attorney, Auburn (Christopher T. Valdina of counsel), forrespondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Cayuga County Court (Thomas G. Leone, J.), renderedOctober 29, 2015. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of rape in the thirddegree (two counts).
It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty oftwo counts of rape in the third degree (Penal Law § 130.25 [2]). Defendant, whowas on parole at the time of the disposition of this case, contends that the plea was not enteredknowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily because County Court failed to advise him that it wouldresult in a parole violation. Defendant failed to preserve that contention for our review inasmuchas his motion to withdraw the plea did not include that ground (see People v Gibson, 140 AD3d1786, 1787 [4th Dept 2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 1072 [2016]). In any event, weconclude that defendant's contention is without merit. "[A] trial court must advise a defendant ofthe direct consequences of [a] plea, but [it] has no obligation to explain to defendants who pleadguilty the possibility that collateral consequences may attach to their criminal convictions" (People v Monk, 21 NY3d 27, 32[2013] [internal quotation marks omitted]). Where, as here, a defendant is sentenced pursuant toPenal Law § 70.80 (5), the sentence must run consecutively to a previously imposedundischarged sentence (see § 70.25 [2-a]). That is a collateral consequenceof the conviction, and the court's failure "to address the impact of Penal Law§ 70.25 (2-a) during the plea colloquy does not require vacatur of the plea" (People v Belliard, 20 NY3d 381,389 [2013]).
Defendant was sentenced to the minimum sentence permissible under the law, and wetherefore reject his contention that the sentence is unduly harsh and severe (see People v Barlow, 8 AD3d1027, 1028 [4th Dept 2004], lv denied 3 NY3d 657 [2004]). Present—Centra,J.P., Peradotto, Lindley, Curran and Troutman, JJ.