| People v Nazarov |
| 2017 NY Slip Op 50337(U) [55 Misc 3d 1201(A)] |
| Decided on March 22, 2017 |
| Criminal Court Of The City Of New York, Kings County |
| Qui�ones, J. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and will not bepublished in the printed Official Reports. |
Decided on March 22, 2017
The People of theState of New York, Plaintiff, against Dilmurod Nazarov, Defendant. |
2016KN002338
Appearance of Counsel:
James Kirshner, Esq., for the Defendant
AlbertDayan, for the Defendant
Natasha Grant, Esq., for the People
Sandra Roberts, Esq., for the People
Joanne D. Qui�ones, J.
Defendant was arraigned on January 14, 2016 on a felony complaint charging him with onecount each of Coercion in the First Degree, in violation of Penal Law (P.L.) section 135.65(1), aclass D felony; Coercion in the Second Degree, in violation of P.L. section 135.60(1), a class Amisdemeanor; Assault in the Third Degree, in violation of PL section 120.00(1), a class Amisdemeanor; Menacing in the Third Degree, in violation of P.L. section 120.14(1), a class Amisdemeanor; Menacing in the Second Degree, in violation of P.L. section 120.15(1), a class Bmisdemeanor; and Harassment in the Second Degree, in violation of P. L. section 240.26 (1), aviolation. On May 26, 2016, the court granted the People's oral application to dismiss the felonycount of Coercion in the First Degree and the accusatory instrument was converted into amisdemeanor complaint. On that date, the People filed the supporting deposition of thecomplainant dated April 14, 2016, together with a certificate of translation dated May 17, 2016,converting the misdemeanor complaint into an information and the People answered ready fortrial. Off-calendar on September 6, 2016, the People filed and served a superseding information(SSI) charging the defendant with all of the charges contained in the original accusatoryinstrument including the felony charge of Coercion in the First Degree. The SSI wasaccompanied by a new supporting deposition of the complainant dated September 1, 2016, acertificate of translation also dated September 1, 2016, and a statement of readiness (SOR).
By motion filed and served February 24, 2017, defendant now moves the court for an orderdismissing the accusatory instrument on the grounds that he has been denied his right to a speedytrial pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law (C.P.L.) sections 30.30(1) and 170.30(e). The Peopleoppose the motion in responses filed and served on February 27, 2017 and March 2, 2017,respectively. The defendant filed and served reply papers to the People's opposition on March 8,2017.
For the reasons stated below, defendant's motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds isdenied.
In this case,once the People moved to dismiss the felony count, the highest crimes [*2]against the defendant were class A misdemeanors (see P.L.§§120.00[1], 135.60[1]), punishable by a sentence of imprisonment not to exceed oneyear (P.L. §70.15[1]). Where the defendant is charged with a class A misdemeanor, thePeople must be ready for trial within 90 days of commencement of the criminal action (C.P.L.§30.30[1][b]). Where a criminal action is commenced by the filing of a felony complaint,and later converted into an information, the period applicable for determining the amount of timein which the People must be ready for trial is the period applicable to the new charges, calculatedfrom the date the first instrument is replaced, or six months from the filing of the felonycomplaint, whichever is shorter (see C.P.L. §30.30[5][c]; see also People v.Cooper, 98 NY2d 541, 543 [2002]; People v. Spector, 181 Misc 2d 522, 523 [CrimCt, NY County 1999], lv den 96 NY2d 942 [2001]). Where the aggregate of the 90 dayperiod and the period of chargeable time which elapsed from the date of the filing of the felonycomplaint exceeds six months, the applicable period is six months from the filing of the originalfelony complaint (C.P.L. §30.30[5][c]).
In the instant matter, one hundred and thirty-three (133) days of chargeable time had elapsedbefore the People dismissed the felony count. Because the aggregate of that chargeable time andthe 90 day period applicable to the new charges exceeds six months, the applicable speedy trialperiod in this case is six months from the filing of the felony complaint, that is six months or onehundred and eight-two (182)[FN1]days from January 14, 2016 (see C.P.L. §30.30[5][c]).
Defendant has the initial burden of showing, through sworn allegations of fact, that there hasbeen an inexcusable delay beyond the time allotted by the statute (People v. Santos, 68NY2d 859, 861 [1986]). Once defendant has made that showing, the People bear the burden ofdemonstrating sufficient excludable time in order to withstand a motion to dismiss(id.).
Based on a review of the official court file, the submissions of the parties, and thestenographic minutes of the proceedings held on May 26, 2016, October 6, 2016, December 5,2016, the court finds as follows:
January 14, 2016-March 16, 2016(62 days chargeable)
On January 14, 2016 defendant was arraigned on a felony complaint and bail was set. Thedefendant posted cash bail that day and the matter was adjourned to March 16, 2016 for grandjury action. As conceded by the People, an adjournment for grand jury action is chargeable to thePeople.
March 16, 2016-May 26, 2016(71 days chargeable)
On March 16, 2016 there was no grand jury action and the case was adjourned to July 29,2016 on the felony dismissal calendar for grand jury action.
On May 26, 2016 the People advanced the case, with the defendant and defense counselpresent, to dismiss the felony count of Coercion in the First Degree. On that same date, thePeople filed and served a supporting deposition signed by the complainant together with acertificate of translation and answered ready for trial. As the People concede, the period thatelapsed from March 16, 2016 to May 26, 2016 is chargeable to the People.
May 26, 2016-June 24, 2016(0 days chargeable)
On May 26, 2016 the People dismissed the felony count, converted the complaint into a[*3]misdemeanor information and answered ready for trial.Defense counsel requested discovery and the matter was adjourned to June 24, 2016 fordiscovery by stipulation (DBS).
An adjournment for discovery is excludable (C.P.L. §30.30[4][a]; People v. Thomas, 26 Misc 3d144[A] [App Term, 2nd, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2010] [time attributable to DBS isexcludable]; People v. Dorilas, 19Misc 3d 75, 76-77 [App Term, 2nd Dept 2008] [same]; People v. Khachiyan, 194Misc 2d 161, 166 [Crim Ct, Kings County 2002] [adjournment for DBS which "is in lieu ofmotion practice and discovery practice in Kings County" is excludable]).
June 24, 2016-August 8, 2016(0 days chargeable)
On June 24, 2016 the People failed to serve DBS and were directed to file and serve itoff-calendar by July 1, 2016. The matter was adjourned to August 8, 2016, for hearing and trial.The defendant does not challenge the excludability of this adjournment and the People, while notspecifying why this period is excludable, refer to August 8, 2016 as "the first Hearing and Trialdate" and contend that this period is not chargeable.
Normally, the People are entitled to a reasonable excludable adjournment to prepare forpre-trial suppression hearings ordered by the court (see People v. Greene, 223 AD2d 474[1st Dept], lv den 88 NY2d 879 [1996]; People v. Lucas, 25 Misc 3d 1213[A] [Crim Ct, Kings County2009]). In Kings County, once DBS has been exchanged, cases are perfunctorily or as a matter ofcourse adjourned for "hearings and trial" even in cases where the People do not seek to introduceany statement or identification evidence and there was no physical evidence recovered from thedefendant. That is, courts routinely adjourn matters for "hearing and trial" notwithstanding thatthere are no hearings required. Here, there were no hearings required or granted: there was noproperty recovered from the defendant, the People did not give notice of any statements made bythe defendant, and although the People filed and served identification notice at defendant'sarraignment of two positive identifications made of the defendant by the complainant, it isundisputed that the parties are known to one another [FN2]thereby obviating the need for a pre-trial Wade hearing (see People v.Gissendanner, 58 NY2d 543, 552 [1979]). As such, the People are not entitled to areasonable adjournment to prepare for trial where no hearings were required and no dispositivemotion, such as a motion to dismiss on speedy trial or facial insufficiency grounds, was made(see People v. Wyche, 4/13/01 NYLJ 19, [col 2] [Crim Ct, Kings County]; People v.Grant, 7/11/95 NYLJ 27, [col 6] [Crim Ct, NY County]). Nevertheless, because the Peoplehad answered ready for trial on May 26, 2016 and are not required to repeatedly answer ready fortrial, this period is not chargeable (see People v. Cortes, 80 NY2d 201, 214 [1992] ["thePeople are generally not required to declare their readiness repeatedly throughout the pendency ofa criminal action"]).
August 8, 2016-October 6,2016(15 days chargeable)
On August 8, 2016 the People answered not ready for trial and the matter was adjourned toOctober 6, 2016, for "hearing and trial or 30.30." On August 23, 2016 the People filed and servedan SOR off-calendar. As the defendant concedes, the People's act in filing this SOR [*4]served to toll the speedy trial clock (People v. Stirrup, 91NY2d 434, 440 [1998]). The People are chargeable, however, with the fifteen (15) days thatelapsed before the SOR was filed and served.
October 6, 2016-December 5, 2016
Off-calendar on September 6, 2016 the People filed and served an SSI together with a newsupporting deposition and affirmation of translation and a second SOR. The SSI charged thedefendant with the previously dismissed felony count of Coercion in the First Degree.
On October 6, 2016 the People answered ready for trial and indicated that an SOR had beenfiled and served off-calendar on August 23. The defendant did not challenge the People'sstatement of readiness but rather stated that he was not ready for trial because he had a hearing atthe Eastern District (see Transcript of 10/6/16, p 2, lines 16-18). When asked by thecourt, "when can you be ready for trial," defense counsel indicated that he had "some evidencethat would be worthwhile for the People to look at in this case" (id. at p 2, lines 19-21)and requested "a little bit longer date so we can sort this out with the People" (id. at p 3,lines 9-11).
Neither the People nor the defendant made any record of the SSI or second SOR that werefiled off-calendar on September 6, 2016, and the defendant was not arraigned on the SSI.
The defendant now submits that the People's SOR dated September 6, 2016 and the People'sdeclarations of readiness in open court on October 6, 2016, December 5, 2016, and January 9,2017 are invalid and illusory because the SSI filed by the People contained a felony count. CitingPeople v. Peluso, 192 Misc 2d 33, 40-41 (Crim Ct, Kings County 2002), he asserts thatthe People cannot effectively answer ready for trial "until all counts of an accusatory instrumenthave been converted, dismissed or severed" and that the period between September 6, 2016, thedate the People filed and served the SSI, to February 22, 2017, the date they moved to dismissthe felony count from the SSI, are chargeable to the People.
The People concede that the SSI erroneously contained the previously dismissed felonycount and that the People could not answer ready for trial on a felony count, but maintain thattheir declarations of readiness were valid with respect to all the non-felony counts against thedefendant. The People cite to People v. Minor, 144 Misc 2d 846, 848 [App Term, 2ndand 11th Jud Dists 1989], for the proposition that "the People's failure to timely proceed on onecount of an accusatory instrument does not necessarily adhere to the remaining counts uponwhich the People could be ready for trial."
In further support of their position, the People rely on the Court of Appeals' decision inPeople v. Dion, 93 NY2d 893 [1999]. In Dion, the defendant was originallyarraigned on a felony complaint charging him with Criminal Mischief in the Third Degree, afelony, and Petit Larceny, a misdemeanor. About a month and a half later, the People moved toreduce the felony charge to the misdemeanor charge of Criminal Mischief in the Fourth Degreeand answered ready for trial. Because the court had not followed the procedure set forth in C.P.L.section 180.50, the reduction was ineffective and the felony charge was not properly reduceduntil an additional five months had elapsed. The defendant argued that his speedy trial rightswere violated because the felony charge was not properly reduced until more than six monthsafter commencement of the action. The Court found that there were not six months of delayattributable to the People and specifically stated that the People's declaration of readiness on thedate they originally attempted to reduce the felony count "included the misdemeanor charge ofPetit Larceny [and] that unreduced charge was unaffected by the procedural mechanics of C.P.L.[section] 180.50" (Dion, 93 NY2d at 894). Other appellate courts have likewise held thatthe [*5]People can validly answer ready for trial on the convertedcounts of an accusatory instrument despite the fact that the instrument has unconverted ordefective counts (see, e.g., People v.Gray, 7 Misc 3d 127 [A] [App Term, 2nd & 11th Jud Dists 2004] [lower court'sgranting of motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds modified to extent of reinstating thosecounts of instrument which were converted and upon which the People answered ready withinthe statutory speedy trial period]; seealso People v. Naim, 46 Misc 3d 150[A] [App Term, 1st Dept 2015] [defect in onecount of the accusatory instrument "did not signify a lack of readiness to proceed on the properlyconverted counts"]; People v. Brooks, 190 Misc 2d 247, 249 [App Term, 1st Dept 2001][any perceived pleading defect relating to one charge did not serve to vitiate the People'sotherwise valid readiness statement relating to the other properly pleaded and convertedcharges]).
Notwithstanding the Court of Appeals' decision in Dion, the defendant asks this courtto follow People v. Gordon, 24 Misc3d 462 (Crim Ct, Kings County 2009). In Gordon, the defendant was arraigned on afelony complaint charging her with one felony count and two misdemeanor counts. Two monthslater, the People made a record that the case was on for reduction and served and filed what theyclaimed was a superseding information. The People did not provide any reasons for the reductionand the defendant was never arraigned on the purported superseding information. Thesuperseding information filed and served by the People turned out to be a copy of the originalfelony complaint with the words "superseded [sic] complaint" added to its face. It contained thesame charges as the original accusatory instrument, including the felony charge. Almost a yearafter the filing of the purported superseding information, the defendant filed a speedy trial motionasserting that the People's prior declarations of readiness were illusory because the accusatoryinstrument contained a felony count. In granting the motion, the court disagreed with the People'sassertion that their failure to properly reduce the felony count had no bearing on theirdeclarations of readiness with respect to the misdemeanor counts. In its decision, the courtreasoned that Dion was distinguishable in that the felony charge in Dion wasproperly reduced to a misdemeanor prior to trial whereas in Gordon there was noindication in the court file that the People ever moved to dismiss the felony count.
The facts here are distinguishable from Gordon. Here, both the official transcript ofthe May 26, 2016 proceedings and the court file establish that the People did in fact move todismiss the sole felony count of Coercion in the First Degree. The original felony complaint has aline drawn through the felony count and the handwritten notation " dismiss," which this courtinterprets to mean "People dismiss," made by the judge then presiding over the matter. Theminutes of the proceeding reflect that the People stated on the record "People move to dismiss135.65," filed a supporting deposition and affirmation of translation and then answered ready(Transcript of 5/26/16, p 2, lines 7-10). The court then arraigned the defendant on thesuperseding information by asking, "So he pleads not guilty?" (id. at p 2, line 11) anddefense counsel responded, "Yes, pleading not guilty on behalf of the defendant" (id. at p2, line 12-13).
While the court does not condone careless mistakes, it is clear that the People did not meanto include the previously dismissed felony count on the SSI that was filed and served onSeptember 6, 2016, an accusatory instrument on which the defendant was never arraigned. In[*6]any event, assuming the SSI is the governing accusatoryinstrument in this case [FN3], the court finds that the People's declarations of readiness off the record in their SORs and on therecord, while not effective as to the felony count, were valid with respect to the properlyconverted non-felony counts (see Dion, 93 NY2d at 894; see also Gray, 7 Misc 3d127 [A]; Naim, 46 Misc 3d 150[A]; Brooks, 190 Misc 2d at 249).
Accordingly, this adjournment is excludable because the People answered ready for trial onthe record in the presence of defense counsel (see People v. Cajigas, 224 AD2d 370, 372[1st Dept 1996], app den 88 NY2d 845 [1996]; People v. Armstrong, 163 Misc2d 588, 590 [App Term, 1st Dept 1994], app den 84 NY2d 1028 [1995]).
This period is also excludable as an adjournment granted at the request of defense counsel(C.P.L. §30.30[4][b]). Courts have consistently held that even in cases where the Peoplehave failed to obtain an accusatory instrument sufficient for trial, adjournments granted at therequest or consent of the defense are excludable from speedy trial calculations (see, e.g.,People v. Worley, 66 NY2d 523 [1985]; see also Brooks, 190 Misc 2d 247, 249;People v. Jones, 151 Misc 2d 582 [App Term, 2nd Dept 1991]).
December 5, 2016-January 9, 2017 (0 days chargeable)On December 5,2016 the People answered ready for trial and new counsel appeared on behalf of the defendant.When asked if he was ready, defense counsel stated he "just got the case yesterday [and has] tolook at paperwork also, so if we can have a date" (see Transcript of 12/5/16, p 2, lines11-12). The case was adjourned to January 9, 2017. This period is excludable because the Peopleanswered ready for trial on the record in the presence of defense counsel (see Cajigas,224 AD2d at 372; Armstrong, 163 Misc 2d at 590) and also as an adjournment granted atthe request of defense counsel (C.P.L. §30.30[4][b]).
January 9, 2017-February 3, 2017 (0 days chargeable)
On January 9, 2017 the People answered ready for trial, but defense counsel was not ready toproceed. The matter was adjourned to February 3, 2017. This period is excludable because thePeople answered ready for trial on the record in the presence of defense counsel (seeCajigas, 224 AD2d at 372; Armstrong, 163 Misc 2d at 590) and also as anadjournment granted at the request of defense counsel (C.P.L. §30.30[4][b])
February 3, 2017-February 6, 2017 (0 days chargeable)
On February 3, 2017 both sides answered ready for trial but there were no trial partsavailable. The matter was adjourned to February 6, 2017 for trial. This period is excludablebecause the People answered ready for trial on the record in the presence of defense counsel(see Cajigas, 224 AD2d at 372; Armstrong, 163 Misc 2d at 590). Moreover, apost-readiness delay resulting from court congestion is not chargeable to the People (Peoplev. Goss, 87 NY2d 792, 797 [1996]).
February 6, 2017-February 14, 2017(0 days chargeable)
On February 6, 2017 the People answered ready for trial, but defense counsel requested anadjournment to work out a disposition. The matter was adjourned to February 14, 2017 forpossible disposition on consent. An adjournment granted at the request or with the consent ofdefense counsel is excludable (C.P.L. §30.30[4][b]).
[*7]February 14, 2017-February 27, 2017(0 dayschargeable)
On February 14, 2017 the defendant failed to appear in court at 9:30AM as directed and at11:17 AM a bench warrant was ordered. The defendant appeared in court later that day and thewarrant was vacated. No disposition was reached by the parties and the matter was adjourned toFebruary 27, 2017 for trial.
On February 17, 2017 the People advanced the case to request a remand hearing pursuant toC.P.L. section 530.12(1)(a). The court was engaged and the matter was adjourned to February 22,2017 for the remand hearing.
On February 22, 2017 this court conducted a hearing and after the hearing, denied thePeople's application. On this date the People also made an application to dismiss the felony countof Coercion in the First Degree from the SSI. The People's application was granted and thematter was adjourned to February 27, 2017 for trial.
The defendant does not challenge this period and the court finds that this entire period isexcludable as "a reasonable period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning thedefendant" (C.P.L. §30.30[4][a]).
February 27, 2017 -March 22, 2017(0 days chargeable)
On Monday, February 27, 2017 the People filed and served a response to the defendant'sspeedy trial motion which was filed and served off-calendar on Friday, February 24, 2017. ThePeople requested an opportunity to supplement their response and the court set a schedule: anysupplemental papers by the People were due on March 2, 2017 and any reply papers from thedefendant were due on March 7, 2017. The matter was adjourned to March 22, 2017 for decision.
An adjournment for motion practice and the period during which defendant's motion is"under consideration by the court" is excludable (C.P.L. §30.30[4][a]; see People v.Shannon, 143 AD2d 572, 572-573 [1st Dept], lv den 73 NY2d 860 [1988] [timewhile speedy trial motion under consideration by court is excludable]).
CONCLUSION
In total, the People are charged with 148 days, which does not exceed the statutorytime limit provided by C.P.L. section 30.30(1).
Accordingly, the defendant's motion to dismiss the accusatory instrument for lack of aspeedy trial is denied.
This constitutes the decision and order of the Court.
Dated: Brooklyn, New York
____________________________
March 22, 2017
JOANNE D. QUIÑONES
A.J.S.C.
Footnote 1:The court notes that 2016 was aleap year and thus the month of February that year had twenty-nine (29) days.
Footnote 2:At defendant's arraignment, thePeople served notice pursuant to C.P.L. section 170.10(8-a) alleging that the defendant and thecomplaint had a past or present intimate relationship. Additionally, the People submit in theiropposition papers that the complainant and defendant "are ex-boyfriend and ex-girlfriend"(see People's Affirmation in Opposition dated 2/27/16, p 1, ¶4).
Footnote 3:On February 22, 2017, thePeople moved to dismiss( the previously dismissed) felony charge of Coercion in the FirstDegree from the SSI.