| People v Scott |
| 2018 NY Slip Op 00203 [157 AD3d 1070] |
| January 11, 2018 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v RobertScott, Appellant. |
John Ferrara, Monticello, for appellant.
D. Holley Carnright, District Attorney, Kingston (Joan Gudesblatt Lamb of counsel) forrespondent.
Clark, J. Appeal from a decision of the County Court of Ulster County (Williams, J.), datedAugust 1, 2016, which classified defendant as a risk level three sex offender pursuant to the SexOffender Registration Act.
Defendant waived indictment and agreed to be prosecuted pursuant to a superior courtinformation charging him with possessing a sexual performance by a child. Defendantsubsequently pleaded guilty as charged in exchange for the agreed-upon prison term of 1 to 3years. In anticipation of defendant's release from prison, the Board of Examiners of SexOffenders completed a risk assessment instrument in accordance with the Sex OffenderRegistration Act (see Correction Law art 6-C). Although such instrument presumptivelyclassified defendant as a risk level one sex offender, the Board—based upon defendant's1991 conviction of sexual abuse in the first degree—requested an override to apresumptive risk level three classification (see Sex Offender Registration Act: RiskAssessment Guidelines and Commentary at 3-4 [2006]).
At the ensuing hearing, the People advocated in favor of the override and, further, urgedCounty Court to assess additional points under risk factors 3 (number of victims), 7 (relationshipwith victim) and 11 (drug or alcohol abuse)—an assessment that, in turn, would result indefendant being classified as a risk level three sex offender based upon points alone. Defendantsought a downward departure, contending that the length of time that had elapsed since his prior[*2]sex offense and the numerous character letters submittedupon his behalf warranted a departure to a risk level two classification. County Court, in a benchdecision, adopted the People's arguments regarding both the override and the assessment ofadditional points, denied defendant's request for a downward departure and classified defendantas a risk level three sex offender. Defendant now appeals.
County Court is statutorily required to "render an order setting forth its determinations andthe findings of fact and conclusions of law on which the determinations are based" (CorrectionLaw § 168-n [3]; seePeople v Horton, 142 AD3d 1256, 1257 [2016]; People v Kemp, 130 AD3d 1132, 1132 [2015]). The resulting order"must be in writing" (People v Kemp, 130 AD3d at 1132) and, further, must be "enteredand filed in the office of the clerk of the court where the action is triable" (CPLR 2220 [a]; see People v Cann, 152 AD3d 828,829 [2017]; People v Cleveland,139 AD3d 1270, 1271 [2016]). The record before this Court does not reflect that CountyCourt issued a written order or that any such order subsequently was entered and filed. AlthoughCounty Court indicated that its bench decision would "serve[ ] as the order of the [c]ourt," abench decision is neither a substitute for the required written order nor an appealable paper (cf. People v Ward, 139 AD3d1254, 1255 [2016]; People vJoseph, 89 AD3d 1324, 1324-1325 [2011]). Notably, neither the transcript of the court'sbench decision nor the standard form designating defendant's risk level classification, the latter ofwhich County Court signed and dated, contains the "so ordered" language required "so as toconstitute an appealable order" (People v Cann, 152 AD3d at 829; see People v Goodwin, 131 AD3d1284, 1285 [2015]). Absent evidence of the required written order, this appeal is notproperly before us and must be dismissed (see People v Cann, 152 AD3d at 829;People v Horton, 142 AD3d at 1257; People v Cleveland, 139 AD3d at 1271;People v Goodwin, 131 AD3d at 1285; People v Kemp, 130 AD3d at 1133).
Garry, P.J., Mulvey, Aarons and Rumsey, JJ., concur. Ordered that the appeal is dismissed,without costs.