| People v Hernandez-Beltre |
| 2018 NY Slip Op 00307 [157 AD3d 814] |
| January 17, 2018 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Spencer Hernandez-Beltre, Appellant. |
Paul Skip Laisure, New York, NY (William Kastin of counsel), for appellant.
Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, NY (Robert J. Masters, John M.Castellano, Johnnette Traill, and Christopher J. Blira-Koessler of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Margulis,J.), rendered January 8, 2014, as amended January 14, 2014, convicting him of criminal sexualact in the first degree (two counts), rape in the first degree, attempted rape in the first degree,robbery in the second degree, assault in the second degree, sexual abuse in the first degree (twocounts), unlawful imprisonment in the second degree, and incest in the third degree (threecounts), after a nonjury trial, and imposing sentence.
Ordered that the judgment, as amended, is reversed, on the facts, and the matter is remitted tothe Supreme Court, Queens County, for the issuance of an examination order pursuant to CPL330.20, and further proceedings thereafter.
In July 2010, the then-19-year-old defendant sexually assaulted and raped his mother. Thedefendant asserted the affirmative defense of lack of criminal responsibility by reason of mentaldisease or defect (Penal Law § 40.15). After a nonjury trial, the Supreme Courtdetermined that the defendant did not meet his burden of establishing the affirmative defense bya preponderance of the evidence, and convicted the defendant of criminal sexual act in the firstdegree (two counts), rape in the first degree, attempted rape in the first degree, robbery in thesecond degree, assault in the second degree, sexual abuse in the first degree (two counts),unlawful imprisonment in the second degree, and incest in the third degree (three counts).
In support of his affirmative defense, the defendant relied upon, inter alia, the experttestimony of a board-certified forensic psychiatrist who has conducted thousands of forensicexaminations over a career spanning more than 30 years. He evaluated the defendant, reviewedthe defendant's psychiatric history and records, and also reviewed witness accounts of thedefendant's behavior before, during, and after the incident. The defense expert opined that thedefendant suffered from a psychotic disorder, and that because of such psychotic disorder, thedefendant lacked the substantial capacity to know the nature and consequences of what he wasdoing, and lacked the substantial capacity to know or appreciate at the time of the incident thathis conduct was wrong.
To rebut the defense expert's testimony, the People called a clinical [*2]neuropsychologist whose practice focused on the study andtreatment of epilepsy, and patients suffering from concussions, stroke, and dementia. While theexpert had testified in criminal proceedings on prior occasions, he acknowledged that he was notboard-certified in forensic psychology. Upon performing his own evaluation of the defendant,and reviewing the defendant's psychiatric records and witness accounts, the prosecution expertagreed with the defense expert that the defendant was under the influence of a psychotic disorderat the time of the incident, and that the symptoms of such psychotic disorder include loss ofreality, hallucinations, delusions, impaired thinking, and impulsive behavior.
The prosecution expert opined that the defendant's psychotic disorder did not "materiallyaffect his ability to know that he was performing a sexual assault on his own mother or his abilityto know that doing such an act was wrong." He opined that the defendant exhibited"goal-directed activity," and that the defendant's anger "contributed to this rape." He stated that itwas possible for someone to be "out of touch with reality and yet still have more than a surfaceknowledge that what they are doing is either against the law or against common morality." Heconcluded that the defendant had the "capacity to understand the nature and consequences of hisactions and to know that they're wrong."
In contrast, the defense expert opined that the defendant had "some thought that what he wasdoing was wrong," but that "in the context of his delusional beliefs, disorganized thinking,religious preoccupation, and his hallucinatory state . . . the thought resulted in nomore than a surface awareness, without depth or emotional significance" (see generallyPeople v Adams, 26 NY2d 129 [1970]). Although the defendant exhibited goal-directedbehavior during the incident, the defense expert opined that, since the defendant was under theoverwhelming influence of a delusion, he still lacked the substantial capacity to know the natureand consequences of the conduct and that it was wrong. The defense expert also disagreed withthe prosecution expert that the defendant was motivated by anger toward his mother, as opposedto being under the overwhelming influence of a psychotic disorder.
"Upon [a] defendant's request, the Appellate Division must conduct a weight of the evidencereview and, thus, a defendant will be given one appellate review of adverse factual findings" (People v Joyner, 126 AD3d 1002,1005 [2015] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 348 [2007]). A weight of theevidence review requires this Court to affirmatively review the record; independently assess allof the proof; substitute its own credibility determinations for those made by the trier of fact in anappropriate case; determine whether the verdict was factually correct; and acquit a defendant ifthe court is not convinced that the trier of fact was justified in finding that guilt was provedbeyond a reasonable doubt (see People vDelamota, 18 NY3d 107, 116-117 [2011]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d at 348;Matter of Shannel P., 137 AD3d1039, 1041 [2016]).
In conducting our weight of the evidence review where a defendant relies solely upon theaffirmative defense of mental disease or defect, we first determine whether a finding of notresponsible by reason of mental disease or defect would have been reasonable. If we answer thatquestion in the affirmative, then we must weigh conflicting testimony, review any rationalinferences that may be drawn from the evidence, and evaluate the strength of such conclusions inorder to decide whether the defendant met his burden of proving the affirmative defense ofmental disease or defect by the preponderance of evidence (see People v Danielson, 9NY3d at 348; People v Joyner, 126 AD3d at 1005; People v Curry, 112 AD3d 843, 844 [2013]; see also PenalLaw §§ 25.00 [2]; 40.15; People v Kohl, 72 NY2d 191 [1988]).
Given the conflicting expert opinions, as well as the witness testimony and psychiatricrecords, a finding of not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect would have beenreasonable. Weighing the opinion of the defense expert, who was an experienced forensicpsychiatrist, against the opinion of the prosecution expert, a clinical neuropsychologist withlimited experience in forensics, the defense expert's opinion was more convincing, and entitled tomore weight. The defense expert's opinion better accounted for the witnesses' testimonyregarding their observations of the defendant's increasingly bizarre behavior and onset of mentalillness which began to exhibit itself just weeks before the incident, and continued during andafter the incident [*3]until the defendant was hospitalized forpsychiatric treatment. The defense expert's opinion was further corroborated by the defendant'ssubsequent psychiatric diagnosis and history. Contrary to the Supreme Court's determination, wefind that the defendant met his burden of proving the affirmative defense of mental disease ordefect by the preponderance of evidence.
In light of our determination, we need not reach the defendant's remaining contentions.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment, as amended, and remit the matter to the SupremeCourt, Queens County, for the issuance of an examination order pursuant to CPL 330.20, andfurther proceedings thereafter. Hall, J.P., Roman, Cohen and Barros, JJ., concur.