| People v Taylor |
| 2018 NY Slip Op 00709 [158 AD3d 1095] |
| February 2, 2018<> |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v DanteTaylor, Appellant. |
The Abbatoy Law Firm, PLLC, Rochester (David M. Abbatoy, Jr., of counsel), fordefendant-appellant.
Dante Taylor, defendant-appellant pro se.
Christopher Bokelman, Acting District Attorney, Lyons (Wendy Evans Lehmann of counsel),for respondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Wayne County Court (Daniel G. Barrett, J.), renderedNovember 20, 2014. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of murder in thefirst degree (four counts), burglary in the first degree (two counts) and arson in the seconddegree.
It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously modified on the lawby reducing the conviction of arson in the second degree (Penal Law § 150.15) toarson in the third degree (§ 150.10 [1]) and vacating the sentence imposed on thatcount and as modified the judgment is affirmed, and the matter is remitted to Wayne CountyCourt for sentencing on the conviction of arson in the third degree.
Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him, following a jury trial, offour counts of murder in the first degree (Penal Law § 125.27 [1] [a] [vii], [viii];[b]), two counts of burglary in the first degree (§ 140.30 [2], [3]) and one count ofarson in the second degree (§ 150.15). On July 14, 2013, the bodies of a mother anddaughter were found in a residence in Sodus, New York. They had gone to the residence to takecare of an animal while the owner was away. Items from the residence as well as items belongingto the victims were missing, and several small fires had been set inside the residence. Using cellsite location information (CSLI), police officers were able to locate the victims' cell phones in abag in Rochester, New York. In the same bag was a receipt for a purchase made with anelectronic benefits card belonging to defendant's girlfriend, with whom defendant resided.Eyewitnesses recalled seeing a "dark-colored Mercury Mountaineer" in the driveway of theSodus residence shortly before the victims had gone to the residence, and a dark-colored MercuryMountaineer was registered to defendant. Police officers thereafter filed an "ExigentCircumstances Form" with defendant's cell phone company, seeking historical CSLI for afour-day period encompassing the date of the crime. Upon learning that defendant's cell phonehad been located in Sodus at the time of the crime, police officers were able to obtain searchwarrants for defendant's vehicle and residence. Inside defendant's residence were items takenfrom the Sodus residence, and blood found on those objects matched the DNA profile of one ofthe two victims. Additionally, blood found on a laundry basket inside defendant's residence aswell as blood found inside defendant's vehicle matched the DNA profiles of the victims.
Initially, defendant contends that the indictment was jurisdictionally defective because thefour counts charging him with murder in the first degree failed to allege that he "was more thaneighteen years old at the time of the commission of the crime," as required by Penal Law§ 125.27 (b). That contention lacks merit. "By alleging that defendant committed['Murder in the First Degree,'] those counts 'adopt[ed] the title of' the first-degree murder statuteand incorporated all of the elements of that crime, including the age element, thereby affordingdefendant fair notice of the charges against him" (People v VanGorden, 147 AD3d 1436, 1437 [4th Dept 2017], lvdenied 29 NY3d 1037 [2017], quoting People v Ray, 71 NY2d 849, 850 [1988]).
Defendant further contends, in his pro se supplemental brief, that his responses to pedigreequestions from police officers, wherein he admitted his age, should have been precluded at trialbecause the People failed to provide him with a CPL 710.30 notice of those statements. We rejectthat contention. "Because routine administrative questioning by the police presumptively avoidsany grounds for challenging the voluntariness of statements given in response to those questions,notice of such statements is not required" (People v Rodney, 85 NY2d 289, 293[1995]).
Relying on Riley v California (573 US —, —, 134 S Ct 2473, 2493-2494[2014]), United States v Jones (565 US 400, 404-405 [2012]), and People v Weaver (12 NY3d 433,445 [2009]), defendant contends that County Court erred in refusing to suppress the historicalCSLI related to his cell phone because that information was obtained in violation of the Federaland New York State Constitutions as well as the Stored Communications Act (SCA) (18 USC§ 2701 et seq.). We reject that contention and conclude that the courtproperly refused to suppress such evidence. As we noted in People v Jiles, historicalCSLI is information "contained in the business records of defendant's service provider" (158 AD3d 75, 79 [4th Dept 2017]). We thus conclude that defendant's reliance on Riley,which concerned a warrantless search of "digital information on a cell phone seized from anindividual who ha[d] been arrested," is misplaced (573 US at —, 134 S Ct at 2480), andthat his reliance on Jones and Weaver, which involved the physical installation ofa device to track the defendant's movements (see Jones, 565 US at 404-405;Weaver, 12 NY3d at 445), is likewise misplaced. The United States Supreme Court hasheld that "the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to athird party and conveyed by [that party] to Government authorities, even if the information isrevealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidenceplaced in the third party will not be betrayed" (United States v Miller, 425 US 435, 443[1976]). Moreover, that analysis "is not changed" by the mandatory nature of such record keeping(id.).
We thus conclude that defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy ininformation that he revealed to his service provider (see Jiles, 158 AD3d at 79-80; People vSorrentino, 93 AD3d 450, 451 [1st Dept 2012], lv denied 19 NY3d 977 [2012];People v Hall, 86 AD3d 450,451-452 [1st Dept 2011], lv denied 19 NY3d 961 [2012], cert denied 568 US1163 [2013]; see also United States v Davis, 785 F3d 498, 513 [11th Cir 2015], certdenied 577 US —, 136 S Ct 479 [2015]; In re United States for Historical Cell SiteData, 724 F3d 600, 615 [5th Cir 2013]; In re Application of United States for an OrderDirecting a Provider of Elec. Communication Serv. to Disclose Records to Govt., 620 F3d304, 313-317 [3d Cir 2010]; cf. United States v Skinner, 690 F3d 772, 777 [6th Cir2012], cert denied 570 US —, 133 S Ct 2851 [2013]). We note that defendant doesnot contend that the relevant CSLI data included passively-generated data, i.e, data that was notgenerated by the subscriber's proactive use of his or her cell phone.
As the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has written, "[w]e understand that cell phone users mayreasonably want their location information to remain private, just as they may want their trash,placed curbside in opaque bags . . . or the view of their property from 400 feetabove the ground . . . to remain so. But the recourse for these desires is in themarket or the political process: in demanding that service providers do away with such records(or anonymize them) or in lobbying elected representatives to enact statutory protections. TheFourth Amendment, safeguarded by the courts, protects only reasonable expectations ofprivacy" (In re United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F3d at 615).
With respect to defendant's state constitutional challenge, we conclude that "there is 'nosufficient reason' to afford the cell site location information at issue here greater protection underthe State Constitution than it is afforded under the Federal Constitution" (Jiles, 158 AD3d at 81; see People v Guerra, 65 NY2d 60, 63-64 [1985]; People v DiRaffaele, 55 NY2d 234, 241-242 [1982]; see also Sorrentino, 93 AD3d at 451;Hall, 86 AD3d at 451-452; cf. State v Earls, 214 NJ 564, 588-589, 70 A3d 630, 644[2013]).
Defendant further contends that there was a violation of the SCA and, as a result, suppressionwas warranted. We need not address the merits of the alleged violation because, even if there hadbeen such a violation, defendant would not be entitled to suppression of the evidence (seeUnited States v Stegemann, 40 F Supp 3d 249, 270 [ND NY 2014], affd in part 701Fed Appx 35 [2d Cir 2017]; United States v Guerrero, 768 F3d 351, 358 [5th Cir 2014],cert denied 575 US &mdash, 135 S Ct 1548 [2015]; United States v Corbitt, 588Fed Appx 594, 595 [9th Cir 2014]; United States v Zodhiates, 166 F Supp 3d 328, 335[WD NY 2016]; United States v Scully, 108 F Supp 3d 59, 87 [ED NY 2015]; see also People v Thompson, 51 Misc3d 693, 714 [Sup Ct, NY County 2016]). "The availability of the suppression remedy for. . . statutory, as opposed to constitutional, violations . . . turns on theprovisions of [the statute] rather than the judicially fashioned exclusionary rule aimed atdeterring violations of Fourth Amendment rights" (United States v Donovan, 429 US413, 432 n 22 [1977]). Here, the statute provides that a violation of the SCA may be punishableby criminal or civil penalties or administrative discipline (18 USC §§ 2701[b]; 2707; see Zodhiates, 166 F Supp 3d at 335; Scully, 108 F Supp 3d at88).
Before trial, the court conducted a Sandoval hearing, after which the courtdetermined that the People would be permitted to question defendant, should he testify,concerning certain prior convictions, but would be precluded from questioning him on otherconvictions or adjudications. Defendant now contends that the court abused its discretion inpermitting the People to question him concerning 1998 and 2004 convictions of attemptedrobbery in the second degree. He contends that both convictions are too similar to the chargedcrimes and are too remote in time to be probative. Inasmuch as defendant failed to challenge the2004 conviction as being too remote, he failed to preserve that contention for our review (see People v Major, 61 AD3d1417, 1417 [4th Dept 2009], lv denied 12 NY3d 927 [2009]). Moreover, defendantfailed to object to the court's ultimate Sandoval ruling and thus failed to preserve for ourreview his challenge to the ultimate ruling (see People v Huitt, 149 AD3d 1481, 1482 [4th Dept 2017], lvdenied 30 NY3d 950 [2017]; Peoplev Taylor, 148 AD3d 1607, 1608 [4th Dept 2017]). We nevertheless exercise our powerto review those contentions as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice (see CPL470.15 [6] [a]). We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in permitting theprosecutor to question defendant about the two prior convictions. " 'Convictionsinvolving theft, such as robbery, are highly relevant to the issue of credibility because theydemonstrate the defendant's willingness to deliberately further his [or her] self-interest at theexpense of society' . . . Moreover, the mere fact that the prior crimes were similar. . . in nature to the instant offenses [does] not warrant their preclusion" (People v Harris, 74 AD3d 984,984-985 [2d Dept 2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 920 [2010]; see People v Davey, 134 AD3d1448, 1450-1451 [4th Dept 2015]; People v Arguinzoni, 48 AD3d 1239, 1240-1241 [4th Dept 2008],lv denied 10 NY3d 859 [2008]).
Defendant raises numerous challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting theconviction of various counts. First, he contends that the evidence is legally insufficient toestablish his identity as the perpetrator because the People proved the element of identity throughthe impermissible stacking of inferences. Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant's contentionis preserved for our review based on his general challenge to the proof of identity in his motionfor a trial order of dismissal (see People v Gray, 86 NY2d 10, 19 [1995]), we concludethat it lacks merit. Although the Court of Appeals has stated that "[a]n inference may not bebased upon another inference" (People v Volpe, 20 NY2d 9, 13 [1967]), and that" 'the facts from which the inferences are to be drawn must be established by direct proof[instead of] conjecture, supposition, suggestion, speculation or upon other inferences' "(People v Leyra, 1 NY2d 199, 206 [1956]), "commentators have noted that theprohibition against basing an inference upon an inference, found in the case law, is merely arestatement in different terms of the principle that a jury cannot be allowed to 'make inferenceswhich are based not on the evidence presented, but rather on unsupported assumptions drawnfrom evidence equivocal at best' " (People v Seifert, 152 AD2d 433, 441 [4thDept 1989], lv denied 75 NY2d 924 [1990], quoting People v Kennedy, 47 NY2d196, 202 [1979], rearg dismissed 48 NY2d 635, 656 [1979]). Here, the jury did not makeany inferences based on unsupported assumptions drawn from equivocal evidence. Defendant'svehicle or one strikingly similar was seen in the driveway of the Sodus residence shortly beforethe women went to that residence. The victims' blood was found in defendant's car and on itemsfound inside defendant's residence. The victims' cell phones were located in a bag with a receiptlinked to defendant's girlfriend. We thus conclude, after viewing the facts in the light mostfavorable to the People, that " 'there is a valid line of reasoning and permissibleinferences from which a rational jury could have found [defendant's identity] proved beyonda reasonable doubt' " (People vDanielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349 [2007] [emphasis added]; see generally People vBleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]).
Defendant further contends that the evidence is not legally sufficient to support theconviction of two counts of murder in the first degree under Penal Law § 125.27 (1)(a) (vii) because there is insufficient evidence that the homicides were committed in the course ofcommitting or in furtherance of the burglary. As defendant correctly concedes, his contention isnot preserved for our review (see Gray, 86 NY2d at 19), and we reject his relatedcontention that preservation is not required here because the proof at trial is legally sufficient tosupport a conviction of a lesser included offense (see People v Whited, 78 AD3d 1628, 1629 [4th Dept 2010], lvdenied 17 NY3d 810 [2011]). Nevertheless, we exercise our power to reach the merits ofdefendant's challenge as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice (see CPL 470.15[6] [a]), and we conclude that it lacks merit. Defendant specifically contends that, inasmuch asthe crime of burglary is complete once a defendant enters the building with the requisite criminalintent (see People v Frazier, 16NY3d 36, 41 [2010]), the murders of the women, who arrived at the residence after theburglary was complete, could not have been in the course of or in furtherance of the completedburglary.
Contrary to defendant's contention, the burglary in this case was not complete at the timehe entered the property. Defendant was convicted of burglary in the first degree under Penal Law§ 140.30 (2) and (3), which required the People to establish the additional elementsof either physical injury to the victims or the use or threatened use of a dangerous instrument.Thus, the crimes of burglary were not complete until the additional elements were established.Moreover, the Court of Appeals has made it clear that a burglar "may be said to be engaged in thecommission of the crime until he [or she] leaves the building with his [or her] plunder"(Dolan v People, 64 NY 485, 497 [1876]; cf. People v Cavagnaro, 99 AD2d 534,534 [2d Dept 1984]).Contrary to defendant's additional contention, the People were not required to establish thatthe murders were necessary to advance the purpose of the burglary (see People v Henderson, 25 NY3d534, 541 [2015]). Rather, "[t]he 'in furtherance of' element requires 'a logical nexus betweena murder and a felony' " (id.). Here, the evidence, viewed in the light mostfavorable to the People (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]), is legallysufficient to establish such a nexus and support the conviction of two counts of murder in thefirst degree under Penal Law § 125.27 (1) (a) (vii) (see Bleakley, 69 NY2dat 495) and, upon viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the crime of murder in the firstdegree as charged to the jury (see Danielson, 9 NY3d at 349), we conclude that theverdict on those counts is not against the weight of the evidence (see Bleakley, 69 NY2dat 495).
Defendant further contends that the evidence is not legally sufficient to support theconviction of arson in the second degree because there is no evidence that the victims were stillalive at the time the fires were set and, therefore, the fires were not set while "another personwho [was] not a participant in the crime [was] present" (Penal Law § 150.15). Weagree with defendant and reject the People's contention that section 150.15 does not require thatthe person be alive when the fire is started.
Although there are cases in which defendants have been convicted of arson in the seconddegree where the evidence established that the victim was already dead at the time the fire wasstarted (see People v Douglas, 36 AD2d 994, 994-995 [3d Dept 1971], affd 30NY2d 592 [1972]; see also People vPierre, 37 AD3d 1172, 1173 [4th Dept 2007], lv denied 8 NY3d 989 [2007]), itappears that the defendants in those cases did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on theground that the victims were no longer alive when the fires were started. We thus conclude thatthose cases lack any precedential value in determining the issue before this Court.
Penal Law article 150 does not contain any definition of "person." We thus rely on thedefinition of person found in section 10.00 (7), which provides that " '[p]erson' means ahuman being, and where appropriate, a public or private corporation, an unincorporatedassociation, a partnership, a government or a governmental instrumentality." Although article125 defines a person as "a human being who has been born and is alive" (§ 125.05[1]), that definition is applicable only to article 125 and "was inserted merely to insure that thedeath of a 'person' would not include the abortional killing of an unborn child" (People vEbasco Serv., 77 Misc 2d 784, 787 [Sup Ct, Queens County 1974]).
Where, as here, the Penal Law article does not contain a different definition of person, werely on cases interpreting the Penal Law § 10.00 (7) definition of person as appliedto other crimes. Those cases establish that the definition of person contemplates a living humanbeing. For example, under article 130, which deals with sex offenses, the crime of "rape" cannotbe committed where the "person" is dead at the time of the offense. In such a situation, thedefendant could be charged with attempted rape if the defendant believed that the "person" wasalive at the time of the crime (see People v Gorman, 150 AD2d 797, 797 [2d Dept 1989],lv denied 74 NY2d 847 [1989], denied upon reconsideration 75 NY2d 770[1989]), or sexual misconduct under section 130.20 (3), which prohibits "sexual conduct with. . . a dead human body." If article 130, relying on the definition of person in section10.00 (7), draws a distinction between a living human being and a "dead human body," then wesee no reason that article 150 should not do so as well. Indeed, the distinguishing factor thatelevates arson in the third degree to arson in the second degree is the danger to human life; ifthere is no living person in the building, then there is no danger to human life.
According to the testimony of the Deputy Medical Examiner, the evidence "all indicate[d]that [the mother] was already dead at the time the fire was started." The evidence also establishedthat the daughter would have died within a minute of suffering one particular stab wound to herchest. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People (see Contes, 60NY2d at 621), we thus conclude that the evidence is legally insufficient to establish that either ofthe victims was still alive at the time the fires were started (see generally Bleakley, 69NY2d at 495). Inasmuch as the evidence is legally sufficient to establish the lesser includedoffense of arson in the third degree (Penal Law § 150.10 [1]), which requires onlythat a person "intentionally damages a building or motor vehicle by starting a fire or causing anexplosion," we modify the judgment by reducing the conviction of arson in the second degree toarson in the third degree (see CPL 470.15 [2] [a]) and vacating the sentence imposed onthat count, and we remit the matter to County Court for sentencing thereon.Present—Carni, J.P., Lindley, NeMoyer, Curran and Troutman, JJ.