People v Barnett
2018 NY Slip Op 00968 [158 AD3d 1279]
February 9, 2018
Appellate Division, Fourth Department
As corrected through Wednesday, March 28, 2018


[*1]
 The People of the State of New York, Appellant, v DeyontayBarnett, Respondent.

John J. Flynn, District Attorney, Buffalo (Julie Bender Fiske of counsel), for appellant.

The Legal Aid Bureau of Buffalo, Inc., Buffalo (Deborah K. Jessey of counsel), fordefendant-respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Erie County Court (James A.W. McLeod, A.J.), dated April 12,2017. The order granted defendant's motion to dismiss the superceding indictment.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously reversed on the law, themotion is denied, the superseding indictment is reinstated and the matter is remitted to ErieCounty Court for further proceedings on the superseding indictment.

Memorandum: The People appeal from an order granting defendant's motion to dismiss thesuperseding indictment on statutory speedy trial grounds. This case arises from the discovery of a.45 caliber pistol in defendant's apartment by parole officers while they were conducting a homevisit and curfew check at defendant's residence. Defendant was originally indicted for criminalpossession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03 [3]). Followingan examination of the grand jury minutes, County Court (DiTullio, J.) determined that theproceedings were defective and granted that part of defendant's omnibus motion seeking todismiss the indictment. By superseding indictment filed the same day as the dismissal of theoriginal indictment, defendant was charged with criminal possession of a weapon in the thirddegree (§ 265.02 [1]). Defendant thereafter moved to dismiss the supersedingindictment on statutory speedy trial grounds. We agree with the People that CountyCourt (McLeod, A.J.) erred in granting that motion inasmuch as the statutory speedy trial periodhad not expired.

Where, as here, the defendant is charged with a felony, the People must announce readinessfor trial within six months of the commencement of the action (see CPL 30.30 [1] [a];People v Cooper, 90 NY2d 292, 294 [1997]). The statutory period is calculated by"computing the time elapsed between the filing of the first accusatory instrument and the People'sdeclaration of readiness, subtracting any periods of delay that are excludable under the terms ofthe statute and then adding to the result any postreadiness periods of delay that are actuallyattributable to the People and are ineligible for an exclusion" (People v Cortes, 80 NY2d201, 208 [1992]).

Here, there is no dispute that the statutory speedy trial period was 183 days, and that the164-day period before the People announced their readiness for trial at defendant's arraignmenton May 26, 2016, was prereadiness delay that is chargeable to the People. Thus, at the time ofdefendant's arraignment, 19 days remained on the speedy trial clock. The period from May 26 toJanuary 11, 2017, is excluded from the speedy trial calculation as delay attributable to the filingof motions by defendant and suppression hearings (see CPL 30.30 [4] [a]). Defendant'sspeedy trial motion was based on the People's inability to proceed on January 11, 2017, the thirdday of defendant's scheduled suppression hearings, because of the temporary unavailability oftheir witness. The People advised the court and defendant that the witness's father wasundergoing surgery that day, and that the witness would be available to testify the next day,January 12, 2017. Despite the People's request for a one-day continuance of the hearings, thecourt urged the parties to "work out a middle ground" and directed them to return to court with anupdate on February 2, 2017. On February 2, 2017, defendant rejected the plea offer, and the courtrescheduled the continuation of the hearings.

In granting defendant's motion to dismiss the superseding indictment, the court charged tothe People the entire 22-day period from January 11, 2017 to February 2, 2017. That was error.We agree with the People that a witness's one-day unavailability while her father is undergoingheart surgery is an excludable delay that was "occasioned by exceptional circumstances" (CPL30.30 [4] [g]; see e.g. People vHarden, 6 AD3d 181, 182 [1st Dept 2004], lv denied 3 NY3d 641 [2004]; People v Lopez, 2 AD3d 234, 234[1st Dept 2003], lv denied 2 NY3d 742 [2004]; People v Rodriguez, 212 AD2d368, 369 [1st Dept 1995], lv denied 85 NY2d 913 [1995]). Moreover, the ensuing 21-dayadjournment until February 2, 2017 was attributable to the court and not chargeable to the People(see People v Goss, 87 NY2d 792, 798 [1996]), inasmuch as the People had requested aone-day adjournment and "any period of an adjournment in excess of that actually requested bythe People is excluded" (People vHernandez, 92 AD3d 802, 803 [2d Dept 2012], lv denied 19 NY3d 961 [2012]).We reject defendant's contention that the period of adjournment resulted from nonfeasance orlack of due diligence by the People.

We further agree with the People that the court erred in charging to them the three-day periodbeginning February 21, 2017, through February 23, 2017, and we reject defendant's contentionthat the court erred in not charging to the People the entire period from February 15, 2017, toFebruary 23, 2017. Those days were not postreadiness delay inasmuch as the People were readyfor trial on January 12, 2017, and the original indictment was not dismissed until February 23,2017.

The record, however, establishes that the court erroneously excluded from the timechargeable to the People an eight-day period between the dismissal of the original indictment onFebruary 23, 2017, and the People's declaration of readiness to proceed on the supersedingindictment on March 3, 2017. Although the court determined that the People announced theirreadiness to proceed upon the filing of the superseding indictment on February 23, 2017, basedon the record before us, we conclude that those eight days must be charged to the People. Thus,at the time of defendant's motion, there were 11 days remaining in the statutory speedy trialperiod. Present—Whalen, P.J., Smith, DeJoseph, NeMoyer and Winslow, JJ.


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