| People v Lee |
| 2018 NY Slip Op 01216 [158 AD3d 982] |
| February 22, 2018 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Collin Lee, Appellant. |
Donna Maria Lasher, Youngsville, for appellant.
James R. Farrell, District Attorney, Monticello (Meagan K. Galligan of counsel), forrespondent.
Egan Jr., J.P. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Sullivan County (McGuire, J.),rendered December 29, 2014, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crimes ofcriminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree (two counts), criminally usingdrug paraphernalia in the second degree and criminal possession of a controlled substance in theseventh degree (two counts).
In September 2013, defendant was arrested after police executed a search warrant at hisresidence in Sullivan County and discovered, among other things, a quantity of heroin. Defendantwas thereafter indicted and charged with criminal possession of a controlled substance in thethird degree (two counts), criminally using paraphernalia in the second degree and criminalpossession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree (two counts). Following anunsuccessful motion to suppress his confession to police, County Court conducted a hearing withrespect to defendant's application requesting judicial diversion to a substance abuse treatmentprogram pursuant to CPL 216.05. Following a judicial diversion hearing, County Court denieddefendant's application. Defendant thereafter moved to vacate County Court's order, whichmotion was denied. Defendant then pleaded guilty to each count as charged in the indictment,with the understanding that he was not waiving his right to appeal. He was sentenced as a secondfelony offender to an aggregate prison term of eight years, to be followed by three years ofpostrelease supervision. Defendant now appeals.
Initially, we find without merit defendant's contention that County Court erred by failing[*2]to set forth on the record its findings of fact and conclusionsof law following a Huntley hearing (see CPL 710.60 [6]; People vMendoza, 82 NY2d 415, 421 [1993]; People v Pagan, 103 AD3d 978, 979 [2013], lv denied 21NY3d 1018 [2013]). Contrary to defendant's assertion, after the Huntley hearing, CountyCourt rendered a decision from the bench wherein it set forth the facts relevant to defendant'sarrest and subsequent custodial interrogation. County Court expressly determined that defendanthad been properly advised of his Miranda rights, knowingly, intelligently and voluntarilywaived same and thereafter voluntarily provided an incriminating statement to the police, absentany threats, coercion or duress. Although County Court did not cite to any specific legal authorityin support of its determination, it is evident that County Court weighed the credibility of thePeople's lone witness, sufficiently set forth its findings of fact and thereafter applied the properlegal standard in rendering its conclusions of law. Accordingly, we discern no reason to disturbCounty Court's denial of defendant's suppression motion (see CPL 710.60 [6]; Peoplev Pagan, 103 AD3d at 979).
We do find, however, that County Court should have referred defendant's application forjudicial diversion to the judge who had been designated by the Administrative Judge for theThird Judicial District as the Superior Court for drug treatment in Sullivan County. As relevanthere, it is the duty of the Chief Administrator of the Courts, when assigning matters that areeligible for judicial diversion pursuant to CPL article 216, to ensure that such cases "shall beassigned to court parts in the manner provided by the [C]hief [A]dministrator and that, to theextent practicable, such cases are presided over by judges who, by virtue of the structure,caseload and resources of the parts and the judges' training, are in the best position to provideeffective supervision over such cases, such as the drug treatment courts" (Judiciary Law§ 212 [2] [r]; see People vCora, 135 AD3d 987, 988 [2016]). To that end, Rules of the Chief Administrator of theCourts (22 NYCRR) § 143.2 (c) provides that, "[w]here a Superior Court orders analcohol and substance abuse evaluation pursuant to [CPL 216.05 (1)] to determine whether thedefendant should be offered judicial diversion for alcohol and substance abuse treatment under[CPL] article 216, the case shall be referred for further proceedings to: (1) the Superior Court fordrug treatment; or (2) any other part in Superior Court designated as a Drug Treatment Court partby the administrative judge for the judicial district in which the county is located or other part inSuperior Court designated to adjudicate such cases by the administrative judge where the judgeor justice presiding in the part . . . is in the best position to provide effectivesupervision over cases eligible for judicial diversion" (see 22 NYCRR 43.1, 143.1[c]).
Here, County Court was not designated by the Administrative Judge for the Third JudicialDistrict to preside over the drug treatment court in Sullivan County. Unlike the situation beforethis Court in People v Cora (135 AD3d at 988), there is nothing in the record presentlybefore us indicating that the designated judge ever recused himself in this case, nor is thereanything demonstrating that it was otherwise impractical for him to preside over defendant'sapplication for judicial diversion (see Judiciary Law § 212 [2] [r]).Accordingly, while County Court had jurisdiction to hear the subject felony case (seeCPL 10.10 [2] [b]; 10.20 [1] [a]), once an alcohol and substance abuse evaluation was orderedfor defendant (see CPL 216.05 [1])—for the express purpose of determiningwhether he was eligible for judicial diversion—the case should have been referred to thedesignated Superior Court for drug treatment pursuant to 22 NYCRR part 143. Accordingly,under the circumstances presented, we find that County Court was without authority to presideover defendant's judicial diversion hearing (see 22 NYCRR 143.2; compare People vCora, 135 AD3d at 988). Based on this Court's holding, defendant's remaining contention hasbeen rendered academic.
Lynch, Clark, Mulvey and Rumsey, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on thelaw, and matter remitted to the Superior Court designated as a Drug Treatment Court in SullivanCounty by the Administrative Judge for the Third Judicial District for further proceedings notinconsistent with this Court's decision.