| Matter of Charlotte MM. v Commissioner of Children & FamilyServs. |
| 2018 NY Slip Op 01367 [159 AD3d 1081] |
| March 1, 2018 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| In the Matter of Charlotte MM., Petitioner, v Commissioner ofChildren and Family Services, Respondent. |
Law Office of Vincent U. Uba, Albany (Vincent U. Uba of counsel), for petitioner.
Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Laura Etlinger of counsel), forrespondent.
McCarthy, J. Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by order ofthe Supreme Court, entered in Albany County) to review a determination of the Office ofChildren and Family Services denying petitioner's application to have a report maintained by theState Central Register of Child Abuse and Maltreatment amended to be unfounded andexpunged.
Petitioner is the mother of four children. In October 2010, while she and her ex-husbandwere engaged in a custody dispute, two of the children (then ages 13 and 17) were living withpetitioner in Schenectady County and the other two were living with their father in CortlandCounty. Petitioner traveled to Nigeria for nine days to see her ill mother, without informing thechildren that she was leaving the country. The Cortland County Department of Social Services(hereinafter DSS) was directed to investigate the situation. After conducting an investigation,DSS indicated its report against petitioner for inadequate guardianship and lack of supervision ofthe two children.
Petitioner requested a hearing to challenge the findings of child maltreatment and to have theindicated report amended to be unfounded and expunged from the State Central Register of ChildAbuse and Maltreatment. At the hearing, DSS relied on its case file, including investigationprogress notes. Petitioner testified on her own behalf. The Office of Children and FamilyServices (hereinafter OCFS) determined that petitioner failed to exercise the minimum degree ofcare under the circumstances, that it was not reasonable to leave the subject children [*2]alone without planning for their supervision and that the report ofmaltreatment was established by a fair preponderance of the evidence. Petitioner moved forreconsideration, but OCFS replied that it lacked authority to entertain the motion. Petitioner thencommenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking review of OCFS's decision and its refusalto reconsider.[FN*] Becausethe issue to be decided in this proceeding is whether OCFS's determination was supported bysubstantial evidence, Supreme Court transferred the proceeding to this Court (see CPLR7804 [g]).
We confirm. Initially, petitioner claims that OCFS and DSS failed to provide her withcomplete information before the hearing. The record contains a cover letter indicating that thefile was provided to petitioner before the hearing. Petitioner's counsel came to the hearing with acopy of DSS's case file, although it had apparently been reproduced by petitioner in a format thatomitted some of the text. The Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter ALJ) allowed counsel toview DSS's copy of documents before the hearing and for that office to provide him with acomplete copy afterward. Counsel did not object to this procedure, stated that he wanted toproceed that day and did not object to admission of the case file into evidence. In this context, wereject the argument that petitioner was deprived of due process in relation to disclosure ofevidence.
Further, the ALJ did not violate lawful procedure by declining to accept statements signed bythe two children or allow them to testify by telephone. The ALJ initially noted that OCFS doesnot normally receive testimony from children who were alleged to have been maltreated. In thecontext of administrative hearings with relaxed evidentiary rules, this policy is rational because itprotects children from being forced to testify regarding abuse or maltreatment and from beingcoached to provide testimony that assists the parent alleged to have abused or maltreated thosechildren. Given these concerns, the ALJ did not abuse his discretion in declining to admit thechildren's statements. After seeking an offer of proof from petitioner's counsel, the ALJconcluded that the children would not have much to add beyond what was already included in therecord. Counsel agreed that many of the things that the children said in their statements werecontained in DSS's report. Additionally, the children's written statements, although notarized,were not sworn to under penalties of perjury. Under the circumstances of this administrativeproceeding, where the ALJ had discretion with regard to the admission of evidence, the ALJ didnot violate lawful procedure.
On the merits, this Court's review of OCFS's determination is limited to whether substantialevidence supports the finding of maltreatment (see Matter of Elizabeth B. v New York State Off. of Children & FamilyServs., 149 AD3d 8, 10 [2017]; Matter of Susan XX. v Tioga County Dept. of Social Servs., 74 AD3d1543, 1543-1544 [2010]). "To establish maltreatment, the agency [is] required to show by afair preponderance of the evidence that the physical, mental or emotional condition of thechild[ren] had been impaired or was in imminent danger of becoming impaired because of afailure by petitioner to exercise a minimum degree of care in providing the child[ren] withappropriate supervision or guardianship" (Matter of Gwen Y. v New York State Off. of Children & FamilyServs., 132 AD3d 1091, 1092 [2015] [internal [*3]quotation marks and citation omitted]; see 18 NYCRR432.1 [b] [1] [ii]). Courts will generally not interfere with the credibility determinations made byan agency after a hearing and, "[i]f substantial evidence is present in the record, this Court cannotsubstitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency, even if a contrary result isviable" (Matter of Stephen C. vJohnson, 39 AD3d 932, 933 [2007] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted],lv denied 9 NY3d 804 [2007]). "[H]earsay is admissible in expungement hearings and, 'ifsufficiently relevant and probative, may constitute substantial evidence to support the underlyingdetermination' " (Matter of Ribya BB. v Wing, 243 AD2d 1013, 1014 [1997],quoting Matter of Robert OO. v Dowling, 217 AD2d 785, 786 [1995], affd 87NY2d 1043 [1996]; see Matter ofMichael NN. v Chenango County Dept. of Social Servs., 155 AD3d 1463, 1465 [2017];Matter of Markman v Carrion, 120AD3d 1580, 1581 [2014]).
Here, where there were discrepancies, OCFS generally credited the investigation notes overpetitioner's testimony. Although OCFS did find a few particular facts that are not supported bythe record, we see no reason to disturb the credibility findings and the majority of factual findingsin the determination. Petitioner testified that she left her children for nine days while she was inNigeria. She testified that her neighbors were watching the children, but she did not sign anyreleases for them to provide medical treatment or for educational purposes. The investigationnotes include summaries of interviews with the neighbors, the children, petitioner and herex-husband. According to most of those sources, petitioner did not tell them where she wasgoing, and there was confusion over when she would return from her trip. The neighborsexplained that petitioner asked them to knock on the door and wake the children each morning,but the neighbors did not stay at petitioner's apartment and were not asked to supervise thechildren. They told DSS that, after the investigation began, petitioner asked them to lie to thecaseworker about petitioner's instructions and their level of supervision over the children.
While petitioner was away, the 13-year-old child was suspended from school, and a teachercould not reach petitioner to discuss the situation. The two children argued, requiringintervention by a neighbor. The oldest child told DSS that the food that petitioner had left forthem turned rancid and they did not have any money, so their father had to wire them money forfood. Both children were distressed or scared due to being left alone without a plan for their care.Substantial record evidence supports OCFS's conclusion that petitioner left the children alone fornine days without a viable plan for them, such that she placed the children in imminent harm byfailing to provide adequate supervision and guardianship while she was abroad, and without anymeans for the children to communicate with her (see generally Matter of Stephen C. vJohnson, 39 AD3d at 933).
Garry, P.J., Egan Jr., Lynch and Pritzker, JJ., concur. Adjudged that the determination isconfirmed, without costs, and petition dismissed.
Footnote *:While this proceeding waspending, OCFS agreed to entertain petitioner's request for reconsideration, but denied the requestbecause petitioner failed to present new evidence that would change the outcome. This action byOCFS rendered moot petitioner's challenge to the original refusal to reconsider, and petitionerhas not challenged OCFS's decision after entertaining the request.