| People v Rouse |
| 2018 NY Slip Op 01868 [159 AD3d 530] |
| March 20, 2018 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Clarence Rouse, Appellant. |
Robert S. Dean, Center for Appellate Litigation, New York (John Vang of counsel), forappellant.
Darcel D. Clark, District Attorney, Bronx (Ramandeep Singh of counsel), forrespondent.
Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (James W. Hubert, J.), rendered April 23, 2015, asamended April 30, May 18, and May 20, 2015, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, ofattempted murder in the second degree, criminal use of a firearm in the first degree and twocounts of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, and sentencing him, as a secondviolent felony offender, to an aggregate term of 18 years, unanimously affirmed.
The verdict was based on legally sufficient evidence and was not against the weight of theevidence (see People v Danielson, 9NY3d 342, 348-349 [2007]). There is no basis for disturbing the jury's determinationsconcerning identification and credibility. The evidence, viewed as a whole, supports an inferencethat defendant had the requisite homicidal intent when he fired a shot that appeared to be aimeddirectly at a group of fleeing men (see generally People v Getch, 50 NY2d 456, 465[1980]). The jury could have reasonably concluded that defendant was not firing a warningshot.
Defendant was not deprived of a fair trial by the court's comments, during thecross-examination of the police witnesses, that allegedly denigrated defense counsel. While thecourt may have displayed exasperation at counsel's repeated failure to comply with the court'srulings and directives, it was justified in acting "to keep the proceedings within the reasonableconfines of the issues and to encourage clarity rather than obscurity in the development of proof"(People v Moulton, 43 NY2d 944, 945 [1978]; see also People v Melendez, 31 AD3d 186, 196-198 [1st Dept2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 927 [2006]). Assuming that some of the court's comments mayhave been better left unsaid, a review of the record as a whole shows that "the jury was notprevented from arriving at an impartial judgment on the merits" (Moulton, 43 NY2d at946).
The evidentiary rulings challenged by defendant were provident exercises of discretion thatdid not deprive defendant of a fair trial or impair his right to cross-examine witnesses and presenta defense (see Crane v Kentucky, 476 US 683, 689-690 [1986]; Delaware v VanArsdall, 475 US 673, 678-679 [1986]). Defendant received a full opportunity tocross-examine a police witness about his involvement in a ticket-fixing scandal, and theadditional areas that counsel wished to explore were remote from the officer's credibility.Anonymous 911 calls proffered by defendant had minimal relevance or probative value on theissue of whether an officer correctly identified defendant as the person who fired the shot.Finally, as to the matter for which defendant sought to call an additional police witness, theevidence was cumulative to undisputed facts already in evidence.
We perceive no basis for reducing the sentence. Concur—Sweeny, J.P.,Manzanet-Daniels, Gische, Kahn, Oing, JJ.