| People v Davis |
| 2018 NY Slip Op 02051 [159 AD3d 1531] |
| March 23, 2018 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Jeremy M.Davis, Appellant. |
Timothy P. Donaher, Public Defender, Rochester (Janet C. Somes of counsel), fordefendant-appellant.
Sandra Doorley, District Attorney, Rochester (Joseph Plukas of counsel), forrespondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Monroe County (Alex R. Renzi, J.), renderedJuly 30, 2014. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of criminal possession ofa weapon in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree.
It is hereby ordered that the case is held, the decision is reserved and the matter is remitted toSupreme Court, Monroe County, for further proceedings in accordance with the followingmemorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict ofcriminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law§ 265.03 [3]) and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree(§ 265.02 [3]). For reasons stated in the codefendant's appeal (see People v Clay, 147 AD3d1499, 1499-1500 [4th Dept 2017], lv denied 29 NY3d 1030 [2017]), we concludethat Supreme Court, following a separate suppression hearing that established the same materialfacts as those established during the hearing in connection with the codefendant, properly refusedto suppress tangible evidence seized by the police after an incident in which an officer and hispartner approached a parked vehicle that was occupied by defendant, the codefendant, and twoother people.
We agree with defendant, however, that the court erred in summarily denying his motion topreclude the identification testimony of the officer and his partner in the absence of noticepursuant to CPL 710.30 (1) (b). "When the People intend to offer at trial 'testimony regarding anobservation of the defendant either at the time or place of the commission of the offense or uponsome other occasion relevant to the case, to be given by a witness who has previously identifiedhim as such,' the [People are] require[d] . . . to notify the defense of such intentionwithin 15 days after arraignment and before trial" (People v Pacquette, 25 NY3d 575, 578-579 [2015], quoting CPL710.30 [1] [b]). As is evident from the language of CPL 710.30, "the statute contemplates. . . two distinct pretrial 'viewings' of a defendant by an eyewitness. First is thewitness's actual observation of a defendant either at the time or place of commission ofthe crime or some other occasion relevant to the case. This is the observation, relevant to andprobative of a defendant's guilt or innocence, which forms the basis for the witness's prospectivetrial testimony. Second, there is a separate, [prosecution- or] police-initiated,identification procedure, such as a lineup, showup or photographic array, which takesplace subsequent to the observation forming the basis for the witness's trial testimony and priorto the trial . . . [T]his is the occasion where the witness points at a defendant andsays, 'That's the one' " (People v Peterson, 194 AD2d 124, 128 [3d Dept 1993],lv denied 83 NY2d 856 [1994]).
The procedure contemplated by the statute is simple: "[t]he People serve their notice upondefendant, the defendant has an opportunity to move to suppress and the court may hold aWade hearing . . . If the People fail to provide notice, the prosecution maybe precluded from introducing such evidence at trial" (Pacquette, 25 NY3d at 579; see People v Boyer, 6 NY3d 427,431 [2006]). "The purpose of the notice requirement is twofold: it provides the defense [*2]with 'an opportunity, prior to trial, to investigate the circumstancesof the [evidence procured by the state] and prepare the defense accordingly' and 'permits anorderly hearing and determination of the issue of the fact . . . thereby preventing theinterruption of trial to challenge initially the admission into evidence of the[identification]' " (Pacquette, 25 NY3d at 579, quoting People v Briggs,38 NY2d 319, 323 [1975]). "Thus, the statute contemplates 'pretrial resolution of theadmissibility of identification testimony where it is alleged that an improper procedureoccurred' " (id., quoting People v Rodriguez, 79 NY2d 445, 452[1992]).
Here, the People provided a blank CPL 710.30 notice to defendant and, in response to thatpart of his omnibus motion seeking preclusion, asserted that "[t]here were no identificationprocedures which would require a CPL 710.30 notice." The record before us establishes,however, that the officer and his partner may have engaged in showup identification proceduresundertaken "at the deliberate direction of the State" that required notice pursuant to CPL 710.30(People v Newball, 76 NY2d 587, 591 [1990]; see Pacquette, 25 NY3d at577-580; People v Hayes, 162 AD2d 410, 410 [1st Dept 1990], lv denied 78NY2d 1011 [1991]; cf. People v Gissendanner, 48 NY2d 543, 552 [1979];Peterson, 194 AD2d at 128-129). The evidence at the suppression hearing establishedthat defendant fled from the front passenger seat of the parked vehicle and was unsuccessfullypursued by the officer, and that the officer knew defendant was apprehended because the officersaw defendant after he was later taken into custody by a third officer. The record furtherindicates, and the People do not dispute, that, after defendant was arrested and brought to thepolice station by the third officer at the officer's direction, the officer identified defendant as thefront seat passenger who fled from the parked vehicle. Additionally, contrary to the People'scontention, in the absence of a hearing on the identification issue, the record is insufficient tosupport the conclusion that the partner did not perform an identification procedure. Indeed, therecord supports the inference that the partner accompanied the officer back to the police station,had some subsequent interaction with defendant at that location, and also could have performed aprocedure identifying defendant as the individual he observed earlier during the incident.
Although the People contend that any police station identifications were merelyconfirmatory, and it appears from the record that the officer and his partner may have beenfamiliar with defendant prior to the subject incident, we are precluded from affirming on thatground inasmuch as the court did not rule on that issue (see CPL 470.15 [1]; People v Ingram, 18 NY3d 948,949 [2012]; People v LaFontaine, 92 NY2d 470, 473-474 [1998], rearg denied 93NY2d 849 [1999]; People vGambale, 150 AD3d 1667, 1670 [4th Dept 2017]).
Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that the issue whether the officer and his partnerengaged in identification procedures at the police station and, if so, whether any suchidentifications were merely confirmatory, must be resolved after a hearing, which we note wasrepeatedly requested by defense counsel during argument on the motion to preclude (seePeople v Castagna, 196 AD2d 879, 880 [2d Dept 1993]; Hayes, 162 AD2d at 410;People v Baron, 159 AD2d 710, 711 [2d Dept 1990]). We thus hold the case, reservedecision, and remit the matter to Supreme Court for a hearing to determine whether the officerand his partner engaged in identification procedures at the police station within the purview ofCPL 710.30 and, if so, whether such identifications were merely confirmatory.Present—Smith, J.P., Peradotto, Lindley, Curran and Winslow, JJ.