| People v Valcarcel |
| 2018 NY Slip Op 02362 [160 AD3d 1034] |
| April 5, 2018 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Oscar Valcarcel, Also Known as Oscar Figueroa,Appellant. |
Sandra M. Colatosti, Albany, for appellant.
P. David Soares, District Attorney, Albany (Vincent Stark of counsel), for respondent.
Aarons, J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (McDonough, J.), renderedOctober 30, 2014 in Albany County, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of murderin the first degree (two counts) and murder in the second degree (three counts).
In December 2013, police officers from the City of Albany Police Department, in response toa call from the victim's friend, discovered the victim's body lying in a pool of blood in hisapartment. After obtaining an exigent circumstances order, the detectives pinged the victim's cellphone and tracked it to a Dunkin Donuts wherein defendant was the only customer. Thedetectives eventually spoke with defendant and, after an investigation, defendant was chargedwith two counts of murder in the first degree (intentional felony murder) and two counts ofmurder in the second degree (felony murder) with the underlying felonies being burglary in thesecond degree and robbery in the third degree. Defendant was also charged with another count ofmurder in the second degree (intentional murder). Following a jury trial, defendant was convictedas charged and thereafter sentenced by Supreme Court to concurrent prison terms of 25 years tolife on each count. Defendant appeals.
Defendant argues that the evidence was not legally sufficient to support any of the felonymurder convictions because the People failed to show that he remained unlawfully in the victim'sapartment for the purpose of committing a crime therein or that he killed the victim infurtherance of a robbery. For the same reasons, defendant also argues that the verdict with respectto the felony murder charges was against the weight of the evidence. We disagree.
[*2] As pertinent here, a person is guilty of murder in the firstdegree when he or she, "[w]ith intent to cause the death of another person, . . .causes the death of such person . . . while . . . in the course ofcommitting or attempting to commit and in furtherance of robbery [or] burglary in the. . . second degree" (Penal Law § 125.27 [1] [a] [vii]). A person isguilty of murder in the second degree when "he [or she] commits or attempts to commit robbery[or] burglary . . . and, in the course of and in furtherance of such crime or ofimmediate flight therefrom, he [or she] . . . causes the death of a person [that wasnot a participant]" (Penal Law § 125.25 [3]). Burglary in the second degree requiresthat the People show that defendant "knowingly enter[ed] or remain[ed] unlawfully" in thevictim's dwelling "with intent to commit a crime therein" (Penal Law § 140.25 [2]).Robbery in the third degree requires that the People demonstrate that defendant "forcibly [stole]property" (Penal Law § 160.05). As relevant here, "[a] person forcibly stealsproperty and commits robbery when, in the course of committing a larceny, he [or she] uses. . . physical force upon another person for the purpose of . . .[p]reventing or overcoming resistance to the taking of the property" (Penal Law§ 160.00 [1]).
At trial, the victim's friend testified that when he went to visit the victim, he noticed that theplexiglass pane outside of the victim's apartment was smashed. He further testified that it was notbroken the previous night. The friend noticed that the inside vestibule door was ajar and he called911 to report a possible burglary. A detective with the City of Albany Police Departmentresponded to the victim's apartment and testified that the broken plexiglass was indicative of aforced entry. The detective testified that he went inside the apartment and it was disheveled andfurniture was thrown about as though there had been a struggle. The detective then discoveredthe victim lying face down in a large pool of blood. The victim was unresponsive and the pocketson his shorts had been turned inside out. The victim's cell phone was missing, and anotherdetective testified that it was pinged so that it could be located. The latitude and longitude pingsled to a Dunkin Donuts and defendant was the sole person in there. After defendant left theDunkin Donuts, the detective and his partner followed him and eventually stopped him. Thedetective testified that defendant admitted that he had the victim's cell phone. Defendant wasinterviewed at the police station wherein he indicated that he was in possession of some of thevictim's property. A detective also testified that blood was on defendant's pants. Defendant wasthereafter arrested and the property was inventoried, which included the victim's backpack,Medicare card, Social Security card, clothing, DVDs and other electronic items.
The pathologist who performed an autopsy of the victim stated that the victim did not havedefensive wounds and that the victim's injuries suggested that he was held down, pressure wasapplied to his neck and that he was cut with a sharp instrument. The pathologist concluded thatthe cause of death was asphyxiation resulting from an assault. A forensic scientist testified thatthe blood found on defendant's pants matched the victim's DNA. A police officer who collectedand reviewed security videos depicting the area by the victim's apartment stated that defendantwas the only person to leave and enter the victim's apartment building on the night inquestion.
Viewing the foregoing evidence in the light most favorable to the People, we conclude thatthe evidence was legally sufficient to support the convictions of murder in the first degree(counts 1 and 2) and murder in the second degree (counts 3 and 4). Considering the evidence ofthe broken plexiglass, the security footage demonstrating that defendant was the only person toenter the apartment building during the early morning hours of the day in question, the lack ofdefensive wounds on the victim, defendant's possession of some of the victim's belongings andthe presence of the victim's DNA on defendant's pants, the jury could rationally conclude thatdefendant unlawfully entered the victim's apartment with the intent to commit a crime therein (see People v Jacobs, 37 AD3d 868,870 [2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 923 [2007]; People v Fogarty, 12 AD3d 854, 856-857 [2004], lv denied4 NY3d 763 [2005]; see generallyPeople v Henderson, 25 NY3d 534, 539-540 [2015]). Additionally, defendantrecognizes that some evidence at trial suggested that he stole property from the victim, namelythat he possessed some of the victim's items and the fact that the victim's pockets werediscovered inside out. This evidence, coupled with the pathologist's testimony that the victim waslikely held down, cut with a sharp instrument and died of asphyxiation, was legally sufficient forthe jury to find that defendant killed the victim in furtherance of a robbery (see People v Chaplin, 134 AD3d1148, 1151-1152 [2015], lv denied 27 NY3d 1067 [2016]; People v Fogarty,12 AD3d at 856-857; People v Garrette, 223 AD2d 749, 752 [1996], lv denied 87NY2d 1019 [1996]).
Although an acquittal would not have been unreasonable, viewing the evidence in a neutrallight, we find the proof amply supports the predicate felony charges (see People v Young, 152 AD3d981, 982 [2017], lv denied 30 NY3d 955 [2017]; People v Novak, 148 AD3d 1352, 1357-1358 [2017], lvdenied 29 NY3d 1084 [2017]; People v Thomas, 112 AD3d 999, 1000-1001 [2013], lvdenied 22 NY3d 1141 [2014]). While defendant testified on his own behalf and provided analternative account of the incident at issue, the jury apparently rejected his version and we accorddeference to the jury's credibility determinations (see People v Favors, 155 AD3d 1081, 1083 [2017]). To the extentthat defendant contends that the remaining elements of the crimes of murder in the first degreeand murder in the second degree were contrary to the weight of the evidence, such contention iswithout merit (see People v Chaplin, 134 AD3d at 1152; People v Burnell, 89 AD3d 1118,1120 [2011], lv denied 18 NY3d 922 [2012]).
Defendant failed to preserve his argument that certain counts in the indictment should havebeen dismissed as multiplicitous given that such argument was not specifically raised indefendant's pretrial motion to dismiss (see People v Knapp, 138 AD3d 1157, 1157 [2016]; People vHalpin, 261 AD2d 647, 647 [1999], lv denied 93 NY2d 971 [1999]). In any event,the claim is without merit (see People v Kindlon, 217 AD2d 793, 795 [1995], lvdenied 86 NY2d 844 [1995]).
Defendant argues that his motion to suppress should have been granted because exigentcircumstances did not exist for the warrantless use of pinging to track the victim's cell phone.Defendant, however, did not advance this argument as a ground for suppression and, therefore, itis not preserved for our review (seePeople v Durrin, 32 AD3d 665, 666 [2006]; People v Barton, 13 AD3d 721, 723 [2004], lv denied 5NY3d 785 [2005]). Even if preserved, defendant lacked standing to challenge the searchinasmuch as he admitted that the cell phone belonged to the victim and not him. Defendant thushad no legitimate expectation of privacy over the victim's cell phone (see People v Ross, 106 AD3d1194, 1196 [2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 1090 [2014]). Furthermore, the recorddiscloses that exigent circumstances existed to permit the police to ping and track the victim'scell phone without a warrant (see generally People v Knapp, 52 NY2d 689, 695-696[1981]).
Defendant's contention that Supreme Court's jury instructions as required by CPL 270.40were inadequate is also unpreserved in the absence of a timely objection thereto (see People v Russell, 155 AD3d1432, 1432 [2017], lv denied 30 NY3d 1119 [2018]). In any event, we perceive noerror in the court's instructions that would warrant a new trial (see People v LaDuke, 140 AD3d1467, 1470 [2016]; People vDashnaw, 37 AD3d 860, 862 [2007], lv denied 8 NY3d 945 [2007]).
Finally, defendant is correct that the convictions for murder in the seconddegree—[*3]counts 3, 4 and 5—should be dismissedbecause they are lesser included offenses of murder in the first degree—counts 1 and2—of which he was also convicted (see People v Miller, 6 NY3d 295, 303-304 [2006]; People v Davis, 155 AD3d 1311,1317 [2017], lv denied 30 NY3d 1114 [2018]; People v Jeremiah, 147 AD3d 1199, 1206 [2017], lv denied29 NY3d 1033 [2017]). Even though this argument is unpreserved, we exercise our interest ofjustice jurisdiction and modify the judgment accordingly (see CPL 470.15 [6] [a]).
Egan Jr., J.P., Mulvey and Pritzker, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is modified, andas a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, by reversing defendant's convictions of murderin the second degree under counts 3, 4 and 5 of the indictment; said counts dismissed and thesentences imposed thereon vacated; and, as so modified, affirmed.