| Matter of Rosa v New York City Hous. Auth., Straus Houses |
| 2018 NY Slip Op 02552 [160 AD3d 499] |
| April 12, 2018 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
[*1]
| In the Matter of Geraldine Rosa, Respondent, v NewYork City Housing Authority, Straus Houses, Appellant. |
David I. Farber, New York (Laura R. Bellrose of counsel), for appellant.
Jeanette Zelhof, Mobilization for Justice, Inc., New York (Sandra Gresl of counsel), forrespondent.
Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Alice Schlesinger, J.), entered July 22, 2016,annulling the determination of respondent New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA), datedMarch 9, 2015, which terminated the tenancy of petitioner for criminal drug activity and chronicrent delinquency, and remanding the matter for a new hearing before a different hearing officersolely on the rent delinquency charge, unanimously reversed, on the law, the determinationconfirmed, the petition denied, and the proceeding brought pursuant to CPLR article 78dismissed, without costs.
The IAS court erred in finding that NYCHA's administrative findings were in violation ofpetitioner's due process rights. First, the IAS court erred in rejecting the arresting officer'stestimony because the underlying criminal proceeding against petitioner had been dismissed andsealed. The sealing of a criminal case will not immunize a defendant against all futureconsequences of the charges, and an administrative tribunal is permitted to consider evidence ofthe facts leading to those charges when they are independent of the sealed records (Matter ofSkyline Inn Corp. v New York State Liq. Auth., 44 NY2d 695, 696 [1978]; Matter of Dockery v New York City Hous.Auth., 51 AD3d 575, 575 [1st Dept 2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 704 [2008]). TheIAS court's finding that the officer's testimony was improperly based on sealed records, ratherthan his independent recollection, was simply not accurate. Regardless, the "reception oferroneously unsealed evidence at [an administrative] hearing does not, without more, requireannulment of respondent's determination" (Matter of Charles Q. v Constantine, 85 NY2d571, 575 [1995]).
The IAS court also improperly rejected the officer's testimony as impermissible hearsay. It iswell-settled that hearsay is admissible in administrative proceedings, that it may be the basis foran administrative determination and—if sufficiently relevant and probative—mayconstitute substantial evidence alone (People ex rel. Vega v Smith, 66 NY2d 130, 139[1985]; Matter of Café La ChinaCorp. v New York State Liq. Auth., 43 AD3d 280, 281 [1st Dept 2007]). Petitioner didnot suffer any due process violation at the hands of NYCHA.
Further, our independent review of the record confirms that NYCHA's administrativefindings are supported by substantial evidence (see generally 300 Gramatan Ave. Assoc. vState Div. of Human Rights, 45 NY2d 176, 180-181 [1978]). The officer's hearsay andnonhearsay testimony, as well as petitioner's own admissions, were more than sufficient to meetthis standard (Café La China Corp., 43 AD3d at 281). Regardless, respondent hadthe discretion to terminate petitioner's tenancy based on her chronic failure to pay rent alone,which was clearly [*2]established at the administrative hearing(Matter of Hairston v New York CityHous. Auth., 144 AD3d 416, 417 [1st Dept 2016]).
We have considered the parties' remaining contentions and find them unavailing.Concur—Sweeny, J.P., Richter, Andrias, Webber, Moulton, JJ.