| People v Barnes |
| 2018 NY Slip Op 02642 [160 AD3d 890] |
| April 18, 2018 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Shawn Barnes, Appellant. |
Paul Skip Laisure, New York, NY (Ronald Zapata of counsel), for appellant.
Eric Gonzalez, District Attorney, Brooklyn, NY (Leonard Joblove and Ann Bordley ofcounsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (William E.Garnett, J.), rendered February 13, 2014, convicting him of criminal possession of stolenproperty in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
On July 24, 2010, the defendant was arraigned on a felony complaint. He was thereaftercharged, by indictment, with a felony. Prior to trial, the defendant moved to dismiss theindictment on the ground that he was deprived of his statutory and constitutional rights to aspeedy trial. The Supreme Court denied the motion.
The defendant was charged with a felony, so the People were required to be ready for trial insix months, accounting for any periods excluded under CPL 30.30 (4) (see CPL 30.30 [1][a]; [4]). The delay in providing the grand jury minutes was excludable from the calculation ofspeedy trial days, as the People are entitled to a reasonable period of time for this purpose (see People v Beasley, 69 AD3d741 [2010], affd 16 NY3d 289 [2011]). Moreover, part of the delay during the periodbefore the People provided the grand jury minutes was excludable because it was at thedefendant's request or with his consent (see CPL 30.30 [4] [b]; People v Whitley, 68 AD3d 790,791-792 [2009]; People v Gonzalez, 266 AD2d 562, 563 [1999]; People vDurette, 222 AD2d 692, 693 [1995]). Further, delays attributable to the People's motion tocompel a handwriting exemplar, or their application for permission to introduce certain of thedefendant's prior convictions in evidence, are similarly excludable (see CPL [*2]30.30 [4] [a]; People v Morris, 94 AD3d 912, 913 [2012]; People vDurette, 222 AD2d at 693). The periods attributable to the People's efforts to comply withthe defendant's requests for discovery were not unreasonable and are likewise excludable, orwere the result of continuances granted by the court at the defendant's request or with his consent(see CPL 30.30 [4]; People v McCray, 238 AD2d 442 [1997]; People vCaussade, 162 AD2d 4, 8-12 [1990]).
Inasmuch as the total time chargeable to the People did not exceed six months, the SupremeCourt properly denied that branch of the defendant's motion which was to dismiss the indictmentpursuant to CPL 30.30.
The Supreme Court also properly denied that branch of the defendant's motion which was todismiss the indictment on the ground that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated(see CPL 30.20; People v Taranovich, 37 NY2d 442, 445 [1975]; People v Cantoni, 140 AD3d 782,784 [2016]; People v Llorems, 133AD3d 465 [2015]).
The Supreme Court's ruling permitting the People to introduce certain prior convictionsaffords no basis for reversal. The evidence of the defendant's prior convictions was probative oneither the issue of his knowledge that the item he possessed was stolen (see People v Cockett, 95 AD3d1230, 1231 [2012]; People v Masone, 111 AD2d 189 [1985]), or on the issue ofabsence of mistake (see People v Trovato, 202 AD2d 457, 458 [1994]). Moreover,inasmuch as the probative value of the evidence outweighed the risk of unfair prejudice to thedefendant (see People v Till, 87 NY2d 835, 836 [1995]; People v Carrasquillo, 10 AD3d424 [2004]), the court's Molineux ruling was not an improvident exercise ofdiscretion (see People v Molineux, 168 NY 264 [1901]). In addition, the court'sinstructions to the jury on the proper use of that evidence alleviated any unfair prejudice resultingfrom its admission (see People vBeer, 146 AD3d 895 [2017]; People v Trovato, 202 AD2d at 458). Balkin, J.P.,Leventhal, Austin and Maltese, JJ., concur.