| People v Archer |
| 2018 NY Slip Op 02738 [160 AD3d 553] |
| April 19, 2018 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Tavil Archer, Appellant. |
Friedman Kaplan Seiler & Adelman LLP, New York (Priyanka Wityk of counsel), forappellant.
Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York (Brent Ferguson of counsel), forrespondent.
Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Ruth Pickholz, J. at suppression hearing;Gregory Carro, J. at jury trial and sentencing), rendered June 8, 2016, as amended July 29, 2016,convicting defendant of criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree (two counts)and tampering with physical evidence, and sentencing him, as a second felony offender, to anaggregate term of 3
We reject defendant's arguments concerning the sufficiency and weight of the evidencesupporting his conviction of possession of stolen property under a count relating to two stolenmoney orders. There is no basis for disturbing the jury's credibility determinations. There wascircumstantial evidence that defendant knew the money orders were stolen. Defendant's attemptto cash them the day after they were reported stolen established recent exclusive possession. Thejury was entitled to reject defendant's explanation of his possession of the property, and to drawthe inference that he knew it was stolen (see People v Cintron, 95 NY2d 329, 332 [2000];People v Starks, 70 AD3d 585,586 [1st Dept 2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 757 [2010]). That inference was also supportedby defendant's flight when the police arrived (see Cintron, 95 NY2d at 332).
The hearing court properly denied defendant's suppression motion. The court correctly foundthat the police pursuit of defendant was based on reasonable suspicion of criminality. Theofficers received a report that an undescribed man had been attempting to cash stolen moneyorders. When the uniformed officers arrived at the scene, and defendant fled immediately uponmaking eye contact, the officers reasonably inferred that defendant was the suspect (seePeople v Woods, 98 NY2d 627, 628 [2002]). The record also supports the court's alternativefinding that, irrespective of the legality of the pursuit, defendant's independent abandonment ofcontraband as he fled was an intentional relinquishment of any privacy interest, and was astrategic and calculated decision rather than a spontaneous reaction to the police activity (seePeople v Boodle, 47 NY2d 398, 402-404 [1979], cert denied 444 US 969 [1979]).Concur—Friedman, J.P., Richter, Andrias, Kapnick, Webber, JJ.