People v Huddleston
2018 NY Slip Op 02923 [160 AD3d 1359]
April 27, 2018
Appellate Division, Fourth Department
As corrected through Wednesday, May 30, 2018


[*1]
 The People of the State of New York,Respondent,
v
Tiyhise Huddleston, Jr., Appellant.

Frank H. Hiscock Legal Aid Society, Syracuse (Sara A. Goldfarb of counsel), fordefendant-appellant.

Tiyhise Huddleston, Jr., defendant-appellant pro se.

William J. Fitzpatrick, District Attorney, Syracuse (Nicole K. Intschert of counsel), forrespondent.

Appeal from a judgment of the Onondaga County Court (Thomas J. Miller, J.), renderedFebruary 19, 2015. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of criminalpossession of a controlled substance in the fourth degree.

It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict of criminalpossession of a controlled substance in the fourth degree (Penal Law § 220.09 [1]),defendant contends in his pro se supplemental brief that County Court erred in refusing tosuppress the evidence obtained by the police following the stop of the vehicle in which he was apassenger. We reject that contention.

As defendant correctly concedes, the police properly stopped the vehicle for a violation ofVehicle and Traffic Law § 375 (1) (b) (i) and, regardless of whether the stop waspretextual, it was lawful inasmuch as the police had probable cause to believe that the driver ofthe vehicle had committed a traffic violation (see People v Pealer, 89 AD3d 1504, 1506 [4th Dept 2011],affd 20 NY3d 447 [2013], cert denied 571 US 846 [2013], rearg denied24 NY3d 993 [2014]).

Following the lawful stop of the vehicle, the police determined that neither the driver nordefendant had a valid driver's license. "At that point, the [police] had a reasonable suspicioneither that the vehicle had been operated by an unlicensed driver, or that the vehicle was soongoing to be operated by an unlicensed driver, and thus its . . . towing was lawful"(People v Witt, 129 AD3d1449, 1450 [4th Dept 2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 937 [2015]; see People v Wilburn, 50 AD3d1617, 1618 [4th Dept 2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 742 [2008]; People v Cochran, 22 AD3d 677,677 [2d Dept 2005], lv denied 6 NY3d 753 [2005]). Contrary to defendant's contention,given the terms of the police department's written policy that was received in evidence at thesuppression hearing and the testimony of one of the police officers that the decision to tow thevehicle was made in accordance with that policy, which we note was in conformance withapplicable law (see generally Witt, 129 AD3d at 1450; Wilburn, 50 AD3d at1618), we conclude that the officers' decision to tow the vehicle was lawful (see People v Tardi, 28 NY3d 1077,1078-1079 [2016]; People vGabriel, 155 AD3d 1438, 1440-1441 [3d Dept 2017]). Moreover, "[t]he record does notsupport defendant's contention that the [corresponding] inventory search was a mere pretext touncover incriminating evidence; rather, the testimony established that the [officers'] 'intention forthe search was to inventory the items in the vehicle' " (People v Morman, 145 AD3d1435, 1436 [4th Dept 2016], lv denied 29 NY3d 999 [2017], quoting People v Padilla, 21 NY3d 268,273 [2013], cert denied 571 US 889 [2013]).

Defendant further contends in his pro se supplemental brief that suppression is warrantedbecause an officer's trial testimony established for the first time that defendant was subjected toan illegal pat frisk, which unreasonably prolonged his detention and revealed no evidence ofcriminality. That contention is not properly before us. " 'Where, as here, the defendantfails to move to reopen a suppression hearing, he or she may not rely upon the trial testimony tochallenge the suppression ruling' " (People v Mosca, 294 AD2d 938, 939 [4thDept 2002], lv denied 99 NY2d 538 [2002]; see People v Gonzalez, 55 NY2d720, 721-722 [1981], rearg denied 55 NY2d 1038 [1982], cert denied 456 US1010 [1982]). Defendant's contention that the police otherwise unreasonably prolonged the trafficstop is not preserved for our review because he did not raise his contention before thesuppression court (see CPL 470.05 [2]). In any event, we conclude that defendant'scontention lacks merit inasmuch as there is no evidence that the police " 'inordinatelyprolong[ed] the detention beyond what was reasonable under the circumstances' " (People v Hale, 130 AD3d 1540,1541 [4th Dept 2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1088 [2015], denied reconsideration 27NY3d 998 [2016]; see People vRainey, 49 AD3d 1337, 1339 [4th Dept 2008], lv denied 10 NY3d 963 [2008];cf. People v Banks, 85 NY2d 558, 562-563 [1995], cert denied 516 US 868[1995]; People v Porter, 136 AD3d1344, 1345 [4th Dept 2016]).

We reject defendant's contention in his main and pro se supplemental briefs that he wasdenied effective assistance of counsel. We conclude that defendant did not meet his burden ofestablishing "that his attorney 'failed to provide meaningful representation' that compromised 'hisright to a fair trial' " (People vPavone, 26 NY3d 629, 647 [2015]). To the extent that defendant's claims of ineffectiveassistance of counsel in his main brief involve matters outside the record, they must be raised byway of a motion pursuant to CPL article 440 (see People v Lopez-Mendoza, 155 AD3d 526, 526-527 [1st Dept2017]; People v Murray, 154 AD3d881, 882-883 [2d Dept 2017], lv denied 30 NY3d 1118 [2018]).

Defendant failed to preserve for our review his contention in his main brief that the court insentencing him penalized him for exercising his right to a trial, "inasmuch as [he] failed to raisethat contention at sentencing" (People vStubinger, 87 AD3d 1316, 1317 [4th Dept 2011], lv denied 18 NY3d 862[2011]; see People v Pope, 141AD3d 1111, 1112 [4th Dept 2016], lv denied 29 NY3d 951 [2017]). In any event,that contention lacks merit. " 'Given that the quid pro quo of the bargainingprocess will almost necessarily involve offers to moderate sentences that ordinarily would begreater, it is also to be anticipated that sentences handed out after trial may be more severe thanthose proposed in connection with a plea' " (People v Martinez, 26 NY3d 196, 200 [2015]). Here, contrary todefendant's contention, "[t]here is no evidence that defendant was given the lengthier sentencesolely as a punishment for exercising his right to a trial" (People v Aikey, 94 AD3d 1485, 1486 [4th Dept 2012], lvdenied 19 NY3d 956 [2012] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Pope, 141 AD3dat 1112). Finally, the sentence is not unduly harsh or severe. Present—Smith, J.P.,Peradotto, Lindley, Curran and Winslow, JJ.


NYPTI Decisions © 2026 is a project of New York Prosecutors Training Institute (NYPTI) made possible by leveraging the work we've done providing online research and tools to prosecutors.

NYPTI would like to thank New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, New York State Senate's Open Legislation Project, New York State Unified Court System, New York State Law Reporting Bureau and Free Law Project for their invaluable assistance making this project possible.

Install the free RECAP extensions to help contribute to this archive. See https://free.law/recap/ for more information.