| People v Credell |
| 2018 NY Slip Op 03278 [161 AD3d 1563] |
| May 4, 2018 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Darnell Credell, Appellant. |
Bridget L. Field, Rochester, for defendant-appellant.
Darnell Credell, defendant-appellant pro se.
Kristyna S. Mills, District Attorney, Watertown (Harmony A. Healy of counsel), forrespondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Jefferson County Court (Kim H. Martusewicz, J.), renderedNovember 30, 2015. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of criminal sale of acontrolled substance in the third degree and criminal possession of a controlled substance in thethird degree.
It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him, upon a jury verdict, ofcriminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree (Penal Law § 220.39 [1])and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree (§ 220.16 [1]).At trial, a confidential informant identified defendant as the man who sold him drugs. Thistestimony was corroborated by an audio recording of the transaction, as well as by the undisputedfact that the informant entered the subject apartment with buy money and exited it with crackcocaine. Morever, while testifying in his own defense, defendant essentially admitted to being theinformant's drug dealer. There is no basis to disturb the jury's credibility determinations. Thus,contrary to defendant's contention, we conclude that, viewing the evidence in light of theelements of the crimes as charged to the jury (see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349 [2007]), the verdict is notagainst the weight of the evidence on the element of identity (see generally People vBleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). In fact, a different verdict would have beenunreasonable (see generally id.).
Contrary to defendant's further contention, County Court properly admitted evidence of hisprior uncharged drug sales to prove his intent to sell in connection with the crimes charged, aswell as to complete the narrative of events leading up thereto (see People v Whitfield, 115 AD3d 1181, 1182 [4th Dept 2014],lv denied 23 NY3d 1044 [2014]; People v Ray, 63 AD3d 1705, 1706 [4th Dept 2009], lvdenied 13 NY3d 838 [2009]; People v Tabora, 139 AD2d 540, 541 [2d Dept 1988],lv denied 72 NY2d 925 [1988]). We reject defendant's related contention that theprejudicial effect of such evidence outweighed its probative value (see People v Lee, 129 AD3d 1295,1298 [3d Dept 2015], lv denied 27 NY3d 1001 [2016]; Whitfield, 115 AD3d at1182). In any event, any error in admitting the disputed evidence is harmless (see People v Graham, 117 AD3d1584, 1585 [4th Dept 2014], lv denied 23 NY3d 1037 [2014]).
Defendant next contends that the court erred in refusing to suppress a scale recoveredpursuant to a search warrant. Even assuming, arguendo, that the scale should have beensuppressed, we conclude that any error is harmless (see People v Burdine, 147 AD3d 1471, 1472 [4th Dept 2017],amended on rearg 149 AD3d 1626 [4th Dept 2017], lv denied 29 NY3d 1076[2017]). The sentence is not unduly harsh or severe. We have considered defendant's remainingcontentions, including those raised in his pro se supplemental brief, and we conclude that nonewarrants relief.
Finally, we note that the uniform sentence and commitment form must be corrected to reflectthat defendant was convicted of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degreeunder count two of the indictment and not under count one, as it currently states.Present—Smith, J.P., Carni, DeJoseph, NeMoyer and Troutman, JJ.