| People v Roberts |
| 2018 NY Slip Op 03563 [161 AD3d 1381] |
| May 17, 2018 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v David Roberts, Appellant. |
Marshall Nadan, Kingston, for appellant.
David E. Woodin, Special Prosecutor, Catskill, for respondent.
Pritzker, J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Greene County (Wilhelm, J.),rendered December 1, 2015, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crime of criminalpossession of a controlled substance in the third degree.
In August 2014, State Trooper Gregory Overholt received a dispatch regarding a disturbanceat an apartment complex. Upon his arrival, he observed a white Jeep Cherokee driving at a highrate of speed in a reckless manner towards the complex's exit. He immediately turned on hisemergency lights, at which point he observed Russell Felter, the driver, and defendant, thepassenger, who both appeared nervous, attempt to flee before stopping again. Overholt detainedboth individuals, patted them down and placed them on the bumper of his vehicle. At this point,another state trooper arrived at the scene and subsequently saw a plastic bag containing heroin onthe passenger seat of the jeep. Felter and defendant were then arrested.
Defendant was charged by indictment with criminal possession of a controlled substance inthe third degree. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the traffic stop on thebasis that it was an illegal search and seizure. After conducting a Mapp hearing, CountyCourt denied the motion to suppress. Following a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of thecharged crime and sentenced, as a second felony offender, to 10 years in prison with three yearsof postrelease supervision. Defendant now appeals. We affirm.
Initially, defendant contends that the trooper lacked reasonable suspicion or probable [*2]cause to initiate the stop because the vehicle was not on a publicstreet. This contention is not preserved as defendant advanced no such argument at thesuppression hearing. Rather, defendant focused on describing the situation as an illegal detentionon the basis that the situation had resolved itself in that defendant, who admitted to causing thedisturbance, was leaving the property. County Court, in denying the motion to suppress, onlyaddressed the issue as framed by defendant, not as presented here. Therefore, this argument is notproperly before this Court (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Miranda, 27 NY3d 931, 932-933 [2016]; People v Graham, 25 NY3d 994,996-997 [2015]).
Defendant next contends that County Court erred in allowing the People to introducetestimony regarding uncharged criminal conduct. "While evidence of prior bad acts or unchargedcrimes is inadmissible to prove the crime charged or to show a defendant's propensity to committhis crime, an exception to this rule exists where the evidence is admitted to show a defendant'sintent, especially after the defendant has put his or her intent at issue" (People v Wright, 5 AD3d 873, 875[2004] [citations omitted], lv denied 3 NY3d 651 [2004]; accord People v Allen, 132 AD3d1156, 1159 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1107 [2016]). Here, from the outset of trial,defendant sought to portray Felter as the owner of the heroin at issue, beginning with defensecounsel's opening statement. Defendant also elicited testimony of a witness who claimed that thedrugs found in the jeep belonged to her, that Felter sold heroin and that she never knewdefendant to sell drugs. Inasmuch as defendant put his intent at issue, we find that evidence ofheroin—seized as a result of search warrants issued for defendant's home and a vehicleassociated with it—was relevant for the purpose of establishing defendant's knowledge ofand intent to sell heroin and was, therefore, properly admitted at trial. Additionally, evidence ofuncharged crimes that related to the sale and transportation of heroin for similar purposes wasalso properly admitted as it was probative of defendant's intent to sell heroin, an element of thecrime charged; County Court's limiting instruction and admonishment lessened the prejudicialimpact of this evidence (see People vWells, 141 AD3d 1013, 1019 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 1189 [2017]; People v Wilson, 100 AD3d 1045,1047-1048 [2012], lv denied 22 NY3d 998 [2013]). Therefore, his conviction isaffirmed.
Garry, P.J., McCarthy, Lynch and Clark, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isaffirmed.