| People v Anderson |
| 2018 NY Slip Op 03694 [161 AD3d 1097] |
| May 23, 2018 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Omar Anderson, Appellant. |
Richard L. Herzfeld, New York, NY, for appellant.
Anthony A. Scarpino, Jr., District Attorney, White Plains, NY (Brian R. Pouliot and WilliamC. Milaccio of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (BarryE. Warhit, J.), rendered October 15, 2015, convicting him of attempted assault in the first degreeand assault in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant was charged with various crimes after he hit the complainant in the head witha baseball bat. After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of attempted assault in the firstdegree and assault in the second degree.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People vContes, 60 NY2d 620 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish thedefendant's guilt of attempted assault in the first degree. Specifically, and contrary to thedefendant's contention, the evidence was legally sufficient to establish that the defendantintended to cause serious physical injury (see Penal Law §§ 10.00 [10];110.00, 120.10 [1]; People v Bracey, 41 NY2d 296, 301 [1977]; People v Newman, 153 AD3d 639,639 [2017]; People v Ekwegbalu,131 AD3d 982, 984 [2015]; People v Hildenbrandt, 125 AD2d 819, 820 [1986]).Next, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of theevidence (see CPL 470.15 [5]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 348 [2007]), we neverthelessaccord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, andobserve demeanor (see People v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383 [2004]; People v Bleakley,69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict ofguilty on the count of attempted assault in the first degree was not against the weight of theevidence (see People v Romero, 7NY3d 633 [2006]).
The defendant contends that the charge of assault in the second degree (Penal Law§ 120.05 [2]) should have been deemed dismissed as an inclusory concurrent countwhen the jury convicted him of attempted assault in the first degree (Penal Law§§ 110.00, 120.10 [1]). That contention is without merit. Since it is possible tocommit attempted assault in the first degree without committing assault in the second degree,assault in the second degree is not an inclusory concurrent count of attempted assault in the firstdegree (see CPL 300.30 [3]; 300.40 [3] [b]; People v Leon, 7 NY3d 109, 112 [2006]; People v Abrew,95 NY2d 806, 808-809 [2000]).
[*2] Viewing therecord as a whole, we find that the defendant was provided with meaningful representation(see People v Benevento, 91 NY2d 708, 712 [1998]; People v Baldi, 54 NY2d137, 147 [1981]).
The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80 [1982]).Balkin, J.P., Austin, Roman and Sgroi, JJ., concur.