| People v Jones |
| 2018 NY Slip Op 03703 [161 AD3d 1103] |
| May 23, 2018 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Shawn Jones, Appellant. |
Paul Skip Laisure, New York, NY (Meredith S. Holt of counsel), for appellant.
Eric Gonzalez, District Attorney, Brooklyn, NY (Leonard Joblove and Keith Dolan ofcounsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Ruth E.Shillingford, J.), rendered March 26, 2015, convicting him of burglary in the third degree andcriminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposingsentence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant was convicted of burglary in the third degree and criminal possession of stolenproperty in the fifth degree following a jury trial at which the prosecution presented evidence thathe took tools and carpentry equipment from a building owned by the complainant.
We agree with the Supreme Court's ruling permitting a lay witness to testify that, in hisopinion, the defendant was the person depicted in a surveillance video of the subject building,since the defendant's appearance had changed between the commission of the crime and the timeof trial. The witness testified that he knew the defendant from the neighborhood and through arelationship the witness had with the defendant's stepson, as well as from having seen thedefendant at the stepson's residence approximately once every other month over a two-yearperiod. Thus, under the circumstances of this case, the challenged testimony served to aid thejury in making an independent evaluation of the videotape evidence (see People vRussell, 79 NY2d 1024 [1992]; People v Franzese, 154 AD3d 706 [2017]; People v Walker, 78 AD3d 1082,1084 [2010]; People v Ruiz, 7AD3d 737, 738 [2004]). Moreover, contrary to the defendant's contention, the court'slimiting instructions regarding this testimony were appropriate (see People v Sanchez, 21 NY3d216 [2013]).
Similarly unavailing is the defendant's contention that the Supreme Court erred in giving thejury a Galbo charge (see People v Galbo, 218 NY 283 [1916]) to the effect thatthe defendant's guilt of burglary could be inferred from his recent, unexplained, and exclusivepossession of the stolen items. The prosecution presented both circumstantial and directevidence, including admissions made by the defendant during a series of telephone calls, that thedefendant committed the burglary and possessed the items, and there was no reasonable view ofthe evidence whereby the jury could have found that the defendant unlawfully possessed theproperty without also finding that he committed the burglary (see People v Howard, 60NY2d 999, 1001 [1983]; People v Lopez, 196 AD2d 891, 891-892 [1993]; People vDouze, 186 AD2d 753, 753-754 [1992]; cf. People v Baskerville, 60 NY2d [*2]374, 383-384 [1983]). Mastro, J.P., Dillon, Cohen and Iannacci, JJ.,concur.