| Matter of Harris v City of Poughkeepsie |
| 2018 NY Slip Op 03977 [162 AD3d 663] |
| June 6, 2018 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| In the Matter of Howard Harris, Petitioner, v City ofPoughkeepsie et al., Respondents. |
O'Neil & Burke, LLP, Poughkeepsie, NY (William J. Burke of counsel), forpetitioner.
McCabe and Mack, LLP, Poughkeepsie, NY (Andrea L. Gellen of counsel), forrespondents.
Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the City Administratorof the respondent City of Poughkeepsie dated October 22, 2015. The determination adopted thefindings of a hearing officer, made after a hearing pursuant to Civil Service Law§ 75, that the petitioner was guilty of certain charges of misconduct and terminatedthe petitioner's employment as a sanitation worker.
Adjudged that the determination is confirmed, the petition is denied, and the proceeding isdismissed on the merits, with costs.
The petitioner, a sanitation worker employed by the respondent City of PoughkeepsieDepartment of Public Works, was assigned, with other crew members, to perform an abatementat a property located within the respondent City of Poughkeepsie. The abatement consisted ofremoving trash and debris from the exterior of the subject property. Although there was a houseon the property, the work assignment pertained only to an abatement of the exterior of theproperty, and the petitioner and the other crew members were not authorized by their supervisorto enter the house.
At a disciplinary hearing held pursuant to Civil Service Law § 75, the petitionertestified that during the work assignment, two of his fellow crew members "started messing withthe window." One crew member entered the house through the window and then opened the doorof the house, through which the petitioner and other crew members entered. According to thepetitioner, once he and the other crew members were in the house, they began "shopping" foritems which might be of value to them. The petitioner removed a bicycle from inside the houseand placed it outside. One of the crew members started to move a television, but, upon hearingnoises from the upstairs of the house, the petitioner and the crew members exited the house. Thepolice were notified and when they came, the crew members learned that there were people in thehouse. The crew members finished the abatement and thereafter left the property; the petitionerdid not remove the bicycle from the property.
Thereafter, the petitioner was charged by the City with several acts of misconduct inconnection with the incident. Following the disciplinary hearing, the hearing officer determinedthat the petitioner was guilty of the first and second charges; specifically, for entering the housewithout authority and removing property that did not belong to him from the house. The hearingofficer recommended a two-month suspension without pay as the discipline to be imposed. TheCity Administrator accepted the hearing officer's findings as to guilt, but determined that thepetitioner's misconduct constituted acts of moral turpitude, rose to the level of criminality, andconstituted a [*2]breach of the public trust. Accordingly, the CityAdministrator terminated the petitioner's employment. The petitioner commenced this CPLRarticle 78 proceeding, contesting both the finding of guilt and the penalty imposed by the CityAdministrator.
Judicial review of an administrative determination in an employee disciplinary case madeafter a section 75 hearing is limited to considering whether the determination was supported bysubstantial evidence (see 300 Gramatan Ave. Assoc. v State Div. of Human Rights, 45NY2d 176, 179-180 [1978]; Matter ofSassi v City of Beacon, 145 AD3d 789, 790 [2016]; Matter of Argenti v Town of Riverhead, 131 AD3d 1053, 1054[2015]). Here, the determination of the City Administrator that the petitioner was guilty of themisconduct alleged in charges one and two was supported by substantial evidence (see Matterof Sassi v City of Beacon, 145 AD3d at 790; Matter of Bermel v Walcott, 112 AD3d 619, 620 [2013]; Matter of Morris v Calderone, 49AD3d 741, 742 [2008]). The petitioner's own testimony established that he knew he was notsupposed to be in the house and that he removed a bicycle from the house knowing that thebicycle did not belong to him.
A court may set aside an administrative penalty only if it is so disproportionate to the offenseas to be shocking to one's sense of fairness (see Matter of Waldren v Town of Islip, 6 NY3d 735, 736 [2005];Matter of Sassi v City of Beacon, 145 AD3d at 790). " 'That reasonable mindsmight disagree over what the proper penalty should have been does not provide a basis for. . . refashioning the penalty' " (Matter of Bolt v New York City Dept. of Educ., 30 NY3d 1065,1068 [2018], quoting City School Dist.of the City of N.Y. v McGraham, 17 NY3d 917, 920 [2011]). A penalty should not beset aside where it is not irrational and does not shock the conscience (see Matter of Bolt vNew York City Dept. of Educ., 30 NY3d at 1068). Here, the penalty of dismissal is notirrational and does not shock the conscience (see id.; Matter of Peterson v City of Poughkeepsie, 131 AD3d 1250, 1251[2015]; Matter of Ward v Juettner,63 AD3d 748, 748-749 [2009]; Matter of Johnson v Kelly, 2 AD3d 155, 156 [2003]).
Accordingly, the determination was proper. Rivera, J.P., Duffy, Barros and Iannacci, JJ.,concur.