| People v Fitzrandolph |
| 2018 NY Slip Op 04167 [162 AD3d 1537] |
| June 8, 2018 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Kevin Fitzrandolph, Appellant. |
The Legal Aid Bureau of Buffalo, Inc., Buffalo (Kristin M. Preve of counsel), fordefendant-appellant.
John J. Flynn, District Attorney, Buffalo (Daniel J. Punch of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Erie County Court (Michael F. Pietruszka, J.), renderedDecember 22, 2015. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a nonjury verdict, of murder in thesecond degree.
It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon a nonjury verdict ofmurder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [1]). Defendant contends that thePeople failed to establish his guilt by legally sufficient evidence because his intoxicationrendered him incapable of forming the requisite criminal intent (see§ 15.25), and the verdict is against the weight of the evidence with respect to theelement of intent. We reject that contention. Although there was evidence at trial that defendantconsumed alcohol, marihuana, and LSD prior to the commission of the crime, " '[a]nintoxicated person can form the requisite criminal intent to commit a crime, and it is for the trierof fact to decide if the extent of the intoxication acted to negate the element of intent' "(People v Madore, 145 AD3d1440, 1440 [4th Dept 2016], lv denied 29 NY3d 1034 [2017]). Here, defendant'sown expert psychiatrist testified that defendant intended to kill the victim, and the nature andextent of the stab wound was sufficient by itself to establish intent (see People v Tigner, 51 AD3d1045, 1045 [2d Dept 2008], lv denied 13 NY3d 863 [2009], denied uponreconsideration 14 NY3d 806 [2010]). Thus, viewing the evidence in the light mostfavorable to the People, we conclude that it is legally sufficient to establish defendant's criminalintent and, viewing the evidence in light of the elements of murder in the second degree, weconclude that the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence with respect to the element ofintent (see generally People vDanielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349 [2007]; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495[1987]).
We reject defendant's further contentions that County Court erred in concluding that theinsanity defense did not apply (see Penal Law § 40.15), and that the verdictis against the weight of the evidence because the testimony of the People's expert was "deeplyflawed." The statute provides that a defendant lacks criminal responsibility for a crime by reasonof mental disease or defect when, "as a result of mental disease or defect, he [or she] lackedsubstantial capacity to know or appreciate either: . . . [t]he nature and consequencesof such conduct; or . . . [t]hat such conduct was wrong" (id.). It is axiomaticthat, for the affirmative defense to apply, a defendant's conduct must be the result of his or hermental disease or defect; the defense is not applicable simply because a defendant is afflictedwith a mental illness. Here, the People's expert opined that defendant's conduct was principallycaused by his drug use rather than his mental illness, while defendant presented the testimony ofan expert psychiatrist that defendant's mental illness prevented him from appreciating thewrongfulness of his conduct. Therefore, it was within the province of the court to conclude thatthe affirmative defense of mental disease or defect did not apply in this instance (see People v Hadfield, 119 AD3d1217, 1222-1223 [3d Dept 2014], lv denied 25 NY3d 989 [2015]; People vGillis, 281 AD2d 698, 699 [3d Dept 2001], lv denied 96 NY2d 918 [2001];People v Bergamini, 223 AD2d 548, 549 [2d Dept 1996], lv denied 88 NY2d 933[1996]). "Where, as here, there was conflicting expert evidence concerning criminalresponsibility, the [court] was free to accept or reject in whole or in part the opinion of any expert. . . , at least in the absence of a serious flaw in the expert's testimony" (People v Hershey, 85 AD3d 1661,1662 [4th Dept 2011], lv denied 18 NY3d 883 [2012], cert denied 566 US 1022[2012] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Stoffel, 17 AD3d 992, 993 [4th Dept 2005], lvdenied 5 NY3d 795 [2005]). Inasmuch "[a]s we discern no 'serious flaw' in the opinionoffered by the People's expert, we are unable to conclude that [the court], in crediting suchtestimony, failed to give the evidence the weight it should be accorded" (Hadfield, 119AD3d at 1223 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Gillis, 281 AD2d at 699;People v Moss, 179 AD2d 271, 272-273 [4th Dept 1992], lv dismissed 80 NY2d932 [1992]).
Finally, defendant's sentence, which is only three years longer than the minimum sentencerequired by law (see Penal Law § 70.00 [3] [a] [i]), is not unduly harsh orsevere. Present—Whalen, P.J., Smith, Carni, Lindley and Winslow, JJ.