| People v Bell-Scott |
| 2018 NY Slip Op 04192 [162 AD3d 1558] |
| June 8, 2018 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Appellant, v Ramel Bell-Scott, Respondent. |
William J. Fitzpatrick, District Attorney, Syracuse (Victoria M. White of counsel), forappellant.
Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Onondaga County (John J. Brunetti, A.J.), datedSeptember 20, 2016. The order granted that part of defendant's omnibus motion seeking tosuppress oral statements made to Syracuse Police detectives.
It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously reversed on the law, thatpart of the omnibus motion seeking to suppress defendant's statements is denied, and the matteris remitted to Supreme Court, Onondaga County, for further proceedings on the indictment.
Memorandum: The People appeal from an order granting that part of defendant's omnibusmotion seeking to suppress oral statements that he made to Syracuse Police detectives. We agreewith the People that Supreme Court erred in suppressing those statements, and we thereforereverse the order, deny that part of the omnibus motion seeking suppression of defendant'sstatements and remit the matter to Supreme Court for further proceedings on the indictment.
Contrary to the court's conclusion, the evidence at the Huntley hearing establishesthat defendant was not in custody when he made the statements, and thus Mirandawarnings were not required (see generally Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436, 467 [1966])."In determining whether a defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes, '[t]he test isnot what the defendant thought, but rather what a reasonable [person], innocent of any crime,would have thought had he [or she] been in the defendant's position' " (People v Kelley, 91 AD3d 1318,1318 [4th Dept 2012], lv denied 19 NY3d 963 [2012], quoting People v Yukl, 25NY2d 585, 589 [1969], cert denied 400 US 851 [1970]). We reject defendant's contentionthat the People failed to meet their "burden of showing that [he] voluntarily went to the[detectives' office] where he allegedly made the inculpatory statements" (People vGonzalez, 80 NY2d 883, 884 [1992]). Indeed, the People "properly demonstrated byunchallenged hearsay testimony" that defendant voluntarily accompanied the officers to thedetectives' office for questioning and, inasmuch as defendant did not dispute that fact in either hismotion papers or his arguments on the motion, that testimony was sufficient to sustain thePeople's burden (People v Rodriguez, 188 AD2d 564, 564 [2d Dept 1992], lvdenied 81 NY2d 892 [1993]; see generally People v Norman, 304 AD2d 405, 405[1st Dept 2003], lv denied 100 NY2d 623 [2003]). We further conclude that defendantwas not in custody when he made the statements because he was informed that he was not underarrest and that he would be going home that day, he was not handcuffed, he was permitted toleave the interview room several times, he never asked to leave the office nor was he told that hecould not leave, and he was not arrested that day (see People v Weakfall, 108 AD3d 1115, 1115-1116 [4th Dept2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 1078 [2013]; see also People v Wilbert, 192 AD2d1109, 1109-1110 [4th Dept 1993], lv denied 81 NY2d 1082 [1993]; People vAnderson, 145 AD2d 939, 939-940 [4th Dept 1988], lv denied 73 NY2d 974[1989]).
The People's further contention that the court erred in denying their request to reopen thehearing is academic in light of our determination. Present—Smith, J.P., Carni, DeJoseph,NeMoyer and Curran, JJ.