| People v Quinones |
| 2018 NY Slip Op 04783 [162 AD3d 1402] |
| June 28, 2018 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Eduardo Quinones, Appellant. |
Michael R. Lieberman, Albany, for appellant.
James R. Farrell, District Attorney, Monticello (Kristin L. Hackett of counsel), forrespondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Sullivan County (McGuire, J.), renderedApril 2, 2015, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime of burglary in the thirddegree.
When this case was previously before this Court, we rejected counsel's Anders brief,withheld decision and assigned new counsel to address at least one issue of arguable meritpertaining to the procedures employed to determine defendant's predicate felony status (153AD3d 1489 [2017]). Defendant now asserts that the sentence imposed was invalid because thePeople failed to comply with the procedural requirements set forth in CPL 400.21. Defendant'schallenge survives his waiver of the right to appeal inasmuch as it implicates the legality of thesentence imposed (see People vGlynn, 72 AD3d 1351, 1351 [2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 773 [2010]).Nevertheless, the issue, which relates to the procedures employed and not whether he qualifies asa predicate offender, has not been preserved for our review due to his failure to object atsentencing (see People v Samms, 95 NY2d 52, 58 [2000]; People v Pellegrino, 60NY2d 636, 637 [1983]; People vWilliams, 155 AD3d 1253, 1255 [2017], lv denied — NY3d —[May 14, 2018]; People v Berry,152 AD3d 1080, 1080 [2017]). Were we to consider the issue, we would find defendant'scontention to be without merit. The record establishes that defendant was aware that he wasconsidered to be a second felony offender and was provided with a special information charginghim with a prior felony conviction. During the plea colloquy, defendant admitted to the priorconviction contained in the special information and, at sentencing, declined to contest his priorfelony offense. Under such circumstances, we would find that there was substantial compliancewith the statutory requirements of CPL 400.21 (see People v Bouyea, 64 NY2d 1140,1142 [1985]; People v Williams, 155 AD3d at 1255; People v Glynn, 72 AD3d at1352; People v Stokely, 49 AD3d966, 968 [2008]).
McCarthy, J.P., Lynch, Clark, Mulvey and Pritzker, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isaffirmed.