| People v Gilliam |
| 2018 NY Slip Op 04794 [162 AD3d 1413] |
| June 28, 2018 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Tyree T. Gilliam, Appellant. |
Rural Law Center of New York, Castleton (Kelly L. Egan of counsel), for appellant.
Gary M. Pasqua, District Attorney, Canton (Matthew L. Peabody of counsel), forrespondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of St. Lawrence County (Champagne, J.),rendered August 1, 2016, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime of criminalsale of a controlled substance in the third degree.
In full satisfaction of a four-count indictment, defendant agreed to waive his right to appealand plead guilty to one count of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree withthe understanding that he would be placed on interim probation for one year. If successful,defendant would be sentenced to five years of probation with a credit for the time spent oninterim probation; if unsuccessful, defendant faced a maximum prison term—dependingupon his felony offender status—of either nine years (felony drug offender) or life inprison (persistent felony drug offender). Against that backdrop, County Court (Richards, J.)accepted defendant's plea and thereafter placed defendant on interim probation—subject tovarious terms and conditions. Approximately seven months later, both defense counsel and thePeople urged County Court (Champagne, J.) to terminate defendant's interim probation andproceed to sentencing—each ultimately requesting that defendant be sentenced to afive-year period of probation. County Court thereafter sentenced defendant to five years ofprobation and transferred defendant's supervision to Erie County, where defendant then wasresiding. Defendant now appeals.
We affirm. Contrary to defendant's assertion, we find that the combined oral and writtenwaiver of the right to appeal was knowing, intelligent and voluntary. County Court (Richards, J.)explained that the waiver of the right to appeal was separate and distinct from the trial-relatedrights that defendant was forfeiting (seePeople v Cayon, 158 AD3d 946, 947 [2018], lv denied — NY3d —[May 30, 2018]; People v Tulip, 150AD3d 1564, 1565 [2017]); after assuring the court that he could read, defendant reviewedand executed a detailed written waiver in open court, wherein he expressly waived the right tochallenge the severity of his sentence and, in response to further inquiry by County Court,indicated that he had been afforded an opportunity to confer with counsel and confirmed that heunderstood both the terms of the waiver and the rights forfeited thereunder (see People v Savage, 158 AD3d854, 855 [2018]; People v Tulip, 150 AD3d at 1565). Under these circumstances, wefind that defendant's appeal waiver was valid (see People v Tucker, 160 AD3d 1303, 1303 [2018]). Finally, inlight of the valid waiver, and given that defendant was fully apprised of his maximum sentencingexposure, he is precluded from challenging the agreed-upon period of probation thereafterimposed (see People v Peterkin, 156AD3d 962, 963 [2017]; People vHumbach, 153 AD3d 637, 638 [2017], lv denied 30 NY3d 980 [2017]; People v Saucier, 69 AD3d 1125,1126 [2010]). Defendant's remaining contentions, to the extent not specifically addressed, havebeen examined and found to be lacking in merit.
Lynch, J.P., Mulvey, Aarons, Rumsey and Pritzker, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isaffirmed.