| People v Marvin |
| 2018 NY Slip Op 04901 [162 AD3d 1744] |
| June 29, 2018 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Kenneth J. Marvin, Appellant. |
Leanne Lapp, Public Defender, Canandaigua (Mark C. Davison of counsel), fordefendant-appellant.
James B. Ritts, District Attorney, Canandaigua (V. Christopher Eaggleston of counsel), forrespondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Ontario County Court (Stephen D. Aronson, A.J.), renderedDecember 3, 2015. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of felony drivingwhile intoxicated, aggravated driving while intoxicated, reckless driving, criminal mischief in thefourth degree and leaving the scene of a property damage incident without reporting.
It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict of,inter alia, felony driving while intoxicated (Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 1192[3]; 1193 [1] [c] [i] [A]) and aggravated driving while intoxicated (§ 1192 [2-a][a]). Defendant's contention that County Court should have precluded certain statements ofdefendant because they were not included in the People's CPL 710.30 notice is unpreserved forour review because defendant did not object to the admission of those statements on that ground(see People v Davis, 118 AD3d1264, 1266 [4th Dept 2014], lv denied 24 NY3d 1083 [2014]). In any event,defendant moved for and was granted a hearing on the noticed statements, and during the hearinga deputy testified about the unnoticed statements at issue on appeal. Defendant therefore" 'waived preclusion on the ground of lack of notice because [he] was given a fullopportunity to be heard on the voluntariness of [those] statement[s] at the suppressionhearing' " (id.).
Defendant's contention that he was denied a fair trial because the prosecutor's questioning ofa prosecution witness improperly implied that defendant had a duty to prove his innocence bynaming someone other than himself as the driver of the vehicle is also unpreserved for ourreview (see CPL 470.05 [2]). The court sustained defense counsel's objections to theprosecutor's questions and provided a curative instruction "that, in the absence of furtherobjection or a request for a mistrial, 'must be deemed to have corrected the error[ ] to thedefendant's satisfaction' " (People v Terborg, 156 AD3d 1320, 1321 [4th Dept 2017], lvdenied 31 NY3d 1018 [2018], quoting People v Heide, 84 NY2d 943, 944 [1994]).Further, the jury is presumed to have followed the court's curative instructions (see People v Allen, 78 AD3d1521, 1521 [4th Dept 2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 827 [2011]).
We reject defendant's contention that the evidence is legally insufficient to establish that hewas operating the vehicle while he was in an intoxicated condition. The standard on appeal fordetermining whether a conviction is supported by legally sufficient evidence "is the same forcircumstantial and non-circumstantial cases—whether after viewing the evidence in thelight most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essentialelements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt" (People v Grassi, 92 NY2d 695, 697[1999], rearg denied 94 NY2d 900 [2000]; see People v Reed, 22 NY3d 530, 534 [2014], rearg denied23 NY3d 1009 [2014]; People vClark, 142 AD3d 1339, 1340 [4th Dept 2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 1143 [2017]).Here, a sheriff's deputy discovered defendant in an intoxicated state walking along a road shortlyafter 5:00 a.m. less than a mile from his recently operated vehicle in an area where no othertraffic or pedestrians had been observed. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to thePeople (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]), we conclude that the jury couldhave reasonably inferred that defendant operated the vehicle while intoxicated. The jury was alsoentitled to construe defendant's false or evasive statements to law enforcement, including that thedeputy "never caught him driving," as evidence of his consciousness of guilt (see People vFicarrota, 91 NY2d 244, 249-250 [1997]; People v Jackson, 118 AD3d 635, 636 [1st Dept 2014], lvdenied 24 NY3d 1044 [2014]; People v Koestler, 176 AD2d 1207, 1208 [4th Dept1991]). Thus, the "jury could rationally have excluded innocent explanations of the evidenceoffered by . . . defendant," specifically that someone other than defendant wasoperating the vehicle (Reed, 22 NY3d at 535). Present—Whalen, P.J., Smith,Carni, NeMoyer and Troutman, JJ.