| People v Smart |
| 2018 NY Slip Op 04979 [163 AD3d 1039] |
| July 5, 2018 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1](July 5, 2018)
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Cody D. Smart, Appellant. |
Noreen McCarthy, Keene Valley, for appellant.
Andrew J. Wylie, District Attorney, Plattsburgh (Jeffrey C. Stitt of counsel), forrespondent.
Mulvey, J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Lawliss, J.), rendered October 5,2015 in Clinton County, convicting defendant following a nonjury trial of the crimes ofendangering the welfare of a child and criminal mischief in the fourth degree.
On November 26, 2014, defendant was charged in separate misdemeanor informations withcriminal obstruction of breathing (two counts), endangering the welfare of a child and criminalmischief in the fourth degree stemming from an alleged domestic altercation with his girlfriend.During an appearance on December 15, 2014, Supreme Court granted a 45-day continuance topermit defendant to file motions, and the People announced their readiness for trial. At the nextappearance on February 9, 2015, the People made a plea offer to defendant, but Supreme Courtrefused to accept it. As a result, the People asked for an adjournment to prepare for trial, statingthat they were not ready to proceed and indicating that their previous declaration of readiness waspremature. Supreme Court granted the request and adjourned the matter without a return date. Atan appearance on June 15, 2015, defense counsel requested that the matter be put back on thecalendar for a bench trial, and the People declared their readiness. Following a bench trial,defendant was convicted of endangering the welfare of a child and criminal mischief in the fourthdegree, but acquitted of the remaining charges. He was sentenced to 15 days in jail and threeyears of probation on each conviction, the sentences to run concurrently. Defendant nowappeals.
[*2] Defendant argues, and the Peopleconcede, that defendant was deprived of meaningful representation as a consequence of hisattorney's failure to make a pretrial motion to dismiss the action on statutory speedy trial grounds.Where, as here, a class A misdemeanor is the most serious offense of which a defendant isaccused, the People have 90 days from the commencement of the criminal action to declare theirreadiness (see CPL 30.30 [1] [b]; People v Cooper, 98 NY2d 541, 543 [2002]; People v Wright, 88 AD3d 1154,1156 [2011], lv denied 18 NY3d 863 [2011]). Compliance with this deadline isdetermined by "computing the time elapsed between the filing of the first accusatory instrumentand the People's declaration of readiness, subtracting any periods of delay that are excludableunder the terms of the statute and then adding to the result any postreadiness periods of delay thatare actually attributable to the People and are ineligible for an exclusion" (People v Sydlar, 106 AD3d 1368,1369 [2013] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lv dismissed 21 NY3d1046 [2013]). Here, although the People declared their readiness 19 days after the accusatoryinstruments were filed and defendant was arraigned on the charges, they expressly stated at thesubsequent appearance on February 9, 2015 that they were not ready for trial and sought anadjournment for the very purpose of trial preparation. The People did not thereafter declare theirreadiness until June 15, 2015, beyond the 90-day period. Thus, as the People acknowledge,defendant possessed a meritorious statutory speedy trial claim, and defense counsel's failure toraise it in a pretrial motion to dismiss deprived defendant of meaningful representation(see CPL 30.30 [1]; People vDevino, 110 AD3d 1146, 1148-1149 [2013]; People v Grey, 257 AD2d 685, 686[1999]). Accordingly, the judgment is reversed and the accusatory instruments aredismissed.
In light of our determination, defendant's remaining contentions are academic.
Garry, P.J., Egan Jr., Aarons and Rumsey, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is reversed,on the law, and informations dismissed.