| Matter of Civil Serv. Empls. Assn., Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME,AFL-CIO v Olympic Regional Dev. Auth. |
| 2018 NY Slip Op 04998 [163 AD3d 1110] |
| July 5, 2018 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| In the Matter of Civil Service Employees Association, Inc.,Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Respondent, v Olympic Regional DevelopmentAuthority et al., Appellants. |
Barbara D. Underwood, Attorney General, Albany (Joseph M. Spadola of counsel), forappellants.
Daren J. Rylewicz, Civil Service Employees Association, Albany (Constance R. Brown ofcounsel), for respondent.
Garry, P.J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Bruening, J.), entered April 21,2017 in Essex County, which granted petitioner's application, in a combined proceeding pursuantto CPLR article 78 and action for declaratory judgment, to annul a determination of respondentOlympic Regional Development Authority finding that certain employees who had been laid offwere no longer members of their previous collective bargaining unit upon their rehire.
In 2012, management of the Belleayre Mountain Ski Center was transferred from theDepartment of Environmental Conservation (hereinafter DEC) to respondent Olympic RegionalDevelopment Authority (hereinafter Olympic), a public benefit corporation. Pursuant to PublicAuthorities Law § 2629 (2) (a), employees then working at Belleayre Mountain,who had been DEC employees and members of petitioner's operating services collectivebargaining unit (hereinafter OSU), became employees of Olympic. As pertinent here, PublicAuthorities Law § 2629 (2) (a) provides that employees affected by the transfer"shall retain their respective civil service classifications, status, salary, wages and negotiatingunit, if any. . . . However, once the employment of any transferred employee. . . is terminated or otherwise ceases, by any means, [*2]any individual hired to fill such vacancy shall not be placed in thesame negotiating unit of the former incumbent but rather shall be placed in [Olympic's]negotiating unit."
In March 2016, Olympic laid off three seasonal employees at Belleayre Mountain who werestill represented by OSU. Upon rehiring these employees roughly two months later to the samepositions each had previously held, Olympic determined that each would be placed in Olympic'scollective bargaining unit, not OSU, resulting in significant adverse changes to their benefits.Petitioner thereafter commenced this combined CPLR article 78 proceeding and declaratoryjudgment action against Olympic and respondent David McKillip, in his capacity as Olympic'shuman resources director, seeking to annul Olympic's determination as arbitrary and capriciousand in violation of Public Authorities Law § 2629 (2) (a). Supreme Court found that"petitioner [was] entitled to a declaration that the layoff of seasonal employees [did] notconstitute a termination or cessation of their employment resulting in a vacancy for purposes ofPublic Authorities Law § 2629 (2) (a)," granted the petition/complaint and annulledOlympic's determination (56 Misc 3d 675, 680 [Sup Ct, Essex County 2017]). Respondentsappeal.
Respondents contend that, under the unambiguous language of Public Authorities Law§ 2629 (2) (a), the employment of a seasonal employee necessarily "terminate[s] orotherwise ceases" when he or she is laid off; thus, such an employee may not return to his or herformer negotiating unit in the event that he or she is subsequently rehired. As Olympic'sdetermination was made without a hearing, our review is limited to whether it was" 'arbitrary and capricious, irrational, affected by an error of law or an abuse ofdiscretion' " (Matter of Buffalo Teachers Fedn., Inc. v Elia, 162 AD3d 1169, 1172 [2018], quoting Matter ofDeVera v Elia, 152 AD3d 13, 18 [2017], lv granted 30 NY3d 907 [2017];see CPLR 7803 [3]). We accord no deference to Olympic's statutory interpretation, as thequestions raised on appeal depend only upon the "accurate apprehension of legislative intent" (Matter of Wegmans Food Mkts., Inc. v TaxAppeals Trib. of the State of N.Y., 155 AD3d 1352, 1353 [2017], lv granted 31NY3d 908 [2018]; see Matter of Ovadiav Office of the Indus. Bd. of Appeals, 19 NY3d 138, 144 n 5 [2012]). As "the clearestindicator of legislative intent is the statutory text, the starting point in [such cases] must alwaysbe the language itself" (Matter ofSoriano v Elia, 155 AD3d 1496, 1498 [2017] [internal quotation marks and citationomitted], lv denied 31 NY3d 913 [2018]; accord Matter of Kern v New York State Dept.of Civ. Serv., 288 AD2d 674, 675 [2001]; see Majewski v Broadalbin-Perth Cent. SchoolDist., 91 NY2d 577, 583 [1998]).
This appeal turns on the meaning of the terms "terminated" and "ceases" within the contextof Public Authorities Law § 2629 (2) (a). As neither word is defined in the PublicAuthorities Law and both are words of ordinary import, we interpret them in a manner consistentwith "their usual and commonly understood meaning" (Yaniveth R. v LTD Realty Co., 27 NY3d 186, 192 [2016] [internalquotation marks and citation omitted]; see Matter of Soriano v Elia, 155 AD3d at 1498;McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 232 at 392). Applying these rulesof statutory interpretation, "terminate" is defined as "to bring to an end," "to discontinue theemployment of" or "to form the conclusion of" (Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, terminate[https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/terminate]; see Black's Law Dictionary[10th ed 2014], terminate ["To put an end to; to bring to an end(:) . . . (t)o end; toconclude"]). Similarly, "cease" is defined as "to come to an end" (Merriam-Webster OnlineDictionary, cease [https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cease]; see Black's LawDictionary [10th ed 2014], cease ["(t)o stop, forfeit, suspend, or bring to an end"]).
[*3] Petitioner argues that a layoff is inconsistent with thesedefinitions and merely constitutes a temporary interruption in a career. We disagree, in light ofthe express statutory provision that an employee whose employment "is terminated orotherwise ceases, by any means" may not return to his or her prior collective bargaining unitupon subsequent rehire (Public Authorities Law § 2629 [2] [a] [emphasis added]).To interpret the language as petitioner urges would render the phrase "by any means" superfluous(see Matter of Friedman v Rice, 30NY3d 461, 477-478 [2017]; Peoplev Sprint Nextel Corp., 26 NY3d 98, 110 [2015], cert denied 578 US �, 136 S Ct 2387 [2016]; Matter ofVerizon N.Y., Inc. v New York State Pub. Serv. Commn., 137 AD3d 66, 69 [2016];McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 231 at 388). To the extent thatpetitioner argues that Public Authorities Law § 2629 (2) (a) applies only to newemployees, the statute states that this provision is applicable to "any individual" anddraws no distinction between workers who are new hires and those who may have previouslyworked at Belleayre Mountain (Public Authorities Law § 2629 [2] [a] [emphasisadded]). We note that respondents submitted affidavit testimony that Olympic seasonalemployees are not always rehired and that the three seasonal employees at issue here had no rightto reemployment under their OSU contract once they were laid off.
Finally, we find unpersuasive petitioner's contention that this Court should adopt itsinterpretation of Public Authorities Law § 2629 on the basis that it is a remedialstatute. "[E]ven a remedial statute must be given a meaning consistent with the words chosen bythe Legislature," and courts must "give effect not only to the remedy, but also to the words thatdelimit the remedy" (Enright v Eli Lilly & Co., 77 NY2d 377, 385 n 1 [1991],cert denied 502 US 868 [1991]). Indeed, petitioner's interpretation of Public AuthoritiesLaw § 2629 could result in the unintended adverse effect of discouraging therehiring of seasonal employees after layoffs. Accordingly, we find that the plain language ofPublic Authorities Law § 2629 (2) (a) barred Olympic from permitting seasonalemployees who were laid off and subsequently rehired to remain in OSU, and, thus, thepetition/complaint should have been dismissed.
McCarthy, Lynch, Devine and Mulvey, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is reversed, onthe law, without costs, and petition/complaint dismissed. [Prior Case History: 56 Misc 3d675.]