| People v Jackson |
| 2018 NY Slip Op 05370 [163 AD3d 1273] |
| July 19, 2018 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Rondell Jackson, Also Known as Diggity,Appellant. |
Amanda FiggsGanter, Albany, for appellant.
Barbara D. Underwood, Attorney General, New York City (Jodi A. Danzig of counsel), forrespondent.
Devine, J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Albany County (Herrick, J.),rendered July 1, 2014, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime of criminal saleof a controlled substance in the third degree.
Defendant and 30 others were charged in an indictment with crimes related to the distributionof cocaine. In satisfaction of the counts against him in the indictment, defendant pleaded guilty tocriminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree and waived his right to appeal. Atsentencing, defendant made an oral application to withdraw his plea, which County Court deniedwithout a hearing. County Court then sentenced defendant, consistent with the terms of the pleaagreement and as a prior violent felony drug offender, to 11 years in prison to be followed by1
Defendant contends that County Court abused its discretion in denying his motion towithdraw his plea. Initially, to the extent that his claim implicates the voluntariness of his plea, itsurvives his unchallenged appeal waiver and was preserved by his motion to withdraw his guiltyplea (see People v Sullivan, 153AD3d 1519, 1521 [2017], lv denied 30 NY3d 1064 [2017]; People v Taylor, 144 AD3d 1317,1318 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 1151 [2017]). Nevertheless, "[w]hether to permit adefendant to withdraw his or her plea of guilty is left to the sound discretion of the trial court,and withdrawal will generally not be permitted absent some evidence of innocence, fraud ormistake in its inducement" (People vPooler, 158 AD3d 935, 936 [2018] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citationsomitted]; accord People v Snow,159 AD3d 1278, 1279 [2018]).
There is nothing in the record to support defendant's claim that his plea was involuntary asthe result of ineffective assistance of counsel. Although defendant alleges that his access to hisattorney was impaired due to his confinement in a maximum security facility, he has failed todemonstrate how this fact rendered his plea involuntary. During the plea colloquy, defendantacknowledged that he understood the provisions of the plea agreement, had sufficiently discussedthe agreement with counsel and was satisfied with her representation. Defendant furtheracknowledged that no one had coerced or pressured him to plead guilty and that he was doing sofreely and voluntarily (see People vRavenell, 114 AD3d 997, 998 [2014], lv denied 23 NY3d 1041 [2014];People v Conyers, 227 AD2d 793, 793-794 [1996], lv denied 88 NY2d 982[1996]). Moreover, counsel negotiated a favorable plea bargain and nothing in the recordsuggests that defendant received less than meaningful representation (see People v Jabot, 156 AD3d 954,955 [2017], lv denied 30 NY3d 1116 [2018]; People v Sullivan, 153 AD3d 1519, 1521-1522 [2017], lvdenied 30 NY3d 1064 [2017]). Under these circumstances, County Court did not abuse itsdiscretion in denying defendant's motion to withdraw his plea without a hearing (see People v Wrest, 159 AD3d1274, 1275 [2018]; People v Snow, 159 AD3d at 1279; People v Brown, 154 AD3d 1004,1006-1007 [2017], lv denied 30 NY3d 1113 [2018]).
Finally, defendant's assertion that counsel did not adequately advise him about the effect thathis cooperation would have on his sentence implicates matters outside the record on appeal andis more properly the subject of a CPL article 440 motion (see People v Pooler, 158 AD3dat 936). Defendant's remaining contentions have been reviewed and determined to lackmerit.
Clark, Mulvey, Rumsey and Pritzker, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.