Matter of Marian T. (Lauren R.)
2018 NY Slip Op 08002 [166 AD3d 1370]
November 21, 2018
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, January 2, 2018


[*1]
 In the Matter of Marian T. Lauren R. et al.,Respondents; Marian T., Appellant.

Sheila E. Shea, Mental Hygiene Legal Service, Albany (Cailin Connors Brennan ofcounsel), for appellant.

Douglas A. Eldridge, Delmar, for respondents.

Pritzker, J. Appeal from an order of the Surrogate's Court of Otsego County (Burns,S.), entered May 31, 2017, which granted petitioners' application, in a proceedingpursuant to Domestic Relations Law article 7, for the adoption of Marian T.

Petitioners run a family care home, a program operated by the Office for People WithDevelopmental Disabilities. They commenced this proceeding for the adoption ofrespondent, a 64-year-old woman with a profound intellectual disability and very limitedverbal ability who is a resident in their family care home.[FN1] Surrogate's Court appointed MentalHygiene Legal Service (hereinafter MHLS) to represent respondent in the adoptionproceeding and, prior to a hearing on the petition, the court granted a motion by MHLSfor a psychological evaluation of respondent. Petitioners also had respondent evaluatedand subsequently moved for the appointment of a guardian ad litem. MHLS objected andcross-moved to request that the court conduct an interview of respondent in the presenceof counsel. The court denied petitioners' motion, but granted the cross motion and, afterreviewing the psychological evaluations and interviewing respondent, the courtdetermined that there was[*2]"good cause to appoint aguardian ad litem." After a hearing, Surrogate's Court granted the petition. Respondentnow appeals and we affirm, albeit for different reasons.

"[P]resently the law simply provides that an unmarried adult or married adultstogether may adopt another person without any restriction on the age of the adoptivechild or adoptee" (Matter of Robert Paul P., 63 NY2d 233, 237 [1984] [internalquotation marks, emphasis and citation omitted]; Domestic Relations Law§ 110). This is consistent with the statutory definition of "adoptive child" or"adoptee" as "a person adopted," without limitation as to age (Domestic Relations Law§ 109 [1]). When an adoptee is over the age of 14, his or her consent isrequired, "unless the judge or surrogate in his [or her] discretion dispenses withsuch consent" (Domestic Relations Law § 111 [1] [a] [emphasisadded]).[FN2]Therefore, because respondent is over the age of 14, the court had express statutoryauthority to dispense with her consent.

This conclusion is well-grounded in sound statutory construction and avoidscategorically prohibiting adoptions of those who are over the age of 14 but are incapableof giving consent, including an entire class of adoptees who are so severely disabled thatthey simply lack the ability to communicate such consent. The factual scenario presenthere is precisely the situation where a judge or surrogate should be, and is, authorized toexercise discretion and waive an adoptee's consent. This is not to say that a judge orsurrogate should automatically waive consent when adjudicating a case with an adopteeincapable of consent; rather, given that the facts are necessarily sui generis, thedetermination as to whether consent should be waived is encompassed within the samebest interests analysis that a judge or surrogate must undertake when making thedetermination of whether to approve the adoption (see Domestic Relations Law§ 116 [4]; Matter of Adult Anonymous II, 88 AD2d 30, 32-33[1982]). Here, though not specifically stated, it appears that Surrogate's Court determinedthat respondent lacked capacity to consent, and, in granting the petition, implicitlydispensed with her consent. Based upon the record before us, and in light of the thoroughbest interests analysis undertaken by the court, respondent's consent was properlydispensed with.

As part of its best interests analysis, Surrogate's Court requested the opinion of theguardian ad litem who, prior to the hearing, met with petitioners and respondent andreviewed the petition for adoption, the psychological evaluations and a redacted versionof a report regarding an incident that led to the temporary removal of respondent frompetitioners' home. Accordingly, the guardian ad litem determined that "it [was his]opinion and recommendation that it [was] in [respondent's] best interest[s] to be adopted. . . by petitioners."[FN3] Also, petitioners both testified duringthe hearing and, as the court noted, it was obvious that petitioners had "great love andaffection for [respondent]," one petitioner even "became visibly emotional whendescribing his relationship with [respondent]." While MHLS expressed concern thatrespondent, if adopted, would no longer be provided the services that she required, it isclear from the record that adoption would not render respondent ineligible for all servicesthat she was currently receiving. It is also evident that, while adoption could affect somebenefits received by respondent, her Medicaid and Medicare would continue and,financially, she would be in a comparable situation if adopted. Further, while MHLSexpressed legitimate concerns about the lack of institutional safeguards against abuse andexploitation should petitioners adopt respondent, there is nothing in the record to indicatethat petitioners have violated those safeguards in the 12 years that respondent has lived intheir family care home or would be unable to keep respondent safe. Although there is nospecific guideline regarding best interests in an adoption proceeding, courts generallylook to whether the person feels loved, safe, happy and content (cf. Matter of Haylee RR., 47AD3d 1093, 1095-1096 [2008]; Matter of Dessa F., 35 AD3d 1096, 1097-1098 [2006];Matter of George L. v Commissioner of Fulton County Dept. of Social Servs.,194 AD2d 955, 956 [1993]), which respondent has and feels with petitioners. Althoughrespondent cannot articulate consent, there is no reason to conclude that these cognitivelimitations prevent her from otherwise desiring, experiencing and feeling the warmth anddeep emotional attachment to a family. As such, because the adoption is in respondent'sbest interests, but she is unable to consent, her consent was unnecessary and, as such, wefind that the adoption was properly approved.

Garry, P.J., Devine, Clark and Aarons, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed,without costs.

Footnotes


Footnote 1:Accompanying thepetition was a consent to adoption form "signed" with an "x" by respondent.

Footnote 2:Domestic Relations Law§ 111 (4) is not germane to this analysis as it merely eliminates therequirement of consent by parents and, if applicable, an authorized agency having lawfulcustody of the adoptive child, neither of which is alleged to have been required here.

Footnote 3:Surrogate's Court erredin holding that the guardian ad litem possessed "implied authority to consent to theadoption." To be clear, no such authority exists nor is it relevant that the guardian adlitem may be acting in a parens patriae role (see generally Vincent C. Alexander,Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR 1207). Whethera judge or surrogate should dispense with consent in an adoption is a uniquely judicialfunction (see generally Matter of Michael B., 80 NY2d 299, 319 [1992,Bellacosa, J., concurring]), derived through statute, and cannot be delegated.


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