| People v Huger |
| 2018 NY Slip Op 08955 [167 AD3d 1042] |
| December 26, 2018 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Kevin Huger, Appellant. |
Paul Skip Laisure, New York, NY (Mark W. Vorkink of counsel), for appellant.
Eric Gonzalez, District Attorney, Brooklyn, NY (Leonard Joblove and Seth M. Lieberman ofcounsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant, by permission, from so much of an order the Supreme Court, KingsCounty (Michael A. Gary, J.), dated July 3, 2017, as, upon reargument, without a hearing, deniedhis motion pursuant to CPL 440.10 to vacate a judgment of the same court rendered September28, 2012, convicting him of kidnapping in the second degree and menacing in the third degree,upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from.
The defendant moved pursuant to CPL 440.10 to vacate his judgment of conviction, whichwas previously affirmed by this Court (see People v Huger, 136 AD3d 943 [2016]), on the ground that hewas deprived of his statutory right to a speedy trial pursuant to CPL 30.30 (1) (a). CPL 30.30requires dismissal of a felony indictment where the People are not ready for trial within sixmonths of the commencement of the criminal action. "Whether the People have satisfied thisobligation is generally determined by computing the time elapsed between the filing of the firstaccusatory instrument and the People's declaration of readiness, subtracting any periods of delaythat are excludable under the terms of the statute and then adding to the result any postreadinessperiods of delay that are actually attributable to the People and are ineligible for an exclusion"(People v Cortes, 80 NY2d 201, 208 [1992]; see People v Carter, 91 NY2d 795,799 [1998]; People v McCarthy,146 AD3d 983, 983 [2017]). The defendant has the burden of demonstrating that anypostreadiness delays should be charged to the People (see People v Cortes, 80 NY2d at215; People v Beasley, 69 AD3d741, 743 [2010], affd 16 NY3d 289 [2011]; People v Brewer, 63 AD3d 402, 403 [2009]).
Here, the six-month period commenced on March 13, 2010, when the felony complaint wasfiled. The People had 184 days from that date, absent excludable delay, to be ready for trial(see CPL 30.30 [1] [a]; 1.20 [17]; People v Murray, 154 AD3d 881 [2017]). The People declared thatthey were ready for trial on May 13, 2010, stopping the speedy trial clock on that date with 61out of 184 days chargeable. Thereafter, by motion dated March 8, 2011, the People movedpursuant to CPL 240.40 (2) (b) (v) to compel the defendant to submit to a buccal swab so that hisDNA could be compared to a DNA mixture that had been recovered from a firearm alleged tohave been used by the defendant during his commission of the offenses charged. The People'smotion was granted, and a buccal swab was taken on April 20, 2011. Also on April 20, 2011, thematter was adjourned in court to May 25, 2011, for "swab results." The DNA results remainedpending at the time of the May 25, 2011, court appearance and the matter was adjourned to June29, 2011. On June 29, 2011, the DNA results still remained pending, and the matter wasadjourned to July 20, 2011. On July 20, 2011, the DNA results still remained pending, and thematter was adjourned to August 26, 2011. The transcript of the proceedings on July 20, 2011,further indicate that counsel for the defendant did not appear for that scheduled court date. OnAugust 26, 2011, the People announced on the record that the DNA results were complete.
CPL 30.30 (4) (g) allows the exclusion of "periods of delay occasioned by exceptionalcircumstances, including . . . the period of delay resulting from a continuancegranted at the request of [the People] if . . . the continuance is granted because ofthe unavailability of evidence material to the people's case, when the [People] ha[ve] exerciseddue diligence to obtain such evidence" (see People v Clarke, 28 NY3d 48, 52-53 [2016]). Here, the Peopleconcede that they failed to exercise due diligence in obtaining a buccal swab from the defendant.Consequently, the 128-day period of delay between April 20, 2011, and August 26, 2011, to testthe defendant's DNA and produce a report, was not excludable from the speedy trial computation(see CPL 30.30 [4] [g]; People v Clarke, 28 NY3d at 53).
Nevertheless, the People established that the 37-day adjournment from July 20, 2011, toAugust 26, 2011, taken while the DNA results remained pending and the People were otherwisenot ready to proceed, is excludable pursuant to CPL 30.30 (4) (f). CPL 30.30 (4) (f) expresslyexcludes from the period of time within which the People must be ready for trial any period oftime "during which the defendant is without counsel through no fault of the court." The exclusionprovided by CPL 30.30 (4) (f) is applicable notwithstanding the People's own lack of readiness(see People v Cox, 161 AD3d1100, 1101 [2018]; People v Mannino, 306 AD2d 157, 158 [2003]; People vAubin, 245 AD2d 805, 806 [1997]; People v Lassiter, 240 AD2d 293 [1997];People v Brown, 195 AD2d 310, 311 [1993]). Contrary to the defendant's contention, theexclusion is not limited to prereadiness periods of delay. Exclusion of the 37 days brings the timechargeable to the People to 152 days, within the six months allowed by statute (see People vCortes, 80 NY2d 201 [1992]). Accordingly, we agree with the Supreme Court's denial, uponreargument, of the defendant's motion pursuant to CPL 440.10 to vacate his judgment ofconviction on the ground that he was denied his statutory right to a speedy trial.
The parties' remaining contentions either are without merit or need not be reached in light ofour determination. Rivera, J.P., Leventhal, Barros and Brathwaite Nelson, JJ., concur.