| Matter of Casey v Town of Arietta Zoning Bd. of Appeals |
| 2019 NY Slip Op 01289 [169 AD3d 1231] |
| February 21, 2019 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
[*1]
| In the Matter of John Casey et al., Appellants, v Town ofArietta Zoning Board of Appeals et al., Respondents. |
Whiteman Osterman & Hanna LLP, Albany (Robert S. Rosborough IV of counsel), forappellants.
Miller, Mannix, Schachner & Hafner, LLC, Glens Falls (Leah Everhart of counsel), forrespondents.
Mulvey, J. Appeal from an order and judgment of the Supreme Court (J. Sise, J.), enteredNovember 3, 2017 in Hamilton County, which dismissed petitioners' application, in a combinedproceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 and action for declaratory judgment, to review a determinationof respondent Town of Arietta Zoning Board of Appeals denying petitioners' request for a buildingpermit.
Petitioners own a 2.6-acre parcel located in a residential zone in the Town of Arietta, HamiltonCounty. The property contains a 3,200-square-foot residence, a detached 1,200-square-foot garageand a boathouse. In August 2014, petitioners applied for a building permit to construct a2,016-square-foot pole barn to be used for storage purposes. In their application, petitioners labeledthe pole barn as an accessory use structure. Respondent Mel LaScola, the Town's Zoning Officer(hereinafter the Zoning Officer), asserted that the pole barn constituted a principal building as definedby the Town of Arietta Land Use Code former § 2.020 (h) due to it exceeding 1,250square feet. Because petitioners' property already contained a home as a principal building and a1,200-square-foot garage, the Zoning Officer denied the application.
Petitioners appealed to respondent Town of Arietta Zoning Board of Appeals (hereinafter theZBA) asserting that the Zoning Officer's denial should be reversed, and a building permit should beissued, because (1) the proposed building is an accessory structure and not a principal building, and (2)even if the proposed building was considered a principal building, the Town Code does not limit thenumber of principal buildings per lot. In January 2015, the ZBA determined that petitioners' proposedbuilding was a principal building and upheld the Zoning Officer's denial of the permit. When petitionersdid not receive a written decision regarding the denial of their application, they filed a combined petitionfor CPLR article 78 relief and complaint seeking a declaratory judgment. Supreme Court remanded thematter based on the ZBA's failure to issue a written determination and the lack of clarity regarding whatthe ZBA had determined.
On remand, the ZBA limited the issue to whether the Zoning Officer made the correct decisionwhen he denied petitioners' application to construct an accessory structure on their lot. Despitepetitioners' disagreement with that characterization of the issue, the ZBA affirmed the Zoning Officer'soriginal decision by a tie vote in December 2015. Petitioners then, at the ZBA's request, submittedanother copy of their application with a revised cover sheet indicating that they sought a permit for anew building rather than an accessory structure. The Zoning Officer immediately denied that application,explaining that their property was nonconforming due to being less than three acres and, according to aFebruary 2015 amendment to article 11 of the Town Code, the proposed structure could not be builtthere.
Petitioners commenced this combined CPLR article 78 proceeding and declaratory judgmentaction seeking, among other things, annulment of the ZBA's December 2015 default decision and adeclaration that petitioners' proposed pole barn is a permitted accessory structure, not a principalbuilding, and that petitioners are entitled to a building permit. Petitioners administratively appealed theZoning Officer's latest decision and, in May 2016, the ZBA affirmed the denial of petitioners'application to construct a new building. On stipulation, petitioners amended this combinedaction/proceeding to include a challenge to the May 2016 determination. Supreme Court held, amongother things, that review was limited to the terms and scope of the application, the original applicationwas solely for an accessory structure so the ZBA rationally limited its review in that regard, it wasrational to conclude that the proposed building was a principal building rather than an accessorystructure, and section 11.010 of the amended Town Code barred expansion on nonconforming lots.Petitioners appeal.
Regarding the ZBA's December 2015 determination, we must first ascertain what issues the ZBAaddressed, or should have addressed. Supreme Court concluded that the Zoning Officer and the ZBAwere limited to what petitioners sought in their application, namely, a permit to build an accessorystructure (see Town Law § 267-b [1]). Petitioners assert that, because layapplicants may not understand how to label their requests, zoning officers are not bound by theapplicants' characterizations and should broadly review applications to determine whether theappropriate portion of a municipality's zoning ordinance is satisfied. Petitioners' suggestion is morecharitable to lay applicants, and we most likely would not disapprove of its use should a zoning boardchoose to implement it. Nevertheless, we realize that such an approach could require zoning officers tospeculate as to an applicant's unstated intent or to provide multi-layered responses addressing everypossible alternative. The interpretation of Supreme Court and the ZBA—to limit the ZBA'sreview to exactly what was requested in the application—reasonably places the burden on theapplicant to formulate a proper request. Therefore, our review is similarly limited to that narrowissue.
"In statutory interpretation cases, the [c]ourt's primary consideration is to ascertain and give effectto the intention of the [legislative body]. The statutory text is the clearest indicator of legislative intentand courts should construe unambiguous language to give effect to its plain meaning" (Matter of Mestecky v City of New York, 30NY3d 239, 243 [2017] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). "A zoning board'sinterpretation of a local zoning ordinance is afforded deference and will only be disturbed if irrational orunreasonable," except that no deference is required "where the issue presented is one of pure legalinterpretation of the underlying zoning law or ordinance in question" (Matter of Lavender v Zoning Bd. of Appeals ofthe Town of Bolton, 141 AD3d 970, 972 [2016] [citations omitted], appeal dismissed28 NY3d 1051 [2016], lv denied 29 NY3d 907 [2017]; see Matter of Sullivan v Board of Zoning Appeals of City of Albany, 144AD3d 1480, 1482 [2016], lv denied 29 NY3d 901 [2017]).
Petitioners' initial application sought a permit for the pole barn as an accessory structure. The TownCode defined that term as "[a]ny structure . . . located on the same premises andincidental and subordinate to the main structure or principal use and that customarily accompanies or isassociated with such main structure or principal use" (Town of Arietta Land Use Code former§ 2.020). In contrast, the Town Code's definition of a principal building consisted of a listincluding, among other things, a single-family dwelling, a tourist cabin for rent, a mobile home, acommercial or industrial use structure larger than 300 square feet, or "any other structure whichexceeds [1,250] square feet of floor space" (Town of Arietta Land Use Code former§ 2.020). Following the list, the definition concluded with the statement that "[a]naccessory structure does not constitute a principal building" (Town of Arietta Land Use Code former§ 2.020).
In his initial denial of petitioners' application, the Zoning Officer quoted the provision of the TownCode defining a building over 1,250 square feet as a principal building and noted that their home isalready a principal building on their property. The ZBA, having framed the issue as whether the ZoningOfficer erred when he denied petitioners' application for a permit to construct an accessory building,affirmed his determination without providing any explanation. Although the Zoning Officer's conclusionthat the proposed pole barn was a principal building implicitly held that it was not an accessorystructure, he did not follow the proper pathway to reach that conclusion. The Town Code's definition ofprincipal building contained a list, but being on the list did not necessarily qualify the structure as aprincipal building. The final sentence of the definition excluded all accessory structures. Therefore, it isimpossible to determine that a structure is a principal building without first determining whether it is anaccessory structure.
The Zoning Officer skipped to the second step without having addressed the first. We cannotresolve the matter ourselves, as it falls within the discretionary province of the Zoning Officer and theZBA. "Whether a proposed accessory use is . . . incidental to and customarily found inconnection with the principal use depends on an analysis of the nature and character of the principal useof the land in question in relation to the accessory use, taking into consideration the over-all character ofthe particular area in question. This analysis is, to a great extent, fact-based" (Matter of New YorkBotanical Garden v Board of Stds. & Appeals of City of N.Y., 91 NY2d 413, 420 [1998][citations omitted]; see Matter of Lavender v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of the Town of Bolton,141 AD3d at 972). For example, although petitioners assert that a storage building is incidental to andcustomarily associated with a residence and three other pole barns have been built in the town, it couldbe argued that those other buildings were approved under different circumstances and that a2,016-square-foot pole barn is not incidental or customary in the area. Under the original application, ifthe pole barn is deemed an accessory structure, the permit must be approved. If the pole barn is notdeemed an accessory structure, the review is at an end and the permit should be denied because theapplication only sought permission for that type of structure. Accordingly, regarding the ZBA'sDecember 2015 determination, we remit to the Zoning Officer to render a determination regardingwhether the proposed pole barn is an accessory structure under the former Town Code and, based onthe answer to that question, whether a permit should be granted.
Next, we address the ZBA's May 2016 determination affirming the Zoning Officer's decision todeny petitioners' application that identified the pole barn as a new building, rather than an accessorystructure. The Zoning Officer's decision was not based on the type of proposed structure (i.e.,accessory structure or principal building). Instead, he denied the application because petitioners' lot issmaller than the minimum three acres required in that zone, rendering it substandard and nonconforming.He attached to his decision article 11 of the amended Town Code, which addressesnonconformity.
The threshold question is whether the former Town Code or the amended Town Code should beapplied to petitioners' latest application. Generally, "the law as it exists at the time a decision is renderedon appeal is controlling" (Matter of Magee v Rocco, 158 AD2d 53, 60 [1990] [internalquotation marks and citation omitted]; see Matter of Alscot Inv. Corp. v Incorporated Vil. ofRockville Ctr., 64 NY2d 921, 922-923 [1985]). Moreover, "when a zoning law has beenamended after the submission of an application . . . , but before a decision is renderedthereon by the reviewing agency, the courts are bound to apply the law as amended unless 'specialfacts' indicate that the [reviewing agency] acted in bad faith and unduly delayed acting upon theapplication while the zoning law was changed" (Matter of Ronsvalle v Totman, 303 AD2d 897,899 [2003] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted]; see Matter of Cleary vBibbo, 241 AD2d 887, 887-888 [1997]). If we consider petitioners' latest application as a newapplication, then the amended Town Code (enacted months before that application was submitted)would certainly apply. Even if we consider the latest application as an extension or resubmission of thefirst application (because the proposed building is the same and the only difference is thecharacterization of it on the cover sheet), the amended Town Code would apply because the ZoningOfficer and the ZBA reached their determinations after the amendments went into effect. On thisrecord, although the process has been lengthy, petitioners have not shown that the ZBA "acted in badfaith and unduly delayed acting upon [petitioners'] application while the zoning law was changed," so asto establish the "special facts" exception (Matter of Ronsvalle v Totman, 303 AD2d at 899[internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). Thus, the amended Town Code governs petitioners'latest application.
Petitioners acknowledge that their lot is nonconforming because it measures less than the minimumintensity designation of three acres (see Town of Arietta Land Use Code§§ 3.040, 3.060). As Supreme Court concluded, although section 11.010 of theTown Code does not expressly "forbid a 'new building' which petitioners seek to build, or issuance of apermit therefor, neither does it provide or allow for such an entirely new building, or issuance of apermit therefor." That provision of the Town Code has an express purpose to allow continuation ofpreexisting nonconforming uses such as petitioners' residential use of their undersized lot, but also hasan express purpose to bar the expansion or extension of nonconforming buildings and structuresthereon. Hence, Supreme Court did not err in concluding that the ZBA had a rational basis to denypetitioners' latest application, which would expand development of their nonconforming, substandardlot. Finally, petitioners are not entitled to costs or counsel fees pursuant to Town Law§ 282.
Lynch, J.P., Clark, Devine and Aarons, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order and judgment ismodified, on the law, without costs, by reversing so much thereof as dismissed the first cause of actionof the amended petition and complaint; matter remitted to respondent Zoning Officer of the Town ofArietta for further proceedings not inconsistent with this Court's decision; and, as so modified,affirmed.