Matter of Carmel Academy v New York State Educ. Dept.
2019 NY Slip Op 01465 [169 AD3d 1287]
February 28, 2019
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, March 27, 2019


[*1]
 In the Matter of Carmel Academy, Appellant,
v
New YorkState Education Department et al., Respondents.

Jeffrey Geier, New York City, for appellant.

Letitia James, Attorney General, New York City (Zainab A. Chaudhry of counsel), forrespondents.

Mulvey, J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Zwack, J.), entered May 30, 2017 inAlbany County, which dismissed petitioner's application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78,to review a determination of respondent Education Department denying the issuance of a BasicEducational Data System code.

Petitioner is a nonprofit private school chartered by the Board of Regents of the University of theState of New York and with a corporate mailing address in New York City, but with a physicalcampus in Greenwich, Connecticut. Petitioner applied to respondent Education Department (hereinafterthe Department) for a Basic Educational Data System (hereinafter BEDS) code based on petitioner'sunderstanding that this code would allow it to apply for state reimbursement of certain expenses. TheDepartment, interpreting the relevant statute to mean that eligibility for reimbursement is based onphysical location within the state, denied petitioner a BEDS code. Petitioner commenced this CPLRarticle 78 proceeding challenging the Department's determination and seeking an order compelling it toissue the code. Following joinder of issue, Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that theDepartment rationally interpreted the statutory language and, therefore, petitioner was not entitled to aBEDS code. Petitioner appeals.

Because the Department rationally determined that petitioner was not eligible for a BEDS code, weaffirm. "[S]tatutes are to be construed according to the ordinary meaning of their words. . . and where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, courts must give effectto its plain meaning" (Matter of AmericanFood & Vending Corp. v New York State Tax Appeals Trib., 144 AD3d 1227, 1228[2016] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). "Interpretation given a statute by the agencycharged with its enforcement is, as a general matter, given great weight and judicial deference, so longas the interpretation is neither irrational, unreasonable nor inconsistent with the governing statute"(Matter of Trump-Equitable Fifth Ave. Co. v Gliedman, 62 NY2d 539, 545 [1984] [citationomitted]). "Ultimately, however, legal interpretation is the court's responsibility" (Matter of MoranTowing & Transp. Co. v New York State Tax Commn., 72 NY2d 166, 173 [1988]); where"the question is one of pure statutory reading and analysis, dependent only on accurate apprehension oflegislative intent, there is little basis to rely on any special competence or expertise of the administrativeagency and its interpret[ation is] therefore to be accorded much less weight" (Kurcsics v MerchantsMut. Ins. Co., 49 NY2d 451, 459 [1980]; accord Matter of Westchester Lib. Sys. v King, 141 AD3d 172, 175[2016]; see Matter of Michael A. GoldsteinNo. 1 Trust v Tax Appeals Trib. of the State of N.Y., 101 AD3d 1496, 1497 [2012], lvdenied 21 NY3d 860 [2013]).

Chapter 507 of the Laws of 1974 (as amended) establishes that qualifying schools shall receivereimbursement for certain services, such as testing, attendance record keeping and immunizations, asrequired under the state's compulsory education statute (see Education Law§§ 3204, 3602-c; 8 NYCRR 3.36, 176.1, 176.2). The statute defines "[q]ualifyingschool" as "a nonprofit school in the state, other than a public school, which provides instruction inaccordance with" Education Law § 3204 (L 1974, ch 507, § 2 [2], asamended). As part of its legislative findings, the statute asserts that "the state has the duty and authorityto evaluate, through a system of uniform state testing and reporting procedures, the quality andeffectiveness of instruction to assure that those who are attending instruction, as required by law, arebeing adequately educated within their individual capabilities" (L 1974, ch 507, § 1, asamended). The Department acknowledges that it uses BEDS codes to allow nonpublic schools tosubmit information to the state for verification and to apply for reimbursement pursuant to this statuteand its implementing regulations.

The issue in this case distills to whether the statutory phrase "in the state" means that the schoolmust have facilities physically located in New York, or if the phrase includes schools that have only acorporate presence by means of being chartered by the Board of Regents and a corporate mailingaddress in this state. The phrase is ambiguous because those words could be interpreted in either ofthese ways. Regardless of whether the Department is entitled to any deference, we agree with itsinterpretation of the statute.

Petitioner argues that because some provisions of the Education Law mention a school building orfacility (see e.g. Education Law §§ 402 [1], [2]; 807-a [1], [5] [d]; 4407),the reference to a "school" in chapter 507 of the Laws of 1974 (as amended) must be intended to referto the school as a corporate entity rather than a physical one. Although this argument initially seemsappealing, it cannot prevail because other provisions of the Education Law use the word "school" incontexts that could refer to a physical building or location (see e.g. Education Law§§ 912, 3204 [1]). Further, Education Law § 4407 demonstrates thatthe Legislature knows how to be explicit when it intends to allow reimbursement for educationalservices provided beyond the borders of the state. The most logical and reasonable interpretation ofchapter 507 is that a nonpublic school must be physically located in New York to qualify for thestatutory reimbursements. As petitioner concedes that it applied for a BEDS code to allow it to applyfor reimbursement, the Department rationally decided that petitioner was ineligible for a BEDScode.

Finally, petitioner argues that the Department's determination was arbitrary and capricious becauseit is inconsistent with the Board of Regents' action in granting a charter stating that petitioner is locatedin New York. It is unclear why the provisional charters and the absolute charter granted to petitioner bythe Board of Regents state that petitioner is located in New York, even though some of the provisionalcharters state that petitioner is authorized to operate educational programs in Connecticut. In any event,the granting of a charter is for purposes of incorporation and recognizes an entity's ability to operate ortransact business in New York (see Education Law §§ 216, 216-a). Acharter does not automatically entitle an educational corporation to reimbursement from Departmentfunds, and petitioner admits that the lack of a charter does not necessarily render a school ineligible forreimbursement (see 8 NYCRR 176.3). The absolute charter granted by the Board of Regentsestablished the location of petitioner as an educational corporation for corporate purposes, but did notmake any determination regarding the physical location of the school to be operated by that corporation(see Kidd v 22-11 Realty, LLC, 142AD3d 488, 489 [2016] [county designated in certificate of incorporation is domestic corporation'sresidence for venue purposes, regardless of maintenance of a facility elsewhere]). Thus, the charters donot necessarily reflect a determination that is inconsistent with the Department's determination thatpetitioner is not a "school in the state" (L 1974, ch 507, § 2 [2], as amended). Inasmuchas the Department's determination is not arbitrary or capricious, we will not disturb it.

Lynch, J.P., Devine, Aarons and Pritzker, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed,without costs.


NYPTI Decisions © 2026 is a project of New York Prosecutors Training Institute (NYPTI) made possible by leveraging the work we've done providing online research and tools to prosecutors.

NYPTI would like to thank New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, New York State Senate's Open Legislation Project, New York State Unified Court System, New York State Law Reporting Bureau and Free Law Project for their invaluable assistance making this project possible.

Install the free RECAP extensions to help contribute to this archive. See https://free.law/recap/ for more information.