| People v Brown |
| 2019 NY Slip Op 01786 [170 AD3d 878] |
| March 13, 2019 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
[*1]
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Sherman E. Brown, Appellant. |
Michele Marte-Indzonka, Newburgh, NY, for appellant, and appellant pro se.
David M. Hoovler, District Attorney, Middletown, NY (Robert H. Middlemiss of counsel),for respondent.
Appeals by the defendant from two judgments of the County Court, Orange County (RobertH. Freehill, J.), both rendered January 3, 2017, convicting him of criminal possession of acontrolled substance in the fourth degree under indictment No. 15-748, and criminal possessionof a controlled substance in the fourth degree under indictment No. 15-685, upon his pleas ofguilty, and imposing sentences.
Ordered that the judgments are affirmed.
The defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to appeal (see People v Sanders, 25 NY3d337, 341 [2015]; People vLopez, 6 NY3d 248, 254 [2006]; People v Coachman, 154 AD3d 957, 957 [2017]).
The defendant's contention that his pleas were not knowing, voluntary, and intelligentsurvives his valid appeal waiver (seePeople v Fontanet, 126 AD3d 723 [2015]). However, the defendant's contention isunpreserved for appellate review, since he did not move to withdraw his pleas or otherwise raisethis issue before the County Court (seePeople v Ellis, 142 AD3d 509, 510 [2016]; People v Gomez, 114 AD3d 701, 701 [2014]). In any event, thiscontention is without merit. The defendant acknowledged, inter alia, that he understood the actshe was being charged with; he did not need additional time to discuss the elements of theoffenses or possible defenses with counsel; he was not under the influence of any alcohol ordrugs that would affect his ability to knowingly participate in the proceedings; he was satisfiedwith his legal representation; he understood the rights he was forfeiting by pleading guilty; noone forced, threatened, or coerced him to plead guilty against his will; and he was pleading guiltyvoluntarily.
By pleading guilty, the defendant forfeited any claims of ineffective assistance of counselthat did not directly involve the plea-negotiation process (see People v Fakhoury, 103 AD3d 664 [2013]; People v Opoku, 61 AD3d 705[2009]). Moreover, the defendant's valid waiver of his right to appeal precludes review of hisclaim of ineffective assistance of counsel, except to the extent that the alleged ineffectiveassistance of counsel may have affected the voluntariness of his pleas (see People v Weston, 145 AD3d746, 747 [2016]; People vOpoku, 61 AD3d 705 [2009]). To the extent that the defendant contends that theineffective assistance of counsel affected the voluntariness of his pleas, the record demonstratesthat the defendant received an advantageous plea, and nothing in the record casts doubt on theapparent effectiveness of counsel (seePeople v Soria, 99 AD3d 1027, 1028 [2012]; People v Yarborough, 83 AD3d 875, 875 [2011]). Furthermore, thedefendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is refuted by the record of the pleaproceeding, in which the defendant acknowledged that he had enough time to discuss the matterwith his attorney and was satisfied with his attorney's representation, that he had not been forcedinto pleading guilty, and that he was entering the plea freely and voluntarily (see People v Trimble, 137 AD3d1309 [2016]; People v Soria, 99 AD3d at 1028). Nothing that occurred during theplea allocution called into question the voluntariness of the defendant's plea (see People v Trimble, 137 AD3d1309 [2016]; People v Wright,95 AD3d 1046, 1047 [2012]).
Contrary to the defendant's contention, raised in his pro se supplemental brief, his challengeto the felony complaint is academic, since the felony complaint was superseded by an indictment(see People v Barnett, 108 AD3d638, 638 [2013]). The defendant's contentions, also raised in his pro se supplemental brief,that the evidence before the grand jury was legally insufficient and that the police lackedreasonable suspicion to support the stop of the vehicle driven by the defendant were forfeited byhis pleas of guilty (see People v Hansen, 95 NY2d 227, 233 [2000]; People vFernandez, 67 NY2d 686, 688 [1986]; People v Woods, 115 AD3d 997, 998 [2014]; People v Devodier, 102 AD3d884, 885 [2013]; People vAdams, 31 AD3d 1063 [2006]).
The defendant's remaining contentions, raised in his pro se supplemental brief, are withoutmerit. Dillon, J.P., Cohen, Duffy and Christopher, JJ., concur.